U.S. ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL SCHOOL

INSPECTOR GENERAL REFERENCE GUIDE

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Inspector General Reference Guide

Part 1

The History of the U.S. Army Inspector General

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Introduction

History of the U.S. Army Inspector General

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this section is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) with a brief historical overview of the U.S. Army Inspector General system.

2. **Historical Relevance:** The U.S. Army Inspector General (IG) system emerged and developed during a time of war -- the Revolutionary War in 1778. The Army IG system that enhanced the warfighting and readiness capabilities of the Continental Army in 1778 is still serving that same critical purpose in today's 21st Century Global War on Terror (GWOT) and other overseas contingency operations. The overall concept of the Army IG system has remained constant through more than two centuries of war and peace. The major changes have occurred in how we execute and apply the Army IG system to today's transforming and operationally oriented Army.

Today's Army IG -- like the Army IG of the past -- is an extension of the commander's eyes, ears, voice, and conscience. IGs serve their commanders; their commands; and the Soldiers, civilians, and Family members that comprise that command. For nearly 231 years, IGs have served their commanders and commands by teaching and training, inspecting, assisting, investigating, and sometimes auditing. Today, the four functions of Inspections, Assistance, Investigations, and Teaching and Training define our Army IG system. But these functions -- like the overall Army IG system -- emerged over the years principally during times of war. The rich history of the Army IG system has contributed to its effectiveness and philosophy today. A solid understanding of that history will allow today's IGs to understand their role in the context of the Army, the Army's readiness, and the Army's warfighting capability.

IGs who would like a more detailed study of the evolution of the Army IG system and its history from 1778 to 1939 should consult the two-volume history commissioned by The Inspector General in the 1980s. These two volumes, written by Joseph W. A. Whitehorne and David A. Clary, are available on The U.S. Army Inspector General School's Web site or in hard copy from the U.S. Government Printing Office.

3. **Historical Constants:** Over the last 231 years, the IG's contribution to combat and mission readiness has proved essential, invaluable, and constant. The consistent contributions that the IG system has made to the Army appear as four historical constants. Those four constants are as follows:

a. Commanders have often relied on the IG as the substitute for experience.

b. Commanders have used the IG to check and instill discipline, ethics, and standards.

c. IGs have enabled commanders to obtain rapid responses to their own higher level interests.

d. Commanders have assigned IGs unanticipated items necessary for the unit's successful mission accomplishment.

4. **A Note on Sources:** The principal sources for the information contained in this section are the two volumes on the history of the U.S. Army Inspectors General by Joseph W. A. Whitehorne and David A. Clary (see complete citations below). All other sources will appear in notes sections following the relevant chapters, to include any direct quotations from Whitehorne and Clary.

Clary, David A. and Joseph W. A. Whitehorne. *The Inspectors General of the United States Army 1777-1903*. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Inspector General and Center of Military History, United States Army, 1987.

Whitehorne, Joseph W. A. *The Inspectors General of the United States Army 1903-1939*. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Inspector General and Center of Military History, United States Army, 1998.

Chapter 1

The Birth of the U.S. Army Inspector General System

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this chapter is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) with an historical overview of the emergence of the U.S. Army Inspector General system during the Revolutionary War from 1775 to 1783.

2. **The Need for an Inspector General:** The Continental Army, when formed in 1775, represented a disorganized array of militia from different states with little uniformity in organization, procedure, drill, appearance, or equipment. The Continental Army's leaders could not compare to the experienced, solid officer leadership of the British Army. General Washington, the Army's newly designated Commander-in-Chief, was clearly dissatisfied with the training and readiness of his diversified and inexperienced forces.

By the time of the American Revolution, the appointment of inspectors, at least in functional areas such as logistics, had become routine in European armies. The tactics of the day -- volley fire and massed bayonet charges -- required stern discipline and extensive drill and training. Commanders needed a way to assess the readiness of their units.

On 29 October 1777, General Washington, recognizing that the future of the Army and the Nation was in peril, convened a council of 14 general officers. This council decided, among other things, that an Inspector General for the Army was necessary. This Inspector General would superintend the training of the entire Army to ensure troop proficiency in common tactics. Moreover, the Inspector General would be the commander's agent to ensure tactical efficiency in the Army by focusing on the greatest and most pressing need of the troops -- tactical competence. The duties envisioned by the council were those of a "drillmaster general" or a "muster master general."

At the same time, the Continental Congress recognized the need for an Inspector General who would provide that governing body with information concerning military affairs. Quality training was expensive and required significant public investment. Therefore, Congress wanted an agent within the Army who would oversee and account for military investments. Congress also wanted assurances that the Army -- and all of the armed forces -- would remain subordinate to Congress's authority.

This parallel requirement for an Inspector General at both General Washington's and Congress's levels created tension between the military and civilian authorities. However, General Washington's preference for an Inspector General who answered only to him finally prevailed, and subsequent Inspectors General received orders to report only to the Commander-in-Chief.

Two of the first officers recruited (by both Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane) to be Inspectors General were Augustin Montin de la Balme, a pompous troublemaker who resigned in protest, and another troublemaker, MG Philippe Charles Jean Baptiste Tronson du Coudray, an artillery officer whose focus was on the production of arms and ordnance. Du Coudray, like his predecessor de la Balme, did not last long. The bad

experiences that Washington suffered with these two would-be Inspectors General clearly solidified in his mind the type and nature of the Inspector General the Continental Army needed.

On 13 December 1777, Congress created within the Army the Office of the Inspector General. The Congressional resolution authorized two Inspector General positions. These Inspectors General would be responsible to review the troops, ensure that officers and Soldiers received instruction in exercise maneuvers established by the Board of War, ensure that discipline was strictly observed, and ensure that officers commanded properly and treated their Soldiers with justice.

The first Inspector General officially appointed by Congress was MG Thomas Conway, an Irish Soldier of fortune who had been a member of Washington's council of 14 generals. Unfortunately for him, Conway had self-serving and political motives. He was quickly marginalized due to his ineffectiveness and his inability to work with his fellow general officers -- most notably General Washington.

The next Inspector General who arrived on the scene thanks to Franklin's and Deane's recruiting efforts became the model for all Inspectors General and certainly the first effective Inspector General -- Friedrich Wilhelm Augustin *Freiherr* (Baron) von Steuben. Von Steuben was a retired Prussian captain who spent a significant amount of his time on the general staff of Frederick the Great. Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane recruited him in Paris in 1777, and Franklin immediately recognized the quality of the man. But Franklin was concerned that Congress might not offer a retired captain a position of such responsibility, so he 'doctored' von Steuben's letter of introduction to Congress and made the Baron a former lieutenant general, a grade that Franklin knew would be acceptable to the members of the Continental Congress.

Washington, clearly skeptical due to past problems with Conway and others, accepted von Steuben as the Army's Inspector General on a temporary basis. Von Steuben reported for duty at Valley Forge in February 1778. Although he spoke no English, he used French to communicate with the troops through a translator. He immediately set to work and impressed everyone with his tireless efforts to improve the Continental Army's training, drill, discipline, and organization.

Within a month, von Steuben had trained several of Washington's best Soldiers, who in turn trained and drilled other Soldiers. Von Steuben also began writing down drill practices and standardized approaches to tactics -- the beginning of the Army's first real doctrine and standards.

A clearly impressed General Washington sang von Steuben's praises and, in May 1778, Congress officially appointed the Prussian officer as the Inspector General with the rank and pay of major general. Congress also appointed two ranks of Inspectors General subordinate to von Steuben, thus creating the first Inspector General organization (see Appendix A for a detailed discussion on the development of von Steuben's role).

The duties Congress outlined for the Inspector General included 'reporting all abuses, neglect, and deficiencies to the Commander-in-Chief.' Many of the Continental Army's regimental colonels bitterly resented von Steuben's efforts and saw the Baron as a threat. But von Steuben's character, tact, and innate military experience overcame this

resistance and set the precedent for the conduct of all future Inspectors General. What von Steuben had established for the Army was a model approach -- a principle -- behind how all Inspectors General performed their duties. That approach, known today as the von Steuben model, required Inspectors General to assist their commanders in enhancing the **Readiness and Warfighting Capabilities** of the Army. In effect, von Steuben not only served as the Army's first effective Inspector General but as the father of the Army's Inspector General system.



Major General Friedrich Wilhelm Augustin *Freiherr* (Baron) von Steuben

3. **Further Reading:** For further reading about MG von Steuben's life and contributions to the American Revolution, consult the following books:

Lockhart, Paul. *The Drillmaster of Valley Forge: The Baron De Steuben and the Making of the American Army*. New York: Harper Collins, 2008.

Palmer, John McAuley. *General von Steuben*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937.

Chapter 2

The Inspector General System in the Late 18th and 19th Centuries

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this chapter is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) with an historical overview of the U.S. Army Inspector General system following the Revolutionary War and throughout the 18th and 19th Centuries.

2. **A Turbulent Time for Inspectors General:** During the late 18th and early 19th Centuries, the number of Inspectors General and their relative influence in the Army rose and fell -- sometimes dramatically. Army strength fluctuations, changing personalities among the senior leadership, and differing philosophical approaches by Army policy makers of the era caused these problems.

In 1790, the prestige of the Inspector General -- as established by MG von Steuben -- led that position to become the second in command of the Army. But changing viewpoints among senior leaders following von Steuben's tenure eventually resulted in a more diminished standing for the Inspector General. For a brief period after 1800, the Inspector General's responsibilities fell to the Department of the Adjutant General. In several instances, the position had been abolished altogether and then re-established.

The Inspector General finally became a department -- The Inspector General's Department -- on 3 March 1813. But 65 years would pass before the department became a formal part of the Army's organization in 1878. The same act that established the Inspector General department also formally codified the position of Inspector General and provided for eight subordinate Inspectors General and many assistant Inspectors General. The real problem with these Inspectors General and their activities throughout most of the 19th Century was that they lacked a uniform doctrine and a clearly defined role.

The role of Inspectors General during the Civil War from 1861 to 1865 was spotty at best. The rapid mobilization of the Union Army in 1861 brought with it a flurry of Congressional legislation, to include the appointment of five Inspectors General in the grade of majors of cavalry. These Inspectors General were clearly 'inspectors without portfolio' and lacked a clear mission and purpose. In fact, they were likely appointed more for their potential to be promoted to colonel than any other reason.

A formal Army inspectorate did not exist early in the Civil War, and the loose band of appointed Inspectors General operating throughout the Army lacked clearly defined purposes and roles. However, the duties of Inspectors General began to increase as the war progressed. In 1863, as an example, Inspectors General were detailed to supervise the organization of Federal and State volunteer regiments consisting entirely of black men.

By the summer of 1863, the Inspector General system began to take on greater shape and direction. The staffs of all corps had an Inspector General, and beneath them acting Inspectors General reviewed most divisions and brigades. The assistant

Inspectors General assigned to corps and field armies were actually the permanent War Department representatives of the Inspector General Department.

Yet the lack of common doctrine still nagged the system. Some assistant Inspectors General would not follow instructions. All the War Department wanted to know from its Inspectors General each month was their location, activities during the month, and any changes of place of assignment.

Despite the numerous problems with the Inspector General system, some Inspectors General served their commanders and their commands quite well. Quartermaster General Montgomery C. Meigs had six Inspectors General by 1864 -- all in the grade of colonel -- reporting directly to him. These colonels visited depots, armies, and military posts to inspect quartermaster officers and their duties and to detect abuses. Meigs used their reports as important sources of information when making critical decisions.

After the Civil War, commanders began relying on their Inspectors General to a greater degree -- especially since the War Department published an order that clearly defined the duties of an Inspector General. In 1876, the Secretary of War directed the Inspector General of the Army to report to the General of the Army on all subjects pertaining to military control and discipline and that all field Inspectors General were to report directly to their Commanding Generals. This directive placed Inspectors General under the commander's control for all matters. No one could view the Inspector General as a 'spy' from higher headquarters any longer thanks to this directive. This same relationship between commanders and their Inspectors General exists today.

Chapter 3

Inspectors General in the First Half of the 20th Century

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this chapter is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) with an historical overview of the U.S. Army Inspector General system from the Spanish-American War in 1898 through World War II.

2. **Serving a Deployed Army:** The Spanish-American War of 1898 deployed the Army for the first time outside the geographical borders of the United States. Troops occupied islands in the Caribbean and were trying to suppress a growing rebellion in the Philippine islands.

The new challenge for all Inspectors General was to inspect an Army scattered across the globe. By 1900, Inspectors General inspected all regiments deploying to the Philippine Insurrection. Later, Inspectors General established an inspectorate directly in the islands.

3. **Relevance During a World War:** The beginning of World War I in 1914 would eventually involve -- by 1917 -- all Army Inspectors General in inspections aimed directly at the readiness of troops deploying from the United States to an overseas theater of operations, to include those units already there. General John J. Pershing's strong relationship with his Inspector General, MG Andre W. Brewster, during World War I clearly boosted the effectiveness of Inspectors General during America's participation in the war from 1917 to 1918.

Pershing, as commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force (AEF) in France in 1917, relied heavily upon Brewster's counsel, advice, and discretion when making training, readiness, and officer assignment decisions. Although Pershing recognized Brewster's inherent potential to command a division in the field, the AEF commander plainly realized that "the services of . . . Brewster cannot be spared." [1] Pershing's memoirs contain praise of Brewster that suggests not only Pershing's esteem for his Inspector General but also the close relationship the two men shared throughout the war. Pershing wrote that Brewster "possesses the personal and military qualifications that make him of exceptional value, especially in determining the efficiency and fitness of officers for command." [2]

The confidence that Brewster enjoyed with Pershing meant that he could now grapple with the overarching problems of unit and Soldier readiness with a strong degree of credibility. Brewster struggled to organize his burgeoning and inexperienced AEF Inspector General Department while still remaining focused on the essential role that he and his subordinate Inspectors General played in enhancing the AEF's combat readiness.

But constant personnel turnover plagued Brewster's AEF Inspector General Department. As officer casualty rosters grew, Pershing felt compelled to strip away all Regular Army officers from staff positions and send them to command units in the field. Soon, Brewster's department comprised mostly inexperienced reserve officers who struggled to learn and understand the things that Brewster charged them with inspecting.

In spite of these problems, MG Brewster, with Pershing's full support and confidence, shaped the AEF Inspector General Department into an agency that enhanced markedly the readiness of all American units within the theater of operations. AEF Inspectors General -- at all levels down to corps and division -- tirelessly inspected the readiness of newly arrived units at the ports, the quality of unit march discipline, the effects of strength and equipment shortages, issues of discipline, and even special items of concern to General Pershing such as a sudden rash of venereal disease cases among the enlisted ranks.

When World War I ended on 11 November 1918, Major General Brewster had shaped and matured the AEF Inspector General Department into a true inspecting and teaching force that helped commanders at all levels identify and correct problems that threatened their units' combat readiness. In General Pershing's preliminary report to the Secretary of War submitted mere days after hostilities ended, the Commander-in-Chief lauded his Inspectors General as follows: "The Inspector General's Department has risen to the highest standards, and throughout has ably assisted commanders in the enforcement of discipline." [3] Pershing clearly wanted the positive role his Inspectors General played in the final victory to become a matter of historical record.

4. **World War II and Emerging Inspector General Functions:** America's entry into World War II in December 1941 sparked the expansion of the Inspector General's Department to meet the needs of a now rapidly expanding Army. The strength of the department jumped from 60 officers in 1939 to 1,438 officers in early 1945. Each combat division now boasted a full Inspector General Section staffed specifically to conduct the same type of readiness inspections that the AEF Inspector General Department conducted under General Pershing's command in World War I. Unlike the one-man, division-level Inspector General sections of World War I, the table of organization for an infantry division in World War II (T/O&E 7 dated 15 July 1943) afforded each division one lieutenant colonel as the principal Inspector General, a captain as the assistant Inspector General, a warrant officer as chief auditor, a master sergeant as chief clerk, and two technicians as stenographers. [4]

Inspections still served as the primary function of Inspectors General at all levels during World War II. General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff in Washington, D.C., charged his Inspector General, MG Virgil L. Peterson, to look into mobilization and training issues and report ways to fix any identified problems. In one instance, Peterson inspected -- and then reported on -- the effectiveness of the Second and Third Armies' massive, 350,000-man maneuvers in Louisiana in September 1941. MG Peterson's report to Marshall gave the Army Chief of Staff the confidence that the Army was on the right track in training its troops for combat. In the report, MG Peterson stated that: "[Lieutenant] General McNair [Chief of Staff and Director of General Headquarters, or GHQ] and his headquarters have accomplished, and are continuing to accomplish, an outstanding job in the supervision of training of the Army." [5]

Although readiness and training inspections served as the mainstay of the Inspector General's charter, more and more incidents that demanded investigations surfaced during mobilization and, later, in combat. General Marshall entrusted Peterson to look into -- fairly and impartially -- some highly sensitive, and sometimes racially charged, incidents. Peterson's deputy, BG Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., the Army's only black general officer, carried the mantle of investigating several of the racially charged

incidents. Marshall knew Davis to be a hard but fair fact-finder -- even when looking into allegations of black-Soldier misconduct in units like the all-black 364th Infantry Regiment. Other sensitive allegations that the Inspector General Department handled concerned the ill treatment of Soldiers and trainees, poor living conditions for the troops, and so on. Some of these issues on the surface seemed like systemic problems best handled by an inspection; however, the investigative approach often led to the reprimand or relief of a commander.

Investigations continued to become a primary Inspector General function even in the combat theaters of operation. Towards the end of the war in Europe in April 1945, LTG Alexander M. Patch, commander of the Seventh Army, was faced with a highly sensitive issue that began receiving some negative press. Seventh Army Soldiers from the 42nd and 45th Infantry Divisions who had converged on -- and then seized -- the Dachau Concentration Camp north of Munich on 29 April were alleged to have killed several unarmed SS camp guards. [6] The men, in an apparent fit of rage over the utter depravity and horror they witnessed in the camp, supposedly lined up and then shot several unarmed SS guards.

Patch recognized the potential seriousness of such an allegation and the public relations disaster that would surely ensue. Therefore, he entrusted his army's Inspector General Section to investigate the allegations formally on 2 May 1945. [7] Although no record is available as to the true nature of Patch's relationship with his principal Inspector General, COL Leerer, Patch's faith in the assistant Inspector General, LTC Joseph Whitaker, appeared quite strong since Whitaker became the lead -- and sole -- investigator for the incident. Whitaker spent the next several weeks taking sworn, recorded testimony from the subjects and suspects involved in the incident. Staying true to his role as a fair and impartial fact-finder, Whitaker presented his final Report of Investigation (now labeled "Secret") to the Seventh Army's Judge Advocate General without recommending any adverse action. He simply stated the facts as he found them. The Judge Advocate General translated Whitaker's findings into charges against four of the suspects. Ultimately, no action was taken against the four men for a variety of reasons. [8] However, Patch's faith in his Inspector General Section appeared justified since LTC Whitaker handled the investigation professionally and thoroughly.

As the U.S. Army demobilized rapidly from nine million troops to a few hundred thousand immediately following World War II, Inspectors General found themselves involved in solving individual problems for scores and scores of soon-to-be-discharged Soldiers. Soldiers complained about a variety of things such as pay and perceived injustices by their chains of command. The principal complaint was that the Army was not releasing Soldiers from the service fast enough -- especially since the war in both the European and Pacific theaters was over. [9] Resultantly, the Inspector General assistance function emerged from this demobilization process and still stands today as one of the four principal Inspector General functions.

Notes

1. Quoted in Joseph W. A. Whitehorne. *The Inspectors General of the United States Army 1903-1939* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Inspector General and Center of Military History, United States Army, 1998), page 158.
2. Quoted in Whitehorne, page 158.

3. Quoted in the *Handbook for Inspectors General* (Washington 25, D.C.: War Department, Office of the Inspector General, June 1947), page 2.
4. Yves J. Bellanger. *U.S. Army Infantry Divisions 1943-45: Volume 1 - Organization, Doctrine and Equipment* (West Midlands, England: Helion and Company, 2002), page 8.
5. Quoted in Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley. *The Army Ground Forces: The Organization of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1947), page 45.
6. John Frayn Turner, and Robert Jackson. *Destination Berchtesgaden: Saga of the US 7th Army* (New York: Charles Scriber's son, 1975), page 173.
7. Letter from Chief of Staff, Seventh Army, to Inspector General, Seventh Army, dated 2 May 1945.
8. Flint Whitlock. "Liberating Dachau." *World War II Magazine*, Volume 14, Number 7, March 2000, page 76. Copies of the sworn, recorded testimony from Lieutenant Colonel Whitaker's report are available on the Boston Globe's Web Site at www.boston.com/globe/nation/packages/secret_/index5_transcript_2.shtml.
9. Personal letters of Staff Sergeant William J. McMurdie, Company A, 394th Infantry, 99th Infantry Division, from May to December 1945. Staff Sergeant McMurdie closely monitored the Army's point-release system during his occupation time in Germany immediately following the war. He commented profusely in his letters home about the point system's problems and the general feelings of his fellow Soldiers.

Chapter 4

Standardization throughout the 1950s and 1960s

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this chapter is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) with an historical overview of the U.S. Army Inspector General system during the period from 1950 to 1961.

2. **Statutory Basis for the Inspector General System:** The 1950 Army Reorganization Act -- enacted the same year the Korean War began -- created the statutory basis for the current Army Inspector General system. This act replaced the Inspector General Department with the Office of The Inspector General (OTIG). The statute further defined The Inspector General (TIG) as directly subordinate to the Army Chief of Staff (CSA) and responsive to the Secretary of the Army.

The reorganization act charged TIG with inquiring into -- and reporting upon -- the discipline, efficiency, and economy of the Army. Specifically, Inspectors General were to focus their efforts on training and combat readiness -- the latter a key tenet of the von Steuben model.

Despite this reorganization, the Inspector General system functioned throughout the three-year Korean War from 1950 to 1953 in much the same way as it performed during World War II. Inspections were the Inspector General system's mainstay -- especially with regard to measuring unit readiness for those combat units deploying to Korea.

3. **The Emergence of Trained Inspectors General:** In 1952, OTIG developed and implemented an orientation course for officers selected to serve as Inspectors General. Prior to 1952, no formal provision existed requiring Inspectors General to receive formal instruction on Inspector General duties -- even though the old Inspector General Department had developed and distributed instructional material to each Inspector General in the form of inspection and investigation guides, handbooks, and other procedural material. The most noteworthy of these early attempts at standardized procedures was the June 1947 Handbook for Inspectors General (see Appendix B). At 23 pages in length, the handbook addressed the three main functions -- Inspections, Complaints (later to become Assistance), and Investigations -- in a broad, cursory manner.[1] This handbook also introduced the requirement for Annual General Inspections (AGIs) and defined the purposes of the AGI "to observe, report upon, and promote the efficiency and economy of the command and other activities inspected." [2]

4. **The Classification of Inspector General Records:** A legal case in 1953 resulted in the classification of Inspector General records as restricted in both access and use. Inspector General Inspection Reports and Reports of Investigation were declared 'privileged' as a matter of law. Inspector General records could not be used as evidence in judicial proceedings except as specifically authorized by the authority ordering the investigation or a higher authority.

5. **Inspector General Qualification Standards:** The Army formally codified qualification standards for Inspectors General in the first edition of Army Regulation 20-1, Inspector General Activities and Procedures, dated 29 January 1957. In addition, Army Regulation 614-100 echoed these standards and stated that only the highest caliber of Army officers be detailed as Inspectors General. Those individuals should meet the following minimum qualifications:

a. The person must be mature with broad military experience.

b. The person must not have previously completed a three-year tour as an Inspector General.

c. The person must exhibit moral and personal traits necessary for a position of dignity and prestige.

6. **Formalizing Inspector General Training:** The mission to conduct the orientation course for all officers assigned as Inspectors General transferred from the OTIG Inspections Division to a newly established Field Service Division on 5 November 1956. The course became a more formal three-week enterprise and was originally targeted to officers with stateside assignments. The course provided formal instruction in Inspections, Investigations, and Procurement Matters.

In 1958, the frequency of the course increased from four to six times a year. Attendance expanded to include civilians and non-commissioned officers assigned to assist Inspectors General. A two-week orientation course also began in some overseas areas.

7. **The Technical Inspections Mission:** In May 1956, the Secretary of the Army directed the Department of the Army to assume responsibility for technical proficiency inspections (TPIs) of Army atomic organizations worldwide. General Order Number 40, dated 24 August 1956, placed these TPIs under the jurisdiction of The Inspector General. The 2 May 1960 edition of Army Regulation 20-1 provided for the first time specific policy governing Inspector General TPIs.

8. **The Assistance Function:** Inspector General Technical Bulletin Number Four, published in 1960, standardized the approved methods and procedures for Inspectors General to receive and process Inspector General Action Requests (IGARs). These procedures formalized the Assistance function and made it into one of the top three functions conducted by the Inspector General.

9. **Training America's Allies as Inspectors General:** The Inspector General shared the U.S. Army's Inspector General philosophy with members of allied nations beginning in 1961. In that year, OTIG presented its standard course of instruction to groups composed entirely of international officers. The first groups to receive this training were Army officers from the Republic of Korea in Seoul, South Korea, and Nationalist Chinese Army officers in Taipei, Formosa. The school today continues to host foreign officers and civilians from allied nations around the globe.

10. **The Army Inspector General System from the Early 1960s and into the 1970s:** The formally defined modern Army Inspector General system that emerged in the 1950s and early 1960s was the system that served the rapidly mobilized draft Army that

deployed to fight in Vietnam throughout the 1960s until 1972. The three primary functions of Inspections, Assistance, and Investigations became the Inspector General system's way of enhancing the warfighting and readiness capabilities (the von Steuben model) of all deploying units and those serving in the Vietnam theater of operations. Among the things Inspectors General investigated during the Vietnam War were supply and equipment management, fraud in procurement and contracting, and racial issues. Inspectors General also processed complaints of leadership deterioration and allegations of offenses against civilians. But the Annual General Inspections (AGIs) conducted by Inspectors General for the readiness of all units became the bulwark of the Inspector General system.

Even before the Vietnam War began in earnest, The Inspector General was already looking into readiness issues for other events such as the Berlin crisis in 1962. An OTIG investigation during that crisis looked into allegations of inefficiencies during the activation of Army Reserve and National Guard units. Readiness continued to be the Inspector General's focus well into the 1970s -- a decade that many call the high-water mark of our Nation's Cold War with the Soviet Union.

Notes

1. *Handbook for Inspectors General*. Washington 25, D.C.: War Department, Office of the Inspector General, June 1947.
2. *Handbook for Inspectors General*, page 9.

Chapter 5

A Changing Philosophy in the Late 20th Century

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this chapter is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) with an historical overview of the U.S. Army Inspector General system during the period between 1977 through 2000.

2. **An Inspector General with a New Philosophy:** In 1977, LTG Richard G. Trefry became The Inspector General, a post he would hold until his retirement in 1983. With LTG Trefry came a significant change in philosophy and a paradigm shift for the Inspector General system -- principally with regard to the function of Inspections.

As an artillery officer who boasted an understanding of how the Army functioned that was without peer, Trefry quickly recognized that the Annual General Inspections (AGIs) conducted by Inspectors General throughout the Vietnam War period to measure individual unit readiness was not working. In fact, AGIs were having an adverse effect on readiness.

The AGIs conducted in the late 1970s and early 1980s were best characterized by a group of clipboard-bearing Inspectors General arriving by bus in front of some battalion's headquarters, offloading, rapidly conducting compliance-oriented inspections on the battalion's functional areas, providing a terse out-briefing, and then reloading the bus and driving off. These compliance inspections -- a type of one-size-fits-all approach -- proved intimidating and eliminated commanders from the process of making informed readiness decisions about their own units. Commanders felt victimized by the AGI process and often were relieved because their units did not 'measure up' to the Inspector General template. Likewise, the Inspector General system's credibility had reached an all-time low due to these "black-hat-style" inspections, and no one trusted an Inspector General enough to ask for assistance. The Assistance function back then did not generate the caseload that Inspectors General see today.

LTG Trefry quickly re-vamped the philosophy behind Inspector General inspections. He pushed compliance-oriented inspections back to where they belonged -- to commanders. Commanders could now inspect their own units using their own staffs and make their own readiness judgments. This commander-led inspection program eventually evolved in 1986 to the Organizational Inspection Program (OIP).

Trefry then changed the inspections paradigm. He re-oriented all Inspectors General on inspections that concentrated on the problems that commanders in the field could not solve -- systemic problems. These topics suggested a pattern of non-compliance throughout the command and meant that some functional area -- such as logistics or personnel -- was not operating as it should. As someone who understood how the Army operated through these functional areas, Trefry expanded the Inspector General School from three weeks to six weeks; the additional three-week Program of Instruction taught Inspectors General how the Army functioned and managed the force. Inspectors General soon began conducting special Inspector General Inspections of systemic issues that sought causes rather than symptoms, examined existing policy for errors or omissions, and traced unit-level problems to Army-level problems. A new

Inspector General Inspections Process began to emerge that also emphasized the key principle of follow-up to ensure that those things that Inspectors General found were fixed in a timely manner. This significant paradigm shift in the Inspector General system's approach and philosophy quickly began to mature and blossom throughout the mid to late 1980s.

2. **The Inspector General Oath:** LTG Trefry further recognized the important relationship that each Inspector General shared with his or her commander. In an effort to emphasize further that special relationship, Trefry created the Inspector General oath in 1981, an oath which the commander administered to all categories of Inspectors General within the command. Trefry even developed oaths for Acting Inspectors General and Temporary Assistant Inspectors General.

3. **The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986:** The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act amended the Inspector General portion of the 1950 Army Reorganization Act by making The Inspector General responsible to the Secretary of the Army and responsive to the CSA. TIG's other responsibilities remained the same, and the Inspector General Agency's office symbol changed from DAIG to SAIG. However, we still use DAIG today as the acronym to describe both the combined OTIG and the Inspector General Agency -- even though the acronym is technically not correct. DAIG is no longer a part of the Army Staff but instead part of the Secretary of the Army's staff (the Secretariat).

4. **Automating the Inspector General System:** In the late 1980s, the Inspector General system crossed into the realm of automation with the advent of a common Inspector General network and database. This automated system allowed Inspectors General to assimilate more effectively all available Inspector General information as well as audit reports written by outside agencies. The first effort was called the Inspector General Management Resource System (IGMIRS). The Inspector General World-Wide Network (IGNET) later replaced IGMIRS.

5. **Emerging Doctrine:** With Inspector General policy firmly in place in the form of Army Regulation 20-1, more substantive doctrinal guides began to emerge from The Inspector General School (more colloquially called TIGU at the time for 'The Inspector General University'). These doctrinal guides existed in the form of Technical Bulletins. The first of these bulletins was TB IG 4, Inspector General Investigation and Action Request Guide (dated August 1986), which loosely provided an outline for what Inspectors General know today as the Inspector General Action Process (IGAP).[1] The bulk of this 100-page guide contained letter formats and interview guides for sworn, recorded testimony.

TB IG 1, Inspector General Inspection Guide (dated November 1986), soon followed. This guide was a thin, 45-page pamphlet that introduced the Root Cause Analysis Model and a rudimentary Inspector General Inspections Process consisting of a Pre-Inspection Phase, an Inspection Phase, and a Post-Inspection Phase. Each phase had four sub-steps. [2]

6. **An Increase in Operational Tempo:** As the 20th Century drew to a close and the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the operational tempo of the Army increased greatly. Likewise, the demands on the Inspector General system increased markedly.

The increase in operational tempo really began on 20 December 1989 when the United States invaded Panama and toppled General Manuel Noriega's corrupt, militaristic regime. Operation Just Cause lasted a mere 40 days and ended on 31 January 1990, but many units remained deployed in the country well into April hunting down remaining Panamanian forces that had not surrendered.

The rapid nature of Operation Just Cause did not allow Inspectors General to prepare in advance for such a large deployment of forces into combat. Inspectors General primarily assisted in facilitating communications between deployed Soldiers and their Family members. For the most part, Inspectors General served as the eyes and ears of their commanders by observing base housing security in Panama, utilization of volunteers, personnel security at Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) and commissary facilities throughout the country, and command information programs.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait several months later in August 1990, the build-up of forces in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Middle East (Operation Desert Shield) allowed Inspectors General to become more proactive. The Inspections function proved critical as Inspectors General conducted inspections on a variety of critical topics such as Family support organizations, the mobilization process, and the Army postal system. Inspectors General also monitored closely the issuing of chemical protective over-garments and assisted hundreds of Soldiers and Family members to resolve a myriad of wide-ranging issues.

Since Inspectors General now deployed forward into the theater of operations, a reach-back capability became critical. Forward-deployed Inspectors General needed help from stay-behind Inspector General offices to solve Soldier problems and issues that surfaced in the theater of operations. This critical technical-channel link back to the U.S. became the center of gravity for Inspector General operations.

To illustrate the importance of the Inspector General system during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Inspector General function of Assistance became critical for the VII Corps Inspector General's Office and a linchpin to morale and Soldier readiness for the corps commander, LTG Frederick M. Franks, Jr. Franks's close relationship with his Inspector General, COL Roosevelt Speed, became key to gauging not just the morale and preparedness of his Soldiers in the theater of operations but also of the Families that remained in Germany.

Franks recognized early in the deployment that the morale and readiness of his Soldiers in the field would be directly proportional to the morale and welfare of the Families they were leaving behind in Germany. After soliciting Speed's advice, Franks decided to split his Inspector General Office into a forward section that serviced the troops in the field and a rear section that responded to the needs and concerns of the Family members back in Germany. Inspections and Investigations still remained critical VII Corps Inspector General functions, but Assistance became the predominant function.

Speed's direct access to Franks greatly facilitated the Inspector General's responsiveness to a variety of issues. When the forward Inspector General section received numerous individual assistance complaints about mail, Speed discussed this emerging trend with the corps commander, who directed that an inspection occur immediately to solve this systemic issue.

Back on the home front, the corps's rear Inspector General section, headed by MAJ Kurt Langenwalter, attended numerous town hall meetings and assisted Soldiers' Families with problems of indebtedness, mail, and other issues. Franks's primary concern was that the corps' Family support systems stay intact now that the units had deployed forward. Franks entrusted Langenwalter, and the rear Inspectors General from all of the corps' divisions, with this mission. Franks believed that if all was well on the home front, his VII Corps Soldiers could focus on the task at hand: expelling the Iraqi army from Kuwait. [3]

Other operations soon followed throughout the 1990s that allowed the Army Inspector General system to refine its functions and further mature the paradigm shift in philosophy begun by LTG Trefry in the early 1980s. Operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo saw a marked increase in forward-deployed Inspectors General directly supporting their commanders and units in the operational theaters. Inspectors General, as a rule, no longer supported from the rear -- another paradigm shift that began with Operation Just Cause in Panama.

Notes

1. TB IG 4, Technical Bulletin: Inspector General Investigation and Action Request Guide. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 28 August 1986.
2. TB IG 1, Technical Bulletin: Inspector General Inspection Guide. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 24 November 1986.
3. Interview with LTC (Retired) Kurt Langenwalter, former Inspector General with VII Corps during Operation Desert Storm, on 6 December 2002. LTG Franks eventually appointed MG Bean as the corps rear commander in Germany, and MAJ Langenwalter's rear Inspector General section often responded directly to him. Langenwalter's rear Inspector General section also conducted inspections of the rear detachments to ensure that Families were receiving the support they needed.

Chapter 6

The 21st Century and the Global War on Terror

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this chapter is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) with an historical overview of the U.S. Army Inspector General system from 2000 to the present.

2. **A Fully Matured Inspector General System:** The dawn of the new millennium brought a fully developed Army Inspector General system into the 21st Century. After more than 222 years of growth and enhancement, the Inspector General system entered the 21st Century as a mature, fully adaptable system of four primary functions -- Inspections, Assistance, Investigations, and Teaching and Training -- executed through two well-defined and time-tested processes -- the Inspector General Action Process (IGAP) and the Inspector General Inspections Process. Doctrine had matured from brief bulletins into comprehensive guides that offered detailed techniques and approaches to executing the Inspector General Inspections Process and the Inspector General Action Process.

3. **The Global War on Terror:** With the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, the nature of warfare changed dramatically for the Army. The need for a massive Cold War military machine shifted to the need for smaller, rapidly deployable brigades and special operations units that could travel quickly to any theater of operations and engage any terrorist or other elements that threatened the United States and her allies. The Army quickly engaged in a revolutionary transformation effort that saw the creation of more rapidly deployable brigades (Units of Action) while at the same time fighting the Global War on Terror.

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq punctuated the nature of the Global War on Terror and the demands the war placed on the Army and all services. The Inspector General system quickly adapted to meet the rapid requirements of this transforming Army that was also simultaneously combating enemy forces overseas. Doctrine emerged at The U.S. Army Inspector General School (TIGS) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, in 2003 for the conduct of compressed Inspector General Inspections that provided forward-deployed Inspectors General with guidance on how to adapt the three-phased, 17-step Inspections Process to short-fused inspection requirements that were critical to immediate mission readiness. Policy and doctrine quickly began to incorporate new ideas, approaches, and techniques learned on the battlefield into the Army Inspector General system, a process that continues today at TIGS with the constant updating of the doctrinal guides and the revision of Army Regulation 20-1.

4. **Reorganizing the Schoolhouse:** The U.S. Army Inspector General School physically reorganized in the summer of 2003 to meet the rapidly changing demands of a transforming Army and the Global War on Terror. The faculty reorganized with a Dean of Academics overseeing the faculty and generating the school's very first Academic Program. This Academic Program incorporated the Training and Doctrine Command's Systems Approach to Training Process to ensure that a constant cycle of feedback,

analysis, and revision occurred in the school's curriculum and in Army Inspector General policy and doctrine. That cycle of constant refinement and improvement continues today.

In addition, the Commandant formed agreements with the National Guard Bureau and the U.S. Army Reserve Command for the assignment of an Army National Guard officer and a U.S. Army Reserve officer to serve as instructors. The three primary instructors soon reflected the multi-component Army with an active-duty officer teaching Inspections, a Reserve officer teaching Assistance, and a National Guard officer teaching Investigations.

5. **Greater Civilian Presence in the Army Inspector General System:** In 2004, Department of the Army civilian positions became more predominant within the Army Inspector General system. Although civilians had served as Inspectors General for many years, a military-to-civilian conversion plan at both DAIG and through the Army's various Inspector General offices saw the creation of many senior-level Inspector General positions (such as Deputy Inspectors General) becoming 'civilianized'. This effort sought to create a greater level of continuity within the system and to ensure that the Inspector General corps, as a non-branch entity within the Army, did not suffer from its own normal turnover. At the DAIG level, leadership and supervisory positions such as the Chief, Operations Division; Chief, Information Resource Management Division; Chief, Technical Inspections Division; and Dean of Academics / Deputy Commandant at The Inspector General School became civilian GS-15 positions.

6. **The Trends Analysis Cell:** In 2004, The Inspector General, LTG Paul T. Mikolashek, reestablished a Trends Analysis cell as part of DAIG's Inspections Division. This cell hearkened back to the Plans and Analysis Cell first established by LTG Trefry back in 1978. This early cell focused primarily on follow-up but stood down in 1995 when DAIG transferred the larger Army follow-up mission to the Army Audit Agency along with five spaces. But instead of focusing on Army-wide follow-up activities for all Army-wide inspections, evaluations, and audits, this two-person cell, according to The Inspector General, would identify emerging trends throughout the Army using the IGARS database, recommend Army-level inspection topics, and provide follow-up but only for DAIG-level inspection recommendations. But with the adoption of Lean Six Sigma (LSS) as an Army-wide approach to increasing the efficiency of Army processes, the cell soon became the natural proponent for LSS training and projects. When both members retired in 2008, the cell stood down.

7. **A New Inspections Mission:** In early 2006, the Army Chief of Staff charged The Inspector General, LTG Stanley E. Green, with providing another layer of oversight for the Army's information operations. The result was a sixth operational division in DAIG named the Information Assurance Division. The first division chief, COL Frederick Henry, built the division in July 2006 around qualified officers and civilians who would conduct Army-wide compliance inspections of information systems as part of the Department of Defense's larger effort in the 'cyber war' against foreign hackers and others who would disrupt the Defense Department's computer infrastructure and architecture. The division now issues an annual report on its inspections to the senior Army leadership.

8. **The End of Major Army Commands (MACOMs):** The publication of Army Regulation 10-87 on 4 September 2007 heralded the end of MACOMs and the introduction of Army Commands (ACOMs), Army Service Component Commands

(ASCCs), and Direct-Reporting Units (DRUs). These name changes more closely aligned the Army's major headquarters with their higher echelon Joint counterparts in the Combatant Commands. This change resulted in the greater likelihood of ASCCs -- and not just divisions and corps -- to assume missions as a Joint headquarters in the form of either a Joint Task Force or Joint Force Land Component. Resultantly, IGs in the ASCCs had to become aware of, and in many cases become trained in, Joint IG policy and how to balance the Joint IG approach with Army IG requirements.

9. **A New Law Requiring Inspections of Wounded Troop Housing:** The Walter Reed Army Medical Center scandal in late 2007 that highlighted sub-standard housing for recovering troops wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan prompted Congress to direct the Army's Regional Medical Command (RMC) IGs to inspect this all such housing annually. Public Law 110-181, dated 28 January 2008, specifically required the RMC IGs to inspect annually all housing facilities occupied by recovering service members and provide reports to the facility commander, affiliated hospital commander, The Surgeon General, Secretary f the Army, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. The Army's Medical Command IG oversaw the first two inspections and assisted the RMC IGs by enlisting the help of other IGs throughout the Army.

10. **A New Trends Analysis Cell:** In 2009, The Inspector General reestablished the Trends Analysis Cell specifically to follow-up on the results of DAIG-level inspections but also to identify broader Army trends that could lead to other Army-wide systemic issues. The cell was re-designated as the Analysis and Inspections Follow-Up Branch and began work on a database that would not only track DAIG-level inspection recommendations but also capture IG inspection findings throughout the Army to identify trends relevant to Army readiness.

11. **A DAIG Civilian Director of Inspections:** In October 2009, The Inspector General established the new position of Principal Director of Inspections (the working title) for an SES-level civilian to oversee DAIG's four inspections divisions. Mr. Joseph Guzowski became the first SES director of inspections with responsibility for the new Analysis and Inspections Follow-Up Branch.

Chapter 7

Inspector General Insignia

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this chapter is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) with a description and explanation of the Inspector General insignia.

2. **The Fasces and the Sword:** The U.S. Army Inspector General insignia has three distinct parts: the sword, the fasces, and the wreath of olive and laurel branches (see figure below).

a. The sword represents military power and justice and is subordinate to the fasces.

b. The fasces consists of a military axe enclosed in a bundle of birch or elm rods tied together with a strap. Since the Roman Republic, the fasces has symbolized civil authority.

c. The wreath ties the sword and fasces together. Since classical times, the wreath has been a mark of honor and distinction for winners of athletic, cultural, and academic honors. Today the wreath is especially symbolic of academic and intellectual achievement.

d. The inscription *Droit et Avant* is French and literally means "right and forward." Freely translated, this French maxim means "First be right and then take action." The text is in blue, which represents loyalty, faith, and fidelity.

Appendix A

Historical Article: Washington and von Steuben: Defining the Role of the Inspector General

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this appendix is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) with a more in-depth historical analysis of how Generals Washington and von Steuben defined the role of the Inspector General.

2. **Journal of Public Inquiry:** The following article appeared in the Fall / Winter 2003 edition of The Journal of Public Inquiry: A Publication of the Inspectors General of the United States. The article appears in facsimile as published.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL
STEPHEN M. RUSIECKI
U.S. Army Inspector General School

Washington and von Steuben

Defining the Role of the Inspector General and Celebrating 225 Years of the U.S. Army Inspector General System

Major General Friedrich Wilhelm Augustin *Freiherr* (Baron) von Steuben has always stood as the U.S. Army's defining inspiration for the role of the Inspector General (IG). As General George Washington's expert drillmaster and organizer of the Continental Army in 1778, von Steuben not only trained the bedraggled American troops at Valley Forge for immediate success on the battlefield but also defined a role for the IG that would ensure the continued growth and refinement of the Continental Army for years to come. On May 5, 2003, the U.S. Army celebrated the 225th anniversary of Major General von Steuben's appointment as the IG, a role that has remained largely unchanged. But defining that role required that the Commander in Chief, General Washington, limit the IG's authority and instead have the Inspector General serve, with great effect, as an agent of the commander and not as an independent entity. This fully defined and accepted relationship between Washington and von Steuben allowed the Prussian officer to flourish and provide his greatest service to the American cause.

Freiherr von Steuben's introduction to the position that would earn him an unquestionable place in American history began somewhat inauspiciously.[1] Born in Magdeburg, Prussia, on September 17, 1730, von

[1] The principal source for this paper is David A. Clary and Joseph W. A. Whitehorne's *The Inspectors General of the United States Army 1777-1903* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Inspector General and Center of Military History, United States Army, 1987), Chapters 2, 3, and 4.

Steuben entered the Prussian Army at the age of 17. He served with credit in the Seven Years' War as an infantry and staff officer and, after assignment to the general staff in 1761, achieved the grade of captain, the highest rank that he would attain in the Prussian Army.

His personal skills and energy brought favorable attention upon him, but not so much attention that his military career soared to great heights. Following his discharge from the army (for reasons unknown), he served as a chamberlain at the court of Hohenzollern-Hechingen and received a knighthood and the honorific title of *Freiherr* (Baron). [2] Strangely enough, this modestly successful former Prussian captain fell into bankruptcy by 1775 and was out of work. He could not even secure military service with the armies of France, Austria, and the Margrave of Baden. But he soon stumbled upon an acquaintance of Benjamin Franklin, who suggested that he might find some work fighting for the American cause and therefore earn some money to pay his debts.

Benjamin Franklin had ensconced himself in Paris with the purpose of lobbying for overseas assistance to the American revolutionary cause. Franklin knew that the Continental Army needed European soldiers skilled in the martial craft, and he learned of von Steuben's reputation as a fully trained Prussian staff officer from the French minister of war, *Comte* (Count) de St. Germain. Von Steuben arrived in Paris in the summer of 1777, but his reputation as a practical expert on military training preceded him. Franklin and Silas Deane met with von Steuben and developed a very favorable opinion of the man and his abilities.

Franklin, St. Germain, Deane, and French author and merchant Caron de Beaumarchais immediately began negotiating for von Steuben's service in the Continental Army. De Beaumarchais offered to pay the cash-strapped von Steuben's travel expenses while Franklin doctored the Baron's resume. When Franklin wrote Washington in September 1777 about this new Prussian volunteer to the American cause, he stated that von Steuben had served as a lieutenant general in the Prussian king's service. Franklin felt that the altered resume would at least get Congress to give von Steuben a chance. Von Steuben went along with the ruse.

When von Steuben arrived at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on December 6, 1777, he immediately wrote to Congress to volunteer his services. In exchange for his skill and expertise, he requested only payment for his expenses and, if the war concluded successfully, reimbursement for the loss of income he would have earned in Europe (he failed to mention that he was unemployed at the time). He closed the message by stating that he only wanted to serve General Washington in the same way that he had served the Prussian king in seven different campaigns. He also wrote to Washington that same day and requested American citizenship as compensation for his services.

Von Steuben's letter evoked a favorable reaction from Congress. Henry Laurens, the president of the now displaced Continental Congress in York, Pennsylvania, warned von Steuben that the Continental Army at Valley Forge was suffering under the most austere of conditions and not to expect much. Von Steuben offered no reaction.

Meanwhile, General Washington was more determined than ever to institute an IG system in the Continental Army. Still smarting from the grievous failures of three previous IGs, Washington vowed to proceed cautiously before selecting his next candidate for the position.

Freiherr von Steuben arrived at Valley Forge on February 23, 1778 to a polite reception. But Washington soon warmed to the gregarious Prussian as von Steuben readily displayed a remarkable knowledge of all things military. Von Steuben was a breath of fresh air to Washington and his staff as they grappled with the problems of an army that was, for all intents and purposes, dying. The bitter winter nagged the underdressed and poorly fed troops. Meat was unavailable to the

[2] Historic Valley Forge Web Site http://www.ushistory.org/valleyforge/served/steuben.html.

men. Horses died almost hourly. Von Steuben was aghast. He inquired about the logistics system only to learn that quartermaster agents scored a commission for what they spent on supplies. Von Steuben immediately proclaimed the system to be "a mere farce," but the neophyte's entreaties fell upon deaf ears.[3]

Although not yet designated as the IG, *Freiherr* von Steuben set to work as an advisor to General Washington. Von Steuben began assessing the Army's organization. Exasperated, the Prussian officer stated that: "I have seen a regiment consisting of thirty men, and a company of one corporal!"[4] The most onerous task for von Steuben was obtaining an accurate roster of the companies, regiments, and corps within the Army. Many men had deserted and taken their weapons with them. Most of the remaining troops were employed on work details or serving as orderlies for officers.

From this chaos, von Steuben began to define his personal role and ultimately the role of the IG. On his own initiative, he undertook the daunting task of overhauling the Army's discipline. He recognized fully that European methods would not work with the American troops, so he simplified the drill manuals and replaced Prussian formality and rigidity with practicality. He stated that: "In our European armies a man who has been drilled for three months is called a recruit; here, in two months, I must have a soldier."[5] He also realized that he must not concern himself simply with tactical matters but also with financial issues to ensure that supplies flowed steadily and in abundance.

By the middle of March, General Washington allowed von Steuben to prove himself and his theories. The Baron's reward would be the position of IG. Von Steuben decided to begin on a small scale. He requested that Washington supply him with 100 of the Army's best men to be attached to the Commander in Chief's guard for training purposes. Washington complied and on March 17, 1778 ordered only "well limbed" men of "robust constitution" to report to von Steuben for duty.[6]

Freiherr von Steuben's training regimen began immediately. On March 19, von Steuben drilled and trained one squad while his sub-inspectors (whom Washington had recently appointed) watched and learned. The sub-inspectors then drilled and trained other squads under von Steuben's watchful eye. When the squads were trained, he drilled them as a company. Von Steuben began each day with squad drills and ended the day with company drills. The troops quickly learned the simplified manual of arms devised by von Steuben. As the training progressed, Washington's observant officer corps began to recognize the development of American battle tactics and techniques. The officers were impressed.

Von Steuben also instructed the officers in how to train their own troops and units. After the first company was trained and ready, von Steuben shifted his drilling system to battalions and then brigades. Within 3 weeks, he maneuvered an entire division before Washington's delighted eyes. Washington now firmly believed that his Prussian adviser really knew his craft. On March 22, Washington ordered all other training stopped and directed that his officers adopt von Steuben's training system immediately. On March 28, he rewarded von Steuben with the title of IG. When Washington asked Congress to approve and finance his new IG system, he suggested expanding (at von Steuben's prodding) the role of the Inspector General from that of mere drillmaster to one that was more comprehensive in nature. Washington also considered bestowing the rank of major general upon von Steuben. Washington had to proceed carefully with this new system so that he did not alienate his officers or suggest that von Steuben held greater stature than them.

Now that the drilling and training program designed by von Steuben was at work under the

[3] Clary, page 37.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Clary, page 38.

direction of the lower inspectors and troop commanders, von Steuben proceeded to set down on paper the new drill regulations. Since Valley Forge lacked printing presses, von Steuben wrote by longhand each chapter of the drill manual.

With the drill regulations complete, von Steuben turned to the Army's organization. He immediately divided the brigades into provisional training battalions of 112 to 224 privates and then further divided these battalions into companies and platoons with officers and non-commissioned officers assigned throughout. Each battalion now became a known quantity of trained troops that could achieve specific results on the battlefield no matter how many losses the Army suffered in battle.

The Baron also addressed the Army's standing problem of being unable to attack from a march column effectively. By marching in columns, the Army was always strung out and could not reinforce the lead units in a timely manner. This inability to advance quickly had cost the Continental Army dearly at the battles of Brandywine and Germantown. Von Steuben also emphasized the use of the bayonet and within mere weeks turned the men into expert bayonet fighters. This skill would serve them well within a few weeks at Monmouth and the following year at Stony Point. Von Steuben also established rules for military inspections which, he proclaimed, were not simply a function of designated inspectors but were a function of command.[7]

By the end of April 1778, the Continental Army was eager to show the British what the Americans could do on the battlefield. Von Steuben had his chance to witness the fruits of his labors on May 19 when the Marquis de Lafayette, in command of 2,200 Continental troops and 800 militia men, was cut off by the British at Barren Hill across from the Schuylkill River. Only a skillful withdrawal would save the troops. As the British advanced for what they believed to be an easy kill, Lafayette barked an order, and the troops von Steuben had trained withdrew quickly and in good order from the trap. The old rabble that marched in long columns could never have escaped such a trap. This success caused von Steuben's stock to increase greatly in the eyes of his Commander in Chief, General Washington.

Washington soon forwarded his plan for the IG system to Congress for final approval. In that plan, Washington stated that the IG and his inspectors would be "the instructors and censors of the Army in everything connected with its discipline and management."[8] Washington proposed that the IG serve directly under the Commander in Chief and that the IG's deputies would inspect wings or divisions commanded by major generals while brigade inspectors would serve their brigade commanders. Washington wanted inspections to remain a command function and for inspectors to stay subordinate to the commanders. The order Washington issued on May 4, 1778 further stated that all subordinate inspectors would receive their technical direction from von Steuben to ensure standardization throughout the Army.

On May 5, 1778, Congress approved Washington's plan.[9] The resolution also carried with it a promotion for von Steuben to the grade of major general and back payment in that grade for services rendered since February. Congress further authorized additional pay for inspectors based upon the demands that their duties would entail and authorized Washington to appoint all inspectors below the IG. The Inspector General system had now taken root in the Army, but the Inspector General's role still required some greater refinement. The IG was no longer just a drillmaster.

As many officers in the Army feared, Major General von Steuben's success in training and organizing the troops gave way to greater ambition for the Prussian officer. Many officers worried that he

[7] Ibid. page 42.

[8] Ibid. page 43.

[9] *Handbook for Inspectors General* (Washington 25, D.C.: War Department, Office of the Inspector General, June 1947), page 1.

would seek a command position as a means to cement further his prestige and power within the Continental Army. The lack of a fully defined role created further angst among the officer ranks since they did not understand the limits placed upon von Steuben as the IG.

Major General von Steuben also began developing his own ideas for the role of IG. He opined that the IG should have legal authority and status equal to that of the Commander in Chief and answer separately to Congress. These proposals resulted in great rumblings among Washington's senior officers, who still struggled to grasp the intent and parameters of von Steuben's rather novel position.

Washington acted immediately to curb von Steuben's ambitions. He published a general order on June 15, 1778 that established an interim role and duties for the IG until Congress could define the role officially. Washington charged the Prussian officer and his subordinate inspectors with setting rules and standards for drill and maneuvers as well as policies for camp and garrison routines. But commanders at their respective levels would have to approve of these rules. In addition, all brigade and divisional inspectors worked directly for their commanders, which established for the long term the notion that inspections are a function of command and that inspectors are agents of the commander.

Freiherr von Steuben challenged Washington's attempt to curb the IG's authority. First, he sought an independent command and then attempted to release the IG from the Commander in Chief's grip. Feeling cocky over the Continental Army's recent success at Monmouth (largely due to his personal efforts), von Steuben opted to lobby Congress directly for these changes. Washington had even given von Steuben temporary command of three brigades after the battle of Monmouth to mollify the Prussian's ambitions; however, Washington removed von Steuben when the original commander returned from temporary duty. Von Steuben protested in vain.

With Washington's permission, von Steuben went to Philadelphia on personal business. Washington was unaware of the Prussian's desire to lobby Congress directly. When he arrived, several highly placed friends told the Baron that they did not support his attempt to secure a command but felt that he should become chief of all inspectors. Congress soon granted his request. Von Steuben then suggested that he report both to the Board of War and the Commander in Chief. In August, a Congressional committee outlined this proposed role for the IG and asked General Washington to comment. Washington balked. He believed that inspectors should not operate independently of commanders but should serve a valuable staff function. Congress compromised and, by the end of the summer of 1778, issued a plan acceptable to both Washington and von Steuben. Von Steuben had become the chief of all inspectors but remained subordinate to the Commander in Chief. At some point during the discussions over his future role, von Steuben recognized the merits of Washington's perspective and the fact that he did not require the powers of command to be effective.

With the issue of the IG's role resolved, the energetic Prussian resumed his invaluable service to Washington and to the Continental Army. Instead of simply serving as the drillmaster-general of the Army, he became a staff officer in the greatest sense and offered sage counsel to Washington based upon the Baron's years of service in the Prussian Army. Von Steuben realized that he could be more effective by serving within Washington's command than by serving outside of it. Likewise, Washington could not have asked for a better staff officer and advisor. At that moment in time, von Steuben had no peer within the Continental Army.

Major General von Steuben immediately immersed himself and his inspectors in the business of training and inspecting the Army. He instituted an inspection system and inspection service for the whole Army under the direction and

approval of General Washington. His inspectors inspected all organizations for discipline, logistics, equipment, and administration. He and his inspectors offered constructive criticism and, since von Steuben reported these results directly to Washington, did not need the powers of command to fulfill his charter. Fairness and thoroughness became the IG's watchwords, and setting and maintaining high standards became part of the Continental Army's culture almost overnight.

When the Army settled into winter quarters in 1778, von Steuben's inspection service was operating under its own power throughout the Army. Von Steuben then turned his attention to codifying the initial regulations that he had scratched out at Valley Forge nearly a year earlier. Von Steuben gathered a literary committee in Philadelphia in late 1778 and began work on a comprehensive set of drill regulations based upon the early Valley Forge documents.

The final product was a text entitled Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States. Printing and binding the book became a major problem for von Steuben due to a shortage of ink, paper, and other materials. Instead of leather binding, the printer used blue paper to cover the book, which forever gave the manual the nickname of the Blue Book. Major William North, von Steuben's most trusted aide-de-camp, recalled in 1814 that: "except [for] the Bible, it [the Blue Book] was held in the highest estimation."[10]

The Blue Book endured 75 printings through 1809. Instead of simply outlining von Steuben's simplified manual of arms, the book taught officers to inspect their troops. Chapter XX, "Of the Inspection of the Men, their Dress, Necessaries, Arms, Accoutrements and Ammunition," set the standard and established a tradition of inspections that has endured into the 21st Century. The Blue Book directed that "Every Saturday morning the captains are to make a general inspection of their companies," an Army tradition that lasted well into the 20th Century.[11] Remarkably, the Blue Book did not address the role of the IG and his inspectors or their relationship to their commanders. Perhaps von Steuben wanted to keep open the possibility that his role, and the role of his inspectors, might change again in the near future.

While von Steuben worked on his Blue Book, Congress formally issued a charter on February 18, 1779 authorizing the position of IG with the rank of major general. The charter specified that the IG's principal task was to form a system of regulations for maneuvers and discipline. The IG and all inspectors also reported directly to their commanders, thus placing commanders in complete control of all officers in their charge. Von Steuben's reports would go directly to General Washington with a copy furnished to the Board of War. The Congressional charter finally put to rest the long-standing debate and controversy over the role and authority of the IG that had surfaced the previous year.

Major General von Steuben clearly embraced his newly defined role as IG and showed Washington and Congress that he was not a man to abuse power. As a result, his invaluable counsel as a staff officer to General Washington elevated him and his office to a stature that made him a de facto Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief. Congress even entrusted the IG office with the mustering of troops in January 1780 since so many problems had resulted in that area. Although von Steuben's influence and reputation helped to increase the stature and scope of his office, his role never changed. He worked for his Commander in Chief, and he never forgot that simple fact.[12]

Limiting the authority of the IG not only helped to define von Steuben's role within the

[10] Clary, page 49.

[11] Frederick William Baron von Steuben. *Baron von Steuben's Revolutionary War Drill Manual: A Facsimile Reprint of the 1794 Edition* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1985), page 88.

[12] Clary, pages 52-53.

Continental Army but also allowed the Prussian officer to recognize the importance and effect of his position while still serving as the Commander in Chief's subordinate. As the eyes, ears, and conscience of General Washington, Major General von Steuben did not have to serve as a sitting commander to have a positive impact on the Army. He realized that by serving as an agent of the Commander in Chief, he could have an equal effect on the training and discipline of the troops. Von Steuben's usefulness and productivity flourished in the wake of a well-defined role that limited his authority but not his influence. The American Revolution would have faltered and, dare one say it, failed if not for the ingenuity and raw talent of this great Prussian-American soldier.

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Appendix B

Facsimile: Handbook for Inspectors General

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this appendix is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) with a glimpse into past Inspector General doctrine by providing a facsimile copy of the 1947 Handbook for Inspectors General.

2. **Historical Doctrine:** The following handbook, published by the Office of The Inspector General, War Department, in June 1947, appears in facsimile.



JUNE 1947

HANDBOOK FOR

INSPECTORS GENERAL

WAR DEPARTMENT

Office of The Inspector General

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT

War Department Special Staff
Office of The Inspector General
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

1 JUNE 1947

MEMORANDUM:

Handbook for Inspectors General, Office of The Inspector General, [illegible]

FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL:

E. L. MILLER
Colonel, IGD
Executive

DISTRIBUTION:

1. *General* (less AAF and National Guard):
   To each inspector general ..... 1 copy
   In addition, to each headquarters commanded by a general officer where an inspector general is detailed ..... 2 copies
   In addition, to each headquarters not commanded by a general officer where an inspector general is detailed ..... 1 copy
   To selected schools ..... (as determined in each case)
   When requested, to each post, camp, station, training center, general hospital or depot where no inspector general is on duty ..... 1 copy
2. *AAF:*
   a. Continental United States:
      To each inspector general ..... 1 copy
      To each air force, independent command and wing ..... 2 copies
      To each AAF base and procurement district ..... 1 copy
   b. Overseas:
      To each inspector general ..... 1 copy
      To each air force headquarters ..... 2 copies
      To each independent command headquarters ..... 2 copies
      To each other headquarters where an inspector general is on duty ..... 1 copy
      When requested, to each base, station, or depot where no inspector general is on duty ..... 1 copy
3. *National Guard:*
   To each infantry and armored division ..... 2 copies
   To each wing and group, AAF (NG) ..... 2 copies
   To each State Inspector General ..... 1 copy

FOREWORD

This handbook is primarily a collection of basic data, in digest form, related to the history, mission, composition, activities, and procedures of the Inspector General's Department. As such, it will be of greatest value to officers newly detailed to the Inspector General's Department and to others who have had little experience with its activities. Although comprehensive, it is not considered to be an all-inclusive document; appropriate Army Regulations and allied sources of information should also be studied by all Inspectors General. In this connection, reference is made to inspection and investigation guides prepared by the Office of The Inspector General and published in the form of War Department Technical Bulletins (IG series). These bulletins are published for discretionary reference only, are of an informative character, and carry no mandatory provisions for use. While suggesting approved methods and procedures as aids to inspectors general, they do not take the place of regulations or orders. It is not intended that the War Department Technical Bulletins (IG series), nor that this Handbook for Inspectors General, will limit the scope of inspections, investigations, or other inspector general activities, either by topics included or the manner in which they are treated.

This publication supersedes Inspection Guide No. 1, "General Instructions for Inspectors General," Office of The Inspector General, 24 May 1940.

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AN INSPECTOR GENERAL'S CODE

1. MY DUTY is to assist my commanding officer in accomplishing his mission.

2. MY STATUS is the same as other members of the commander's staff and I will coordinate my activities with theirs.

3. MY ACTIVITIES shall be devoted to all matters affecting the welfare of the command.

4. MY EFFORTS shall be unceasing in advancing the efficient handling, maintenance and safeguarding of supplies, equipment and funds.

5. MY INSPECTIONS shall be constructive rather than critical.

6. MY INVESTIGATIONS shall be so conducted as to establish all pertinent facts.

7. MY REPORTS shall be governed by strict impartiality.

8. MY FINDINGS shall include all matters meriting commendation as well as those requiring adverse comment.

9. MY WHOLEHEARTED ATTENTION shall be given to complaints of individuals and to allegations of irregularities within the military establishment.

10. MY CONSTANT GOAL shall be to protect the best interest of the military service and the rights of its individual members.

CONTENTS

SECTION I

HISTORY AND INSIGNIA OF THE IGD

1. History

The Office of The Inspector General dates from 13 December 1777. Shortly before that date, General Washington had assembled a council whose final decision, signed by every member, was that "such an office was desirable." As a result, the Continental Congress, on 13 December 1777, created the office of The Inspector General of the Army, but made him independent of every authority except that of Congress itself. General Washington objected to The Inspector General making his reports direct to Congress and finally succeeded, on 28 February 1779, in having the law amended to make The Inspector General answerable to the War Board, the Commander in Chief, and Congress.

In March, 1778, about a month after Baron Frederick William Augustus von Steuben had reported to General Washington, the latter published an order announcing that the Baron has "obligingly undertaken the exercise of the Office of The Inspector General of the Army." Therefore, it may be properly said that Baron von Steuben was the first Inspector General of the Army. This was followed by a letter to Congress in which Washington explained the ill consequences arising from a want of uniformity in discipline and instruction throughout the Army, and the necessity for a well-organized inspectorship, explaining what had been done by Baron von Steuben. As a result of this correspondence, Congress, on 5 May 1778, approved Washington's plan and appointed Baron von Steuben The Inspector General with the rank and pay of major general. Following von Steuben's resignation and retirement to private life, after six years in office, another Inspector General to make comparable contributions during this early period was Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton was serving during the critical period of 1798 when Congress authorized a provisional army with Washington again being made Commander in Chief.

Not too unlike the duties of an inspector general today, the duties of The Inspector General in those early days, in the main, were: to muster the troops monthly, noting the number and condition of the men, their discipline and drill, state of arms and equipment, clothing, rations, etc.; to reject unserviceable recruits and discharge or transfer

to the invalid corps all men disabled in the service; and to report all abuses, neglect, and deficiencies to the Commander in Chief, the commander of the organization, and the Board of War.

Shortly after the year 1865, the War Department published an order defining the duties of the Inspector General's Department to include "all matters pertaining to the military art or having interest in a military point of view." In 1874, the inspection of disbursements of funds was required by law, and it was directed "that officers detailed for this duty should not be in any way connected with the department or corps making the disbursements." Later, under the provisions of the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, in addition to all the traditionally accepted responsibilities, the Inspector General's Department was required to make systematic inspections of the National Guard.

During World War I, one or more officers of the Inspector General's Department were on duty with each combat division and at each of the large camps or cantonments in the United States. In addition to such inspections of camps, divisions and units as were made by their own inspectors, each division was inspected at least twice, before going overseas, by inspectors general from The Inspector General's Office. This was one of the most important functions performed by inspectors general, resulting in the detection and prompt correction of many irregularities and deficiencies, in the elimination of certain unfit officers and in the promotion of certain others whose efficiency warranted it.

In his preliminary report to the Secretary of War, dated November 20, 1918, in reference to the organization and operations of the American Expeditionary Forces from May 26, 1917, to the signing of the Armistice, November 11, 1918, General John J. Pershing stated:

"The Inspector General's Department has risen to the highest standards, and throughout has ably assisted commanders in the enforcement of discipline."

As the Army expanded to meet the needs of global warfare, in World War II, so the Inspector General's Department had to expand to meet the demands of the War Department and to satisfy the requirements of each new command for an inspector general. This brought about an increase in the Department from 60 officers in 1939 to 1,438 officers early in 1945.

Soon after troops began moving from their training areas to ports of embarkation, and thence by ship to oversea theaters of operations, the Office of The Inspector General was directed by the Chief of Staff to inspect all units prior to their departure from the United States for an oversea station with a view to determining whether the units were qualified to perform their missions and whether their equipment met the necessary requirements of the theater for which they were destined. Also with every major unit going overseas went an inspector general, to every far-off land and corner of the earth.

No sooner had American troops landed overseas than individual complaints, such as those regarding treatment, conditions, pay, and food, began coming back through various channels to the War Department. To meet this new requirement for inquiry and investigation, an Overseas Inspections Division was organized in the Office of The Inspector General, and its members were soon being dispatched to all parts of the world, by land, sea and air.

2. Insignia

The insignia of the Inspector General's Department has three distinctive parts: (1) the sword; (2) the fasces; and (3) the wreath of laurel branches and leaves. The fasces rests diagonally atop the sword while the wreath, which is in diameter about half the length of the sword and fasces, holds both the sword and fasces in their respective positions.

The symbolism of the sword is obvious. It represents military power and justice. In the insignia, the sword occupies the foundational or primary position. The fasces, which consists of a military ax inclosed within a bundle of birch or elm rods tied together with a strap, since early times of the Roman emperors has symbolized authority. The third part of the insignia, the wreath, ties the sword and fasces together. Beyond its artistic and functional value it, too, has a symbolism of its own. Since the Pythian games in Greece, about 500 B. C., the laurel wreath has been a mark of honor and distinction for winners of athletic, cultural, and academic honors. Today it is especially symbolic of academic and intellectual achievement.

The French inscription, "Droit et Avant," literally means "right and forward." Freely translated it means "First be right; then take action." This motto is in blue, the color of the Inspector General's Department. Blue, it is recalled, stands for loyalty, faith, and fidelity.

SECTION II

MISSION, COMPOSITION, SPHERE OF INQUIRY OF THE IGD

3. Mission

The Inspector General's Department is an instrumentality placed at the disposal of the Secretary of War to assist him in the administration of the War Department and the Army of the United States. Precisely, the mission of the Inspector General's Department is to inquire into and report upon all matters which affect the efficiency and economy of the Army of the United States and to make such inspections, investigations, surveys, studies, and reports as may be prescribed by

law or regulations, as may be directed by the Secretary of War, the Under Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretaries of War, or the Chief of Staff, or as may be requested by the Commanding Generals of the Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, armies (ZI), and Military District of Washington, the commanders of oversea commands, or the chiefs of administrative and technical services.

It is the duty of the Inspector General's Department to assist commanders and other members or employees of the military establishment in the performance of their duties by supplying information when appropriate, by recognizing and reporting meritorious conduct and performance of duty, and by suggesting ways and means to improve conditions. Also, throughout its existence, the Inspector General's Department has been charged with the responsibility of seeing that no fraud is perpetrated against the military establishment by any of its members, and that no injustice is done to any member or employee of the Army.

4. Composition

The Inspector General's Department consists of one inspector general of appropriate general officer grade and such number of other officers of appropriate grades as may from time to time be authorized within the provisions of the National Defense Act, as amended, or cognate acts.

The Department on 1 April 1947 consisted of 2 major generals, 4 brigadier generals, and 526 officers of other grades from captain through colonel. In addition there were an indeterminate number of acting inspectors general appointed under the provisions of paragraph 1a (3), AR 20–5, by various commanders, particularly for the purpose of hearing complaints and assisting in making inspections of National Guard units.

Officers of the Inspector General's Department are obtained by detail (not assignment) of officers above the grade of first lieutenant from other arms and services, except that officers of the Finance Department, Judge Advocate General's Department, and Corps of Chaplains will not be so detailed without the approval of the chief of service concerned. Officers are detailed in the IGD for assignment to IG positions at the headquarters of a specific command, installation, activity or station and, upon relief from assignment thereto, will be relieved from detail in the IGD. Formerly all orders effecting the detail or relief from detail of officers in the IGD were published by the War Department. Current regulations, however, prescribe that Commanding Generals of the Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces and oversea commands are authorized to, and will, detail suitable officers under their assignment jurisdiction to the IGD, to authorized IG positions within their commands, and are likewise authorized to relieve from detail in the IGD and assign to other duties, officers of the IGD under their assignment jurisdiction. War Department orders will be issued only for the relief and detail of officers in the IGD to fill authorized positions in the War Department Special Staff and in commands, installations, and activities under the control of the chiefs of administrative and technical services and other War Department agencies.

The foregoing method of detailing officers in the Inspector General's Department accentuates the fact that an inspector general of a command belongs to his commander; and that he does not operate directly under the control of The Inspector General of the Army. This is a matter that is frequently misunderstood. Many persons are of the opinion that an inspector general is entirely apart from the remainder of the staff and works directly under *The* Inspector General. On the contrary, the inspector general of a command is the chief of a special staff section on the staff of his commander and, as such, his relations with his commander are the same as those of any other member of that commander's staff. Since the duties of an inspector general of any command are so broad in scope and often involve the determination of the efficiency with which members of other staff sections are functioning, he should not be placed under the operational or administrative control of any general staff section; but he should perform his duties under the direct control of the Commander or his Chief of Staff.

5. Sphere of Inquiry of the IGD

The sphere of inquiry of the Inspector General's Department includes every branch of military affairs, except where specifically limited in Army Regulations or in orders. Inspectors general exercise comprehensive and general observation over all that pertains to the efficiency and economy of the Army:

a. The preparedness of the Army as an agency of national defense.

b. The conduct, discipline, efficiency, living conditions, and morale of units and individuals.

c. The condition and state of commands, posts, services, and installations, and of their arms, equipment, and other supplies.

d. The economical, efficient, and lawful expenditure of funds and property, including the purchase, receipt, storage, issue and sale of property and the condition of accounts pertaining to funds and property. Inspectors general must report their findings with strict impartiality, note specially meritorious performance of duty, and make recommendations for the correction of deficiencies and irregularities.

The sphere of inquiry also includes:

a. An annual inspection of the United States Soldiers' Home, Washington, D. C., which is made by The Inspector General.

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b. Annual inspection of the National Guard and Civilian Components.

c. Inspections of accounts of United States Property and Disbursing Officers of the National Guard.

d. Inspections and investigations of any nonmilitary activity of the War Department when so directed by the Secretary of War.

In other words, the sphere of inquiry may be briefly defined as "Observation over all that pertains to the efficiency and economy of the Army." It is all-inclusive. Some inspections are mandatory by law, others by Regulations. The local inspector general program must be a balanced one, searching for the intangibles as well as recognizing the obvious. Funds and records are only minor phases of the program.

SECTION III

DUTIES OF PERSONNEL

6. Duties of The Inspector General

The Inspector General is stationed in Washington, D. C., and assists the Chief of Staff in keeping the Secretary of War informed as to the state of the Army. He is a member of the War Department Special Staff. In addition he does the following:

a. Insures that all commands, installations, and activities, and records of account of accountable disbursing officers and class B agent officers are inspected periodically by inspectors general as prescribed in Army Regulations.

b. Causes an inspector general to investigate and report upon complaints and allegations as may be directed by the Secretary of War, the Under Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretaries of War, or the Chief of Staff, or as may be requested by the Commanding Generals of the Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, armies (ZI), the Military District of Washington, the commanders of oversea commands, or the chiefs of administrative and technical services.

c. Reviews reports of annual general inspections, or special inspections directed by the War Department, or extracts therefrom, and reports of investigations requiring consideration by the Chief of Staff and will submit them to the Chief of Staff or other appropriate War Department agencies. In initiating necessary action, The Inspector General deals directly with the appropriate commander, or chief of administrative or technical agency concerned.

d. Serves as the custodian of all War Department records referred to above and, from time to time designates the articles which, in his opinion, should be procured and kept for sale by the Quartermaster Corps to officers and enlisted personnel while in garrison or permanent camps and while in temporary camps or on active campaign. These recommendations are submitted to the Secretary of War for his action.

7. Duties of Unit Inspectors General

The staff of the commander of a division, or comparable units, or of a larger unit, includes one or more officers of the Inspector General's Department. The official designation of the senior inspector general of such a staff is Division Inspector General, Corps Inspector General, Army Inspector General, and so on.

In addition to the general duties prescribed in Regulations, inspectors general assigned to military commands make such inspections and investigations as their commanders may direct. It is the duty of an inspector general to inquire into all matters that pertain to the efficiency and economy of the command and to report his findings to his commander with strict impartiality and to make recommendations for the correction of deficiencies and irregularities.

Before proceeding on any mission, an inspector general makes known his orders or instructions to commanding officers or other officers whose troops and affairs he is directed to inspect or investigate. He gives orders only when specially authorized to do so. Such orders are given in the name of the commander authorizing them, and report is made by inspectors general of any orders so given.

Commanding officers facilitate the work of inspectors general by furnishing transportation, clerical help, and such other assistance as will enable the inspector general to ascertain promptly all pertinent facts. Inspectors general follow the policy of disrupting local routine only so far as may be necessary for the early completion of their missions.

SECTION IV

COMPLAINTS

8. Complaints

Inspectors general are enjoined to give careful consideration to complaints affecting individuals and to allegations of facts or conditions detrimental to the service. How? In the course of his inspections each officer of the IGD takes such steps as may be necessary to ascertain whether or not any members of the personnel on duty at the station where the inspection is being conducted (especially those in confinement) have been given an opportunity to present, in person or in writing, to an inspector general (or to an officer designated to act as such) their individual grievances not less frequently than once a month. Further, each inspector general ascertains whether through the generous use of bulletin-board notices, posters, training talks, or

other information media the members of the commands have been acquainted with the procedures whereby they may seek redress for alleged grievances, and whether each complainant is advised in writing of the final action taken in his case.

The Inspector General's Department has always been a medium through which military personnel have been able to submit complaints and state their grievances. In the past these grievances could be submitted at any time to the inspector general, if one was available, or otherwise during the annual general inspection. However, because this general inspection was conducted only once a year, the War Department directed that an opportunity be made available at least once a month, and it is so written in Army Regulations. Commanders are thus given a new working philosophy for improving efficiency and morale within their commands. They are directed by the War Department to encourage frequent contact between their personnel and the inspectors general and to keep all individuals acquainted with the procedures for seeking redress for alleged grievances. Also, commanders, through their inspectors general, must: (1) Follow through on each complaint to see that appropriate corrective action is taken; (2) See to it that no retaliatory action whatever is taken against any complainant for having made a complaint; (3) Inform each complainant in writing of the final action taken on his complaint; and (4) Keep a record of all complaints received in order that apparent or potential defects in command and administration may be determined and corrected before they reach major proportions.

Every soldier now can be sure that his grievance, however large or small, will be handled immediately, either by his commander or by the local inspector general. He may go directly to the inspector general, without seeking permission or applying through channels; and he will not be discouraged from doing so whenever the need arises.

As might be expected, many complaints received are of a trival nature and many are cases where an individual simply wants to unburden himself. Yet others are cases where the individual has not exhausted appropriate command channels for the solution of his problem. The right of an individual to complain cannot be denied, nor is it appropriate for an officer or noncommissioned officer to insist upon his holding a preliminary hearing with a view to denying permission to register a complaint; but he can counsel the men on separating their problems into appropriate channels. Personal and family affairs usually belong to the Chaplain or the Special Services Officer; legal matters to the Judge Advocate; matters pertaining to pay and allowances to the Finance Officer; and these local officials should be consulted by the complainant before submission of a complaint to the Inspector General. The IG, however, as already pointed out, is required to follow through on each complaint presented to him.

SECTION V

INSPECTIONS

9. Annual General Inspections

One formal general inspection, known as "the annual general inspection," is made during each fiscal year of all commands and other activities of the Army, except national cemeteries and soldiers' lots under War Department jurisdiction which are inspected once every two years.

The purposes of annual general inspections are to observe, report upon, and promote the efficiency and economy of the command and other activities inspected. They include an inquiry as to whether law and regulations are being complied with, and observations of the condition and preparedness of commands, installations, and activities to fulfill their respective missions.

Inspection being a function of command, annual general inspections of commands, installations, and activities are made by inspectors general on the staffs of commanders of the appropriate commands, installations or activities. Annual general inspections of the headquarters of any echelon of command are made by the inspector general on the staff of the commander of the next higher echelon of command. Annual general inspections of commands, installations, and activities not thus provided for are made as ordered by the Secretary of War, upon recommendations of The Inspector General.

Annual general inspections are of two kinds or types, the *continuing* and the *noncontinuing*. The former pertains to large units and activities; in this case the IG may work on the inspection throughout the year, making one final report. The noncontinuing type is associated with the case where the IG stays on the job until the inspection is finished; that is, an inspection of an *entire* command or other activity which is completed within a definite and relatively short period of time. Examples are: (continuing type) in an infantry division, the Division IG will inspect the elements successively during the year, as may be convenient; (noncontinuing) the IG of a higher echelon will inspect the Division Headquarters during a continuous period, such as three days or one week, until the task is completed. At installations and activities where inspectors general are stationed, and in divisions and similar organizations of the field forces, the annual general inspection may be a continuing one in which case it will be considered incomplete until all units or elements of the organization, installation or activity concerned shall have been inspected.

In conducting a noncontinuing type of annual general inspection of an activity such as a Recruiting District, the inspecting officer may be in doubt as to the required scope of the inspection. There will be a number of components; the district office will have several

main stations which in turn probably will have several substations. Questions frequently asked are: "Must every element be inspected?" and "Should a separate report be rendered on each element inspected if the element has been assigned a separate ASU designation?" The answer to both questions is "No." The inspecting officer will inspect each element only when so directed, or when in his opinion it is warranted. An ASU designation is made for purposes of personnel accounting only, and does not determine whether an annual general inspection will be made. One report will cover the entire activity.

10. Special Inspections

Special inspections are supplementary inspections, usually covering only one subject or phase and are ordered by a commander having an IG on his staff. The disposition of the report and the action taken are according to the desires of the commander ordering the inspection. Examples are: Inspections of messes, post operations, etc.

11. Records of Account of Disbursing Officers

The records of account of *accountable* disbursing officers, including special disbursing agents, are inspected by an inspector general on the staff of the commander who exercises command or inspectional jurisdiction over the accountable disbursing officers concerned, unless otherwise provided for by the commander of a higher echelon of command.

The accounts of class B agent officers are normally inspected during the course of the annual general inspection of the post, camp or station at which the inspecting officer is serving.

Prior notice of the inspection is not given to an accountable disbursing officer, a fact which is an exception to the general rule.

12. Reports of Inspections

Irregularities and deficiencies of a major nature are reported, as discovered, through the medium of "Action-letters, IGD." These action-letters, IGD, constitute a special form of military correspondence peculiar to the Inspector General's Department and which are utilized exclusively by inspectors general or by officers designated to act as such. In general, an "irregularity" is a failure to comply with the letter or spirit of regulations, laws, or orders, or else is an assumption of authority beyond that authorized. In referring to irregularities, the specific regulation, law or order violated is cited. A "deficiency," on the other hand, is a lack or shortcoming of facilities, either in personnel, matériel, or services. The subject matter of each action-letter, IGD, is restricted to a single topic in order to provide celerity of action within large headquarters and within the War Department itself.

An action-letter, IGD, is classified according to the subject about which it is written. It may be secret, confidential, restricted, or unclassified. It is forwarded through all interested headquarters and agencies to The Inspector General, War Department. Normally the indorsements thereon indicate that corrective action has been taken at the earliest practicable date by the appropriate headquarters in the chain of command. When the action-letter, IGD, finally reaches The Inspector General, War Department, he reviews it to determine whether or not the proper corrective action has been taken and makes recommendations accordingly. This procedure enables the commander on whose staff the inspector general is serving, and all other higher commanders, to become acquainted with the conditions existing within their commands and gives them an opportunity to take timely action to correct matters under their control.

Properly, the report of the annual general inspection is as brief as possible. It includes a detailed list of the component commands or other activities covered by the inspection together with a general rating given each such command or activity. In addition, the following information is included in the report:

a. When, where, and by whom the inspection was made and the authority for making it.

b. When, where, and by whom the last preceding annual general inspection was made.

c. A description of the mission of the activity or installation whenever it is other than a troop organization.

d. Whether or not the major and minor irregularities and deficiencies reported at the last preceding annual general inspection have been corrected.

e. Conditions noted in connection with each subject that has been designated as a War Department special subject for inspection.

f. Irregularities, deficiencies, commendations, or other pertinent matters noted by the inspector general.

g. Appropriate recommendations.

h. Inclosures:

(1) List of action-letters, IGD, pertaining to the report.

(2) A summary and analysis of the total number of complaints submitted to the local inspectors general during each three-month period since the last annual general inspection.

During his inspection, the inspector general looks for the good as well as the bad; he should report favorably upon all who have rendered meritorious service.

In addition to the main report, described above, the inspector general transmits directly to the commander of the organization inspected a detailed memorandum of all minor irregularities and deficiencies discovered. This is frequently a voluminous document.

Although a reply may not be required, prompt corrective action is called for; and at the time of the next annual general inspection, the inspector general will call upon the commander for the following:

a. His retained copy of the last annual general inspection, or the extract, and

b. The memorandum of minor irregularities and deficiencies, together with a statement of the corrective action that has been taken.

The inspector general will, of course, inquire into the results achieved.

13. War Department Special Subjects for Inspection

Periodically there are published what are known as War Department special subjects for inspection. Such a subject is one into which the War Department desires inspectors general to inquire particularly. They, therefore, should become of similar interest and importance to all commanders who are responsible for annual general inspections. Immediately upon receipt of a War Department directive setting forth a special subject, the inspector general should present to his commander an appropriate plan for determining the prevailing state of compliance with the directive, and a suggested course of action for following through. These matters should not be permitted to lie dormant until the time of the next annual general inspection.

Results of such special inquiries into these special subjects, which are made during the course of an annual general inspection, are reported in the report of the annual general inspection. Results of special inquiries thereinto which are made at any time other than during the course of an annual general inspection are reported to the commander on whose staff the inspector general is serving, but, unless otherwise specifically directed, such reports will not be submitted to the War Department. When such special reports are directed they will be submitted to The Inspector General through appropriate channels of command.

14. Fundamentals of Procedure—Inspections

Once the inspection has been directed or approved by his commander or chief of staff (and approval must always be secured), an inspector general finds his efforts in the field of inspections devoted to three primary phases:

a. Preparation for the inspection.

b. Conducting the inspection.

c. Preparing the report of inspection.

In making a schedule for an inspection, an inspector general should select those dates which will insure the presence of the greatest number of components of the activity to be inspected. This applies especially to the inspection of National Guard units, which are inspected at times convenient to the National Guard authorities with a view toward securing the maximum attendance of personnel.

Prior to starting his inspection, an inspector general should study previous reports of inspection and become familiar with the mission, Table of Organization and Tables of Equipment of the activity to be inspected. He should procure and study pertinent available inspection guides, such as War Department Technical Bulletins (IG series), and from this study prepare his own detailed check list for specific application during his inspection. While a considerable amount of inspection guide or check list material is published by the Office of The Inspector General, War Department, Washington 25, D. C., an inspector general preparing to conduct an inspection properly should supplement these guides with those prepared locally and with his own check list notes. Many published guides are not to be carried by an inspector general into the field but are designed for use as reference sources.

An inspector general should have in his possession copies of his orders and all other pertinent and necessary papers. His uniform should be correct in every detail. His personal appearance should be beyond criticism. A brief questionnaire may be mailed to the commander before the inspection takes place asking for any essential data. However, statistics, copies of the organization charts of units, lists of the officer personnel, and similar information may be asked for at the beginning of the inspection, if required. Information should not be requested unless it is to be put to some definite use. When inspecting the money accounts of disbursing officers, advance notice of the inspection will not be given.

The inspector general should ascertain from other staff sections of the headquarters to which he is assigned whether there is any special information desired concerning the activity to be inspected and whether the activity has had any difficulties of administration, supply, or similar operation, with which it may need assistance.

In conducting the inspection, the inspector general should report immediately upon arrival to the commanding officer of the installation and to the commander of the activity to be inspected. In many cases these two will not be the same person. A copy of his orders will be presented to these officers. At the headquarters of the activity to be inspected the details of the inspection should be arranged and clerical or other assistance secured. A definite schedule for the inspection is helpful to both the inspector general and those being inspected. The schedule of the inspection should, of course, interfere as little as possible with the routine duties of the activity. The inspection should

be made, as far as possible, while all concerned are engaged in normal duties. The schedule, once established, should be followed exactly, despite a need to return to some activities for further inspection.

An inspector general should make his inspections helpful and constructive. He should secure the confidence of all persons with whom he deals and should be courteous, approachable, and tolerant. In pointing out discrepancies, his manner should be free from sarcasm or ridicule, and any criticism should be accompanied by suggestions for correction or improvement.

From time to time during the inspection, the inspector general should confer with the commander on matters developed by the inspection. Matters of a minor nature which require his corrective action, but which will not be included in the formal report, should be discussed. Irregularities should be brought to the attention of the responsible officer as soon as convenient after discovery.

A time and place may be set aside to hear complaints. Both time and place should be selected for the convenience of all personnel concerned. The place for hearing complaints should be so located that personnel will feel free to enter and leave the room without fear of embarrassment or reprisal through having been seen by others. For instance, a room in the headquarters, such as one opposite the office of the commanding officer, is completely undesirable for this purpose. On the other hand, a room in the post chapel would contribute to securing free and uninhibited responses. Advance notice giving time and place of the complaint period should be announced so that anyone desiring to register a complaint may be present.

In hearing complaints, inspectors general must secure the whole story, verify the facts and then submit fair and impartial recommendations in each case. Only in this way can the Inspector General's Department accomplish one of its principal missions, which is to protect the best interests of the military service and the rights of its individual members.

Of particular importance is the fact that at the close of the inspection a final conference on the results of the inspection should always be held with appropriate commanders.

Upon his return to his station from an inspection trip, the inspector general should report orally to his commander any matters which, in his judgment, require immediate attention. This oral report should be followed as early as practicable by a written report covering the entire inspection and containing the information as called for in paragraph 12, above.

SECTION VI

INVESTIGATIONS

15. Duties and Powers of Inspectors General in Investigations

The officers of the Inspector General's Department are confidential agents of the Secretary of War and of the commander on whose staff they are serving. Their investigations and reports thereof are confidential. The Inspector General's Department is not a tribunal; it may, in its advisory capacity, reach conclusions from developed facts and make recommendations, but it has no power to reach findings, nor to impose punishment.

16. Purpose of Investigations

The purpose of an investigation is to provide the commander or directing authority with a sound basis for just and intelligent action regarding matters for which he is responsible and about which doubt or allegations of wrong-doing, inefficiency, or maladministration have arisen. Because of the confidence placed in inspectors general, the commander's action in such matters may hinge upon the soundness of the conclusions reached by the investigating officer and the recommendations based thereon. It is, therefore, imperative that every investigation be complete, factual, fair to both sides, and that conclusions and recommendations resulting therefrom be based upon clearly established facts.

17. Fundamentals of Procedure—Investigations

Inspectors general are trained as investigators, not as detectives and criminologists. There are Criminal Investigation Division personnel and Provost Marshals for criminal investigations. The field of investigations is broad and varied; however, there are five chief phases in the conduct of any investigation. These are as follows:

a. Study the directive—understand the mission.

b. Prepare a plan of procedure.

c. Study the plan, discuss it with and secure its approval from the section chief (senior staff inspector general).

d. Conduct the field work to get the facts.

e. Prepare the report.

Although definite principles govern the procedure in each of these phases, the procedure itself, governed by the everchanging nature of cases for investigation, is not susceptible of blue-printing. Each phase must be studied to understand its characteristics and requirements.

The characteristics common to investigational procedures are:

a. Testimony should be be taken under oath.

b. The witness, if a citizen of the United States, must be reminded of his rights under the 24th Article of War or Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

c. Occasionally questions arise concerning the authority of an inspector general to require or compel a witness to testify. There arises first the statutory right of any witness to avail himself of the absolute protection afforded by the 24th Article of War, or by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Should the witness indicate a reluctance to testify, possibly through fear of reprisals, it should be explained to him that investigations by officers of the Inspector General's Department are confidential and that his rights and interests will be protected so far as practicable. However, regardless of the witness' desires in the matter, it should be understood that he is required to testify and that this requirement applies to the accused as well as to other witnesses subject, of course, to the limitations imposed by the 24th Article of War, or by the Fifth Amendment.

If a witness who is subject to military law should decline or refuse, on grounds other than the provisions of the 24th Article of War or the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, to testify in an investigation, the inspector general, in a literal sense, has no actual authority or powers to *compel* the witness to testify. Should such an occasion arise, the recourse and proper procedure of the inspector general would be to report the matter to the commanding officer of the witness with request for appropriate action by the said commanding officer: (a) to cause the witness to testify; or (b), in the event of his continued refusal, to initiate appropriate corrective or punitive measures.

In the case of an employee under the jurisdiction of the War Department or of any other branch of the Federal Government who is not amenable to the Articles of War and who might refuse to testify on any grounds other than his constitutional right to decline to testify against himself, the procedure of the inspector general should be substantially the same as outlined above, namely: to report the matter to the commanding officer if the witness is under the jurisdiction of the War Department, with request that the commanding officer take appropriate steps to cause the witness to testify, or in the event of his continued refusal to do so, to take appropriate disciplinary action in the case. If the witness should be an employee of a branch of the Government not under the jurisdiction of the War Department, the proper procedure would be for the inspector general to report the facts to the employee's local superior officer if there be one, with request that the employee be required to testify, or, in the event of his continued refusal, that appropriate disciplinary action be taken in his case. If there be no local superior officer of the obstinate witness,

the inspector general should report all the facts and circumstances to his Commanding General in order that appropriate presentation of the matter may be made to the proper official of the Government (through the War Department in Washington, if appropriate) should the Commanding General deem such action advisable.

If a civilian who is not connected with the Federal Government refuses to testify, there is nothing the inspector general can do about it other than perhaps to attempt, by friendly and persuasive argument, to appeal to the witness' sense of fairness and his civic duty to aid in the administration of justice by giving whatever testimony he is able to give. Should the witness still refuse to testify, and his testimony is considered material and essential to a proper determination of the case, the inspector general should record in his report a statement to that effect for the information of higher authority.

In any case such as those illustrated above, it might be well to omit the suggested procedure and ignore the refusal of the witness to testify, unless his testimony is considered as being in fact material and essential to a proper determination of the matters under investigation.

d. The testimony usually consists of questions and answers, plus exhibits.

e. If the subject matter concerns accusations prejudicial to the character, standing or efficiency of a person, then the nature of the allegations must be explained to that person and he must be afforded an opportunity to defend himself.

f. Sworn testimony does not have to be signed by the witness.

g. The entire matter and the report are confidential. Inspectors general must refrain from informal conversation or comment upon subjects under investigation.

h. The investigating officer submits a report of his work, the report generally following a pattern which includes the following sections:

I. AUTHORITY
When, where, and by whom the investigation was made and the authority in the first instance for making it.

II. MATTER INVESTIGATED
Digest of allegations. Name of complainant or source of allegations.

III. FACTS
Coherent presentation of all pertinent established facts which should be free from argument or bias and must be supported by evidence appended to the report. Facts should be presented in chronological order and woven together in a logical narrative form so as to make a cohesive and readable presentation.

IV. DISCUSSION
Presumptions and inferences to be drawn from all the circumstances in the case. Resume of mitigating or extenuating circumstances, if any.

V. CONCLUSIONS
Concise summary of results of investigation directly consequent from and supported by the facts.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Practical suggestions as to appropriate action to be taken to make suitable disposition of all phases of the case. Recommendations must be consistent with conclusions.

As may be seen from the above outline of the report, when an inspector general has completed an inspection or investigation, particularly an investigation, his mission is but partially completed, for he still has before him hard, important and laborious work and study in the writing of his report. It must be borne in mind that every investigation which an inspector general is called upon to make, regardless of how unimportant the subject matter may at first glance appear to be, has some important angle or phase; otherwise it would not be in the hands of an inspector general for investigation. The material facts, discussion, conclusions, and recommendations must be stated in a language that expresses exactly what is meant. Extravagant language or statements couched in words that do not give a temperate, accurate and fair account of the occurrence or matter under discussion often have repercussions and aftermaths that bring criticism or embarrassment upon the author, and even upon the Inspector General's Department or the War Department.

The preparation and completion of the inspector general's report of an investigation are, for these reasons, of great importance and entail a thorough study and analysis of the testimony or exhibits if it is to be of the usefulness and helpfulness expected and usually found in reports submitted by inspectors general.

18. Classification and Routing of Reports of Investigations

Reports of investigations are normally classified as "confidential." They are submitted to the commander who ordered the investigation to be made. However, once such reports are submitted they become part of the records of the headquarters where the inspector general making the reports is serving. It is the commander's decision as to who may or may not see those reports, with one very important limitation. The Manual of Courts-Martial states that such reports are "privileged," which means that they may not be introduced as evidence in a court-martial unless the parties thereto consent.

In the case of an investigation directed by his own commanding general, the inspector general conducts the investigation and makes report thereof in the manner and form desired by his commander. No copy or report thereof is communicated to any higher headquarters, unless the commander considers such action necessary and proper in his own interests or the report brings up a matter the correction of which is beyond his control.

In the case of an investigation directed by some other higher authority, the inspector general functions for his commanding general in making the investigation and preparing the report. No such report of investigation is complete until his commanding general has indorsed thereon such remarks and recommendations as he may deem necessary and appropriate. These remarks and recommendations should be indicated, with the date, on the copy of the report retained in the office files. This provides a record of complete action, to be studied by inspectors general during subsequent visits to the headquarters concerned. After the commanding general has made his remarks and recommendations, the report of investigation is forwarded through channels to the authority who ordered the investigation. Those reports which are to be forwarded to the War Department are transmitted through channels of command to The Inspector General with such remarks and recommendations as intermediate commanding officers deem necessary and appropriate. In no case is a report of investigation forwarded except through the office of the commanding general on whose staff the inspector general is serving.

Inspectors general do not ordinarily initiate formal investigations of their own accord but only when directed to do so by the commander on whose staff they serve. Yet, in the course of any duly authorized inspections should there come to the attention of an inspector general conditions or circumstances indicating a major irregularity or a major deficiency, it is the duty of that inspector general to find out all the facts so that the proper authorities may take corrective action. However, it must be remembered that no investigation, survey, or study is to be conducted without prior approval or authority of the commander exercising jurisdiction and on whose staff the inspector general is serving.

SECTION VII

SUMMARY—PERSONAL EQUATION OF INSPECTORS GENERAL

19. Basic Premise

An Army is composed of two factors—men and matériel. The latter, a constant factor, can be planned, designed, ordered, and made according to specifications. The former must be accepted as procured and then organized, equipped, trained—and is always an inconstant factor. Human nature cannot become perfect. It is uncertain under stress and subject to the commission of errors, irrespective of good intentions and training. Consequently, an army of human beings must be subjected to inspection for correction of irregularities and deficiencies that are, by nature, expected to exist.

20. Personal Guide for Inspectors General

There are four fundamental principles which must become deeply ingrained in the consciousness of every officer of the Inspector General's Department. The degree of success achieved will be in direct proportion to the thorough knowledge and application of these principles, which are:

a. Development of the faculty of approaching every mission with a determination of developing the facts that have a direct bearing upon the main issue or function. Almost anyone can find dust in some corner, but a well-trained inspector general will raise his sights and aim at the primary issue.

b. The ability to inquire into and report the facts concerning the efficiency and economy of the Army without bias or prejudice.

c. Exceptional and extensive powers of observation, a photographic mind, and a retentive and recording memory.

d. Meticulous adherence to uniform regulations and strict personal observance of "military discipline, courtesy, and customs of the service."

The inspector general must inquire into and report facts without bias or prejudice. Facts are established only on truth. A mission can be accomplished only by reporting the truthful facts as seen and heard. All inspections should be commenced with an open mind and not prejudiced by former reports or hearsay evidence. An inspector should not start a mission thinking he will find many irregularities and deficiencies or that he will find none whatever. If he has such a mental attitude, his mind is biased, and he is likely to report something as wrong or right which might be contrary to the facts. He must remember that his job is to assist his commander by having answers and not questions. His staff work must be complete.

The third principle, (*c*), observation and memory, may be amplified by the fact that an officer talking with other officers about their training programs, progress, operation, care of equipment and installations must have exceptional and extensive powers of observation. He must mentally observe and record what he sees, what he hears, what he learns, and what he thinks. He should base his conversation on questions, suggestions and recommendations. He must automatically know what questions are to be propounded.

It is natural that any unit or installation being inspected is on the defensive. Some commanding officers and staff officers may mentally resent the inspection and erect a mental barricade. In all inspections being made under orders from higher authorities, the inspecting officer *must* have full cooperation from officers and enlisted personnel. To secure this assistance the inspector general must at all times exercise tact, tolerance, diplomacy, and intelligence. He should avoid arguments and discussions of controversial subjects. In his initial

meeting with the unit commander, he should be attentive to details, listening much and talking little. His composite attitude should dispel and allay any suspicion of snooping. He should make his presence a pleasure and his absence a regret.

Carrying a note book and pencil in the open is not encouraged. All written notes should preferably be made in private and not in the presence of officers or troops. Should any notation of factual or statistical data become necessary in public, the note book and pencil may be withdrawn from the pocket, but the inspecting officer should indicate what he is recording.

It is desirable for every inspector general to develop his own individual method of memorizing. Mental notes can generally be recorded by associating facts with names, units and locations for later transcription by a review of the sequence of events that have occurred.

The mission to be accomplished should be kept constantly in mind during the inspection and/or investigation. It is well to recall that it is a matter of selecting the wheat from the chaff. One may become easily side-tracked or carried away on a tangent, if not careful, to become involved in trivial, irrelevant matters. One should not let himself become engrossed over the "dust in the corners" to the detriment of an appraisal of the overall task at hand.

Minor irregularities and deficiencies should be immediately and orally brought to the attention of the proper authorities and followed by written memorandum to the commanding officer if not currently corrected. An inspector general's remarks should never be of a brusque or critical nature nor bluntly stated. Neither should they be too direct or forceful. Attention should not be directed by remarks such as "Why don't you follow instructions in ———?" or "How do these men happen to be quartered over here?" or "What's the trouble with that man's overcoat?" Instead, language should be used such as "I think you will find the instructions about as follows, etc.," "I presume there is a reason for these men being quartered over here," or "That man does not exactly fit his overcoat, does he?" The policy of politeness will produce far better results than caustic and sarcastic questions.

Above all, the inspector general must be specific. For instance, it is not sufficient to report: "Two mess halls were dirty;" or "Two men needed haircuts and shaves." The comments should be "The floors and tables in the mess halls of Companies A and B were dirty;" and "Privates A. Lawes and B. Robinson needed haircuts and shaves."

If an inspecting officer is questioned regarding policies, regulations, programs, etc., and has not the information presently in mind, he should not guess but should check the matter and advise the questioner at the earliest practicable time. It is, therefore, essential that an inspector general must be generally familiar with all regulations and

directives. He should see all such papers received by his unit headquarters and prepare a small personal reference file for his own records.

Appearance, manners and military demeanor are vital assets. (d) To secure truthful information he must have the respect and confidence of the individuals being inspected. While an inspector general is inspecting, he must realize that he, also, is being inspected by both officers and men. An inspector general must look, act and talk like an officer and a gentleman. His uniform must be regulation and he must wear it properly. He must not put on a stern, severe or overbearing front. He must be gracious and cordial but not familiar and he should maintain this attitude when questioning enlisted men as well as officers. The use of profanity is uncalled for in making an inspection, nor is smoking advisable in the presence of troops when they are not permitted to smoke. In other words, he must be a gentleman and an outstanding soldier at all times.

During the course of an inspection, an inspector general properly may be invited out socially to an officer's quarters, to a mess or club. However, it is not good policy to occupy the status of a house guest of the commanding officer, because of possible situations wherein it later becomes necessary for an inspector general to render an adverse report on the commander, and further because of influences, potential or actual, which may arise from this unofficial relationship.

By and large, an inspector general must be a versatile officer. His position is positive, his missions are manifold, his duties are directed, his actions accurate, his conduct cooperative, his inquiries relevant, his reports impartial, and his conclusions should be correct.

Detail in the Inspector General's Department is at once a challenge and an opportunity—a challenge to resourcefulness, ingenuity, initiative, and an opportunity to serve in the spirit of the motto of the Department—"Droit et Avant"—"Be sure you are right—and then go ahead," or "First be right; then take action."

KEEP YOUR SIGHTS ALIGNED ON THE MAIN ISSUE; THE DUST IS LIKELY TO BLOW AWAY

SECTION VIII

REFERENCES

21. List.

AR 20–5, Inspector General's Department (General Provisions).
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War Department Technical Bulletins (IG Series).
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National Guard Regulations.

Part 2

Communicative Skills

Table of Contents

Communicative Skills

Introduction

Communicative Skills

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this part is to assist Inspectors General (IGs) at all levels in developing written products and conducting interviews and sensing sessions.

2. **IGs as Communicators:** IGs are in the communication business. An IG's ability to communicate effectively is essential to the success of the IG system. This part contains three chapters that will assist IGs in communicating effectively and clearly as they gather, and then report upon, information of all types. The three chapters address the writing process, interviews, and sensing sessions. These chapters will help to improve the effectiveness of IGs in these commonly used communicative skills.

This part further assumes that an IG has achieved a certain level of expertise and experience in the use of basic communicative methods such as speaking and writing. This part draws from a variety of Army and civilian sources, but the IG must not consider this text to be all-inclusive. Other resources exist that address writing and speaking in greater depth, and IGs should explore these resources as necessary. The ultimate purpose of this part of the guide is to help already accomplished communicators sharpen further their communicative skills.

In addition to discussing the writing process, this part of The Inspector General Reference Guide will explore in detail two of the five techniques (or domains) of information gathering available to an IG as mentioned above. For further information on the other information-gathering domains, see the U.S. Army Inspector General School's two primary doctrinal publications: The Inspections Guide and The Assistance and Investigations Guide. This text serves to supplement -- and complement -- these two doctrinal publications.

3. **The Information-Gathering Domains:** IG inspectors have five information-gathering techniques -- or domains -- available to them. These domains apply to the Inspections, Investigations, and Assistance functions and represent the primary methods that IGs use to gather information for an Inspection, an Investigation or Investigative Inquiry, or an Assistance Inquiry. The five domains are as follows:

a. Interviews with key leaders or other personnel.

b. Sensing sessions with enlisted Soldiers, NCOs, and officers.

c. Reviews of documents such as Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs), policy letters, post regulations, training-guidance memorandums, documentary evidence, and so on.

d. Observation of major training events, live-fire exercises, after-action reviews, inspections, and so on.

e. Surveys and Questionnaires (normally used for topics that require a sampling of a unit's population).

Inspections usually apply all five of these domains while Investigations principally employ interviews. The way an interview occurs in an Inspection differs from an interview conducted during an Investigation. However, the same basic principles apply. An IG conducting an Assistance Inquiry often conducts walk-in interviews and -- on occasion -- scheduled sensing sessions. All three IG functions employ document review to some degree; however, observation most often occurs during Inspections. This part will focus on the two domains that require the most polished of communicative skills -- interviews and sensing sessions.

Chapter 1

The Writing Process

1. **Purpose:** This chapter assists Inspectors General (IGs) at all levels in developing, crafting, and producing effective written products as required when engaging in the Assistance, Investigations, or Inspections functions.

2. **The Purpose of Writing:** As IGs, you will write to inform your intended audience of something they do not already know, or you will write to defend a particular point of view or finding. In either case, IGs must write to transmit their message clearly and concisely and in a manner and style that is clear and generally free of spelling and grammar errors.

3. **The Army Writing Style:** IGs communicate effectively in written form by adhering to a writing style (long advocated by the Army) that is not dense with complicated or obscure words or that relies on long, complex sentences. IGs must write using clear, short sentences as much as possible. Avoid using the passive voice since this writing style robs verbs of their subjects, muddles meaning, and avoids responsibility. Be aware of grammar and such things as punctuation and pronoun reference pitfalls. In effect, IGs should develop a writing style that will allow the reading audience to glide through the text with minimal distraction or confusion. See paragraph 1-44 in AR 25-50, Preparing and Managing Correspondence, and DA PAM 600-67, Effective Writing for Army Leaders, for further information on the Army writing style.

4. **Approaching the Writing Task:** Most IGs feels that writing is an ominous task. They approach the writing of Reports of Investigation (ROIs), Inspections Findings Sections, and so on as an exceedingly complex, linear process. Actually, the opposite is true. Writing can be as free flowing and without form as necessary -- until the writer has to package the final product using the prescribed format or outline. Until that point, an IG's approach to writing depends upon the individual IG. When first approaching the writing topic, the writer should do the following:

a. Explore what you already know or believe about the topic at hand. Reflect on the subject abstractly or engage in free writing in an attempt to capture these random thoughts.

b. Clarify the writing task.

c. Develop a writing plan that allows you sufficient time to develop and then revise at least two drafts of the written product before considering the task complete. In effect, your writing plan should consider these six basic steps:

(1) Pre-writing and research (includes delving into -- and studying -- your sources)

(2) Thesis development

(3) First draft development

(4) Second draft development

(5) Final editing and grammatical check

(6) Production of the final product in the prescribed format (Inspections findings section, Report of Investigation, and so on).

The actual steps an IG uses to write will vary from person to person. The writer must keep in mind his or her time constraints and approach the writing task accordingly. Some writing assignments may be short fused while others will afford the writer sufficient time to do a thorough job of developing the written product. In any case, the final goal is a solid, well-crafted, and well-packaged written product that will effectively communicate its point to the desired audience.

5. **The Writing Plan:** An explanation for each of the six steps in a standard writing plan is as follows:

a. **Pre-Writing:** IGs should first approach any writing task without worrying about form, style, or content. The first step of the writing process should be to understand the requirement and what the writer must achieve with the final product. This step is called pre-writing and requires the writer to explore the topic mentally and reflect upon the writing task at hand. Pre-writing may also include the writing down of random thoughts and ideas about the topic without regard to form or structure (sometimes called mind-mapping in the Army). Naturally, pre-writing means that the writer is willing to take the time to develop the essay, paper, findings section, or report and not simply bang out a hasty product on the computer. Waiting until the last minute to generate a written product that requires thought, illustration, and analysis will almost certainly spell disaster for the writer. Setting aside the time to do it properly is essential. Pre-writing will soon give way to some sense of what the final product will resemble in both substance and structure.

b. **Developing a Thesis:** Most written products that an IG will produce require a bottom-line-up-front (BLUF in Army parlance). In effect, IGs will write to support a thesis or BLUF. This form of writing is generally known as the argumentative style in which a writer presents a thesis and then supports it through illustrations, analysis, and other types of information. Remember that an argument does not necessarily imply a combative attitude; instead, the writer is rationally and soberly defending his or her position as stated in the thesis.

Thesis development can be difficult if the writer has not formed a complete opinion about the subject based upon available evidence or supporting information. Therefore, most writers develop a draft thesis prior to crafting the written product with the intent of revisiting that thesis later to revise it and -- in some cases -- change their position completely. Resultantly, all IGs should consider their thesis statements to be in draft form until they develop a final draft of the entire written product.

But what is a thesis statement? The thesis statement is the main point of the written product and shapes the form and content of that product. Generally, thesis statements are assertions that normally comprise a fact and an opinion. In other words,

the fact that the writer is defending in the essay also includes the writer's opinion about that fact. In a formulaic sense, the thesis can appear as: I think x because of a, b, and c. The x is the fact derived from the writer's opinion and analysis of the available evidence, and the a, b, and c portions are the supporting facts or evidence that reinforce that particular stance. By shaping the draft thesis in this manner, the writer can capture the main point of the written product and then offer a preview of the evidence that will support that main point (or thesis) by hinting at that evidence directly in the thesis statement. Naturally, the thesis statement will not begin with "I think" but will instead take the form of an assertion. Here's an example:

The surprise German counterattack through the Ardennes forest in December 1944 **(fact)** resulted from an intelligence failure **(opinion, or x)** caused by **(a)** the senior leadership's overly optimistic view that the Germans were beaten, **(b)** needless bickering and second-guessing among the intelligence chiefs at the Army Group and Army levels, and **(c)** poor analysis of the information gathered by numerous front-line patrols in the days immediately preceding the attack.

This example clearly illustrates the point made by Irene L. Clark of the University of Southern California that: "The thesis serves as a unifying thread throughout the essay, tying together details and examples" (*Writing About Diversity: An Argument Reader and Guide*, Harcourt-Brace College Publishers, Fort Worth, Texas, 1994). This thesis states the fact, the writer's opinion, and then outlines the evidence that supports that opinion (an intelligence failure). In effect, the thesis has helped to establish the basic structure of the final written product.

Infinite possibilities for thesis statements exist, so the writer should not mechanically attempt to conform to any particular formula. However, structuring a draft thesis in a certain way can help the writer visualize the essay or written product before actually creating the first draft of that product.

After drafting the thesis statement, the writer should develop an outline of the written product so that he or she can continue the writing process with some clear sense of direction. This outline will give the written product its intended structure.

c. **Developing First and Second Draft Versions of the Written Product:** The writer should develop the first draft of the written product without worrying about mistakes such as grammar errors or stylistic problems. The IG can fix those problems when editing and refining the first and second draft versions of the document. However, the writer must select some basic structure before writing that first draft. Many written products that an IG will craft often have their own pre-established structures such as an Inspection findings section or a Report of Investigation (ROI). However, most of these formats will generally follow a basic pattern as follows:

(1) **Introduction:** The written product will usually begin with an introductory paragraph that presents the written product's main point or thesis. Depending upon the written product's purpose and intended audience, the introduction can take on many forms such as presenting a problem or issue; providing historical context; expounding upon the particular importance of the topic; or introducing the topic through a lively anecdote, vignette, or description. Above all, the introduction's primary purpose is to lead the audience into the written product, give them a clear sense of the subject, and present the thesis statement. The introduction and thesis statement will

always exist in draft form until the writer completes the final draft of the written product. The writer must go back and ensure that what he or she supports in the main body of the essay is logically linked to the assertion made in the thesis statement.

(2) **Main Body:** The main body of the written product consists of the individual paragraphs that will support the thesis. The writer must develop at least one paragraph for each point or idea (the a, b, c, etc.) that he or she wants to make or introduce to support the thesis (some evidence may take several paragraphs to discuss). The main paragraph of each point discussed must have a topic sentence that captures -- like a thesis statement -- the main point of the evidence presented. In effect, topic sentences for paragraphs are similar to thesis statements for essays; each one captures the main point of what the writer wants to discuss so that the reading audience is not struggling to determine where the written product is going or what it is trying to achieve. The main body of the written product -- the supporting paragraphs -- develops the main thesis using various strategies such as analysis, comparison-contrast, illustrations, and other types of information. In IG Inspection Reports, each Findings Section has an Inspection Results portion, which represents the main body of that five-part written product; this Inspection Results portion outlines the evidence that supports the finding statement (or thesis) for that particular Findings Section. Likewise, the main body of an IG Report of Investigation or Investigative Inquiry (ROI / ROII) will be the portion that discusses – and logically sequences – the evidence that supports the IG investigator's conclusion of substantiated or not substantiated.

(3) **Conclusion:** The written product ends with a concluding paragraph that redirects the audience's attention back to the main point. The conclusion may reaffirm the main point, pose a question, summarize what the writer has just stated, or elaborate upon the significance of the topic that the writer has just discussed. More captivating conclusions will offer the reading audience an illustrative anecdote or vignette that further reinforces the main point outlined in the thesis statement.

Once the first draft is complete, the writer should review the written product for content, meaning, accuracy, and completeness. Changes made to the first draft will lead to a second draft. Once again, the IG should review the second draft for structure and content but also with an eye toward finding and correcting any nagging spelling and grammatical errors. Seeking out a peer to review the second draft is an excellent idea since a writer can sometimes get too close to his or her own work and not be able to see any problems with the text clearly.

d. **Final Editing:** Once the writer is satisfied that the written product successfully communicates -- or argues for -- the writer's main point, then the writer should carefully review the text for all remaining grammar errors. Computer spell- and grammar-checking programs greatly facilitate this process; however, not all grammar recommendations made by the computer are correct. The writer is ultimately responsible for the content of the final written product. Don't let a computer do the thinking for you.

e. **Producing the Final Product:** This final step can occur as part of the final editing process or later as a separate step. The writer must now package the written product in final form using the prescribed format. For example, if the writer is developing a findings section for an Inspection report, the writer will state the thesis up front as the Finding Statement followed by a paragraph that outlines the applicable standards. The

Inspection Results and Root Cause come next and actually represent the main body of the written product. The recommendations come last and serve as the conclusion.

6. **Style and Grammar Tips:** The following style and grammar tips will assist IGs from making common writing errors.

a. Passive Voice. Passive voice -- as opposed to the active voice -- robs the verb of its subject and inverts the order of a sentence by placing the subject after the verb. Passive voice allows the subject to escape responsibility for the verb and the thing acted upon through that verb -- the direct object. In addition, passive voice increases the number of words in a sentence and is therefore less direct and more verbose. The active voice increases the tempo of the written language and encourages a clearer, more immediate understanding of the text. An IG can identify passive voice in a sentence by looking for three distinct things:

(1) Some form of the verb *to be* (is, was, been, etc.)

(2) A past participle of some verb (usually ending in *-ed* such as *chopped, whipped,* and *kicked* or as an irregular past-participle verb form such as *seen* or *written*)

(3) The subject of the sentence follows the verb or is missing completely

Consider this example of the passive voice:

The dog was kicked by John.

The sentence is written in the passive voice because we have a form of the verb *to be* (was), a past participle of a verb (kicked), and the subject following the verb (John). The dog is the receiver of the action -- the direct object -- and should follow the verb. To convert this sentence to the active voice, place the subject (John) before the verb (kicked).

John kicked the dog.

The sentence is now in the active voice because the subject precedes the verb. Notice how the words *was* and *by* disappeared, making the sentence shorter and more direct. Some passive-voice sentences will also suffer from the absence of a subject.

The dog was kicked.

To convert this sentence into the active voice, the writer will have to name the otherwise unknown subject (John) in the sentence. A sentence written in this manner allows the subject to escape responsibility for the action. Consider this example:

The critical memorandum was lost.

The person who lost this important piece of paper is clearly avoiding responsibility by not naming himself or herself as the subject. Accepting responsibility in the active voice would read as follows:

Senator Jones lost the critical memorandum.

Since leaders in the Army routinely accept responsibility for their actions, the use of the active voice in Army writing is essential.

b. Pronoun Reference. Many writers often use the pronoun *this* without naming a clear antecedent. This failure to name an antecedent routinely creates confusion in the text and causes the reader to refer back to previous sentences to determine what *this* really is. Consider the following example:

Many Soldiers failed to complete the obstacle course on time. *This* resulted in several Soldiers receiving a poor grade on their Soldier Skills test.

The pronoun *This* in the second sentence vaguely refers to the main idea in the first sentence. But to what does *this* really refer? To ensure clarity, insert a clear antecedent for *this* immediately following the pronoun.

Many Soldiers failed to complete the obstacle course on time. *This* failure resulted in several Soldiers receiving a poor grade on their Soldier Skills test.

The pronoun *This* now clearly refers to the notion of failure outlined in the first sentence. Always try to insert a clear reference after the pronoun *this* to ensure absolute clarity and to keep the reader from guessing.

c. Forming the Possessive for Singular Nouns Ending in *s*. The standard rule for forming the possessive for singular nouns ending in *s* is simply to add *'s* to the end. Here are some examples:

Charles's friend

Burns's poems

Ross's rifle

Dickens's novels

d. The Use of *It's* and *Its*. A common error is to write *it's* for *its* or vice versa. *It's* is a contraction meaning *it is*, and *its* is a possessive form. Consider this example:

It's (it is) a wise dog that scratches *its* (possessive) own fleas.

e. Commas for Items in a Series. In a series of three or more items, use a comma after each item except for the last one. Here are some examples:

red, white, and blue

gold, silver, or copper

If one or more of the items in a series has internal punctuation such as a comma, use a semi-colon to separate the items.

During the inspection, the IG discovered a general willingness to comply with the standard; a desire to excel at all things within the battalion; and a patriotic fervor that resulted in the Soldiers painting each rock in the unit area a bright red, white, and blue.

f. The Use of Commas with Dates. Dates usually contain parenthetic words or figures. The correct punctuation is as follows:

April 6, 2003

February to July, 2002

Wednesday, November 11, 1999

In the Army, we often invert the date to read as day-month-year. In these cases, punctuation is not necessary.

20 July 1944

g. Comma Splices. Comma splices normally occur when a writer joins two complete, independent sentences with a comma. In many cases, comma splices occur using a conjunctive adverb such as *likewise*, *however*, *moreover*, etc. Here is an example of a comma splice that uses a conjunctive adverb:

The snow fell quickly today, however, the snowplows cleared the streets within an hour.

The two sentences are spliced together inappropriately using the conjunctive adverb of *however*. To correct this fault, a semi-colon belongs after the word today -- or the two sentences should be separated.

The snow fell quickly today; however, the snowplows cleared the streets within an hour.

The snow fell quickly today. However, the snowplows cleared the streets within an hour.

h. Coordinating Conjunctions. Coordinating conjunctions help to connect two closely related -- but independent -- sentences. There are seven coordinating conjunctions, and each one requires a comma before it when connecting two separate sentences. The seven coordinating conjunctions are as follows: *and, or, nor, for, yet, but,* and *so*.

The men started to chase Bill, so he turned and ran away.

Frank liked Bill's poems, but he preferred to read short stories.

If necessary, each of these two sentences could be split into two separate sentences and omit the coordinating conjunction.

The men started to chase Bill. He turned and ran away.

Frank liked Bill's poems. He preferred to read short stories.

i. Dashes. A dash represents an abrupt break or interruption in a sentence. A dash is a mark of separation stronger than a comma, less formal than a colon, and more relaxed than parentheses. Use dashes sparingly and for effect.

His first thought on getting out of bed -- if he had any thought at all -- was to get back in again.

The rear axle began to make a noise -- a grinding, chattering, teeth-gritting rasp.

The style and grammar tips listed above represent some of the more common grammar and stylistic errors made by writers today. For a more complete guide to grammar and writing style, refer to The Elements of Style by William Strunk, Jr. and E. B. White. MacMillan Publishing Company in New York routinely keeps this book in print; MacMillan produced a Third Edition in 1979.

Chapter 2

Conducting Interviews

1. **Purpose:** This chapter outlines a general approach to conducting interviews.

2. **The Purpose of Interviews:** An interview is an information-gathering technique designed to allow an IG to gather information through one-on-one, face-to-face contact with an individual. Interviews are not interrogations.

3. **Types of Interviews:** Two types of interviews exist: scheduled and walk-in. Scheduled interviews normally occur during Inspections and Investigations. Walk-in -- or unscheduled -- interviews normally occur as part of the assistance function (for example, when someone comes to the IG office to lodge a complaint, make an allegation, or request assistance). The principle difference between a scheduled interview and a walk-in interview is the amount of preparation on the IG's part. Scheduled interviews will follow a well-prepared interrogatory (or list of questions) while walk-in interviews will result in an IG developing on-the-spot questions to gather the information necessary to assist the individual. Scheduled interviews may also occur by telephone and require a certain level of coordination. The IG must pre-brief the person he or she plans to interview by telephone on the purpose, time, and location of the interview in addition to conducting a pre-interview telephone-line and tape-recorder check as necessary.

4. **Setting the Conditions for an Interview:** Scheduled interviews often last one hour, but the actual duration will vary based upon the amount of information required. The same notion applies to walk-in interviews. The IG should always conduct the interview in a private place that will be free from interruptions and will readily set the interviewee at ease. If necessary, place "do not disturb" signs on the door or find a place that is free from distracting telephone calls or repeated interruptions by co-workers or subordinates. Always be friendly and personable to the person you are about to interview. This behavior will set the person at ease. For a walk-in interview, greet the person by coming from behind your desk with your hand extended and a smile on your face. IGs may also conduct interviews in pairs; one IG can record the information while the other IG asks the questions. Interviews conducted as part of an Investigation (sworn, recorded testimony) will normally occur with two IGs present.

5. **Introduction:** Scheduled interviews during Inspections will begin with a prepared introduction recited by the IG to the interviewee. This introduction will explain the purpose, scope, and ground rules of the interview. The introduction will also explain the notion of confidentiality and set a prescribed time limit for the interview (see the example at the end of this chapter). Scheduled interviews for Investigations will begin with a read-in briefing and end with a read-out briefing (see The Assistance and Investigations Guide). Walk-in interviews will not normally have a prepared introduction; however, IGs who routinely work in the Assistance function and receive Inspector General Action Requests (IGARs) on a daily basis may develop and use a standard introduction that explains the type of information required for the DA Form 1559 and what information the complainant must provide to allow the IG to solve the problem.

6. **Conducting the Interview:** Immediately following the introduction or read-in briefing, scheduled interviews will continue with the prepared questions (for an Inspection) or interrogatory (for an Investigation). Develop no more than 10 questions since time will not allow for many more. The IG must always ask one question at a time and present the questions in a logical sequence. Give the interviewee enough time to answer each question thoroughly. Do not ask bullying or trick questions. The questions should be open-ended and promote discussion. Close-ended questions -- questions that normally require only a yes or no response -- will often keep the IG from determining the root cause or deeper meaning of a problem or issue. The IG should ask each question in a friendly yet business-like manner, and the IG should probe for answers only as far as is necessary to obtain the required information. The same principles apply to walk-in interviews -- even though the IG will not be using prepared questions to gather information. The following are some helpful hints about conducting interviews:

a. Establish rapport. Rapport is a relationship built on harmony and will immediately set the interviewee at ease. The interview will proceed well if the interviewee senses that the IG is someone with whom he or she can speak easily and comfortably.

b. Maintain Control. The IG must always control the interview and not allow the discussion to digress to irrelevant issues. IGs can maintain control without being overly assertive. Instead, the IG can simply keep re-directing the discussion back to the interview's primary topic.

c. Avoid Arguing. An IG must not argue with the interviewee even if he or she disagrees strongly with what the person says. The IG's mission is to gather the required information and to remain as neutral as possible.

d. Maintain Strict Impartiality. IGs should never make value judgments about the information gathered. In cases where an interviewee misquotes a regulation or standard, the IG can -- and should -- intercede and correct the error as part of the IG's Teach-and-Train function. Likewise, IGs should not proffer an opinion about anything an interviewee says or commiserate with that person on any real or perceived injustices.

e. Do Not Try to Solve Problems on the Spot. Numerous issues and personal problems may arise during the course of scheduled interviews. The interviewee may attempt to solicit the IG for a response or an agreement to fix a problem as soon as possible. This same notion especially applies to walk-in interviews for assistance. In all circumstances, IGs must refrain from attempting to solve a problem on the spot or promising that he or she will get something "fixed" for the interviewee. If the IG is unable to comply with that promise at a later date, the IG's credibility will invariably suffer.

f. Do Not Allow the Interviewee to Interview You. If the interviewee begins asking questions of the IG such as "What do you think of this situation?" or "Would you put up with that stuff?", the IG should ignore the queries and continue with the questioning. If the interviewee persists, then the IG should simply state that he or she is not familiar enough with the situation to render an opinion. An opinion proffered by an IG may compromise that IG's impartiality at a later date.

g. Be a Good Listener. The quality of an IG's listening can actually control another person's ability to talk. Listening is an active process in which the IG thinks

ahead, weighs the points, reviews the information already covered, and searches the information for greater meaning. Most people need some feedback to ensure that the IG is being attentive and hearing them. If the IG stares at the responding interviewee impassively, the interviewee will be less forthcoming and feel that what he or she is saying is unimportant. The IG should be a positive listener who uses non-judgmental expressions or gestures that show interest or understanding. A small gesture such as a nod, a smile, or eye contact are often enough to maintain rapport with the interviewee. The IG may also try neutral phrases such as "Tell me more about it" or "Go on and explain what happened next."

h. Silence. Silent pauses during an interview should never embarrass an IG. A respect for silence is often helpful and can allow both the interviewer and interviewee to collect their thoughts before proceeding. A hasty interruption on the IG's part may leave an important part of the story forever untold. The IG may also use silence to force a response from a reluctant interviewee. If the IG must ask a lot of questions in order to keep the person providing information, the interview can quickly become an interrogation.

i. Accept the Interviewee's Feelings. IGs must learn to accept a person's feelings during an interview and avoid passing judgment on someone. Gather only the facts, and do not dole out false reassurances about anything.

j. Make Perception Checks. A perception check is a test that the IG can conduct to ensure that he or she has interpreted the other person's feelings about a particular fact or issue correctly. The interviewee's information may suggest displeasure with a person or system even though the person never actually states those feelings as a fact. The IG can clarify this perception by simply making a statement such as "I am under the impression that you are upset with what your commander is doing." The interviewee will either confirm or deny the statement.

7. **Ending the Interview:** For scheduled interviews conducted as part of an Investigation (sworn, recorded testimony), the IG should follow the read-out briefing listed in The Assistance and Investigations Guide. All other interviews -- scheduled and walk-in -- should conclude with the IG doing the following:

a. Informing the interviewee that he or she has provided all of the required information.

b. Asking if the interviewee has anything else to offer.

c. Establishing a continuation date and time if a follow-up interview is necessary.

d. Reminding the interviewee of confidentiality.

e. Thanking the interviewee for his or her time and for providing the information.

f. Avoiding making promises or commitments.

8. **Sample Introduction for a Scheduled Interview:** The following sample introduction is for a scheduled interview conducted as part of an inspection on Risk Management:

Risk Management Interview Introduction

Hello, I am _____ of the _____ Inspector General office.

- I am talking to you as part of an inspection that the IG is doing on the Army's Risk Management process to determine that process's integration and institutionalization in training, operations, and high-risk training. The commanding general directed this inspection.

- I am interviewing you to get your thoughts and opinions about Risk Management training and its function in your on- and off-duty activities. We will combine what you tell us with what others say. We will look for patterns and trends in the collective comments and perceptions and then report that information to the commanding general.

- We define Risk Management as: The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risk arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (AR 385-10, The Army Safety Program).

- This command may describe the program by a different name or term. If so, please let me know. If you do not recognize a term, please ask.

- I want you to feel perfectly at ease and talk freely with me. To this end, I propose these ground rules:

    - I am interested specifically in your thoughts, feelings, opinions, or anything relevant to the subject.

    - I will take notes to capture the essence of what you say. However, I will not use your name or in any way attribute what you say to who you are. I am sensitive to the fact that you might not talk as freely about things if you think your comments could later be attributed to you in a negative way.

    - The only time that I might attribute a name to a statement is in the unlikely event that you indicate that you have evidence of a crime, a security violation, or a serious breach of integrity. If that happens, I will discuss that issue with you immediately following this interview.

    - I will take about one hour of your time.

- Do you have any questions about the ground rules? Great! Let's begin!

Chapter 3

Conducting Sensing Sessions

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance on how to conduct a sensing session.

2. **Discussion:** Sensing sessions are group interviews that can serve as an excellent source of information. The objective of a sensing session is to provide IGs with the perceptions and opinions of the group's members (Soldiers, civilians, Family members, and so on). If conducted properly, the group that the team is sensing will feel comfortable and share some critical opinions and observations about a certain topic.

The key to a successful sensing session is to make the group feel comfortable -- even though the facilitator may be a lieutenant colonel while the group members are junior enlisted Soldiers. The facilitator must not assert his or her authority directly but instead do so in a subtle manner through body language and tone. The sensing-session group will understand that authority if the facilitator conducts the session professionally and treats everyone with equal respect throughout the session. The key features of a successful sensing session are as follows:

a. Location: The setting should be in a classroom-sized environment and -- preferably -- away from the unit. The location must support the notion of anonymity since the Soldiers you are sensing will expect some measure of confidentiality. The preferred structure of the room is to arrange the chairs into a "U" shape so that the facilitator and recorder can position themselves at the open mouth of the "U." All participants should be able to see each other. Avoid using a classroom set-up with tables or desks since the participants cannot see each other and the facilitator will have difficulty maintaining eye contact.

b. Group Size and Composition: A successful sensing session cannot occur with fewer than eight (8) people. The preferred group size is 15 since the facilitator cannot maintain eye contact or rapport with a group larger than 15. Groups smaller than eight people will not support -- in each participant's mind -- the IG's promise of anonymity and will normally devolve into a discussion between the facilitator and one or two of the more outspoken participants.

The unit will select the participants based upon criteria established by the IG. The IG must not, under any circumstances, select the participants by name. The IG should stratify the group by unit, gender, race, and grade as required. The facilitator must not allow members of the group's chain of command to observe the session. Likewise, the facilitator must ensure that none of the group members shares a supervisory relationship with another member.

c. Preparation: The facilitator must develop no more than 10 open-ended questions that will help capture the desired information about the topic. Close-ended questions require yes or no responses and will not allow the IG to get at the root cause of the problem or any other underlying issues.

The facilitator must also consider the group's composition when developing sensing-session questions. The questions that the facilitator asks a group of enlisted Soldiers will vary from the questions posed to a group of junior officers. In addition, he facilitator must know and understand the questions thoroughly. The facilitator must be prepared to allow the discussion to ramble a bit and not simply force the group to answer a series of questions in succession. The facilitator should ultimately ensure that the group answers all of the questions but within the context of a free-flowing discussion.

d. Recording: Another team member, who will serve as a recorder (or scribe) for the session, must accompany the facilitator. The recorder will take notes to capture the essence of what the group members say without quoting anyone directly. The recorder will never list the names of those present for the session. Also, some situations may require the facilitator to also serve as the recorder.

e. Introduction: The facilitator must have on hand a prepared introduction or statement that captures the purpose and intent behind the session. Likewise, this introduction must establish ground rules for the session such as confidentiality, actions taken if a Soldier inadvertently gives evidence of a crime, and so on. The introduction must mention that the IG is interested in the group's opinions and perceptions about the topic at hand and that the recorder will only take notes to capture the essence of what the group says but will not take names (see the end of this chapter for a sample introduction).

f. Conducting the Session: The session should not last for more than two hours since most of the group members will become fidgety and fatigued by this time. The preferred time for a sensing session is 90 minutes. The facilitator can begin with some humor but should do so only if the comments do not compromise the seriousness or professional nature of the session.

The facilitator should ask the first question and then allow the discussion to develop naturally. Once the facilitator obtains the required information from the group concerning the first question, the facilitator can begin with the next question. Asking the questions in sequence is less important than gathering the required information. A rambling, naturally developing discussion may ultimately answer all of the questions, so the recorder has to know how to capture the relevant information as it surfaces. When the discussion begins to wind down, the facilitator can ask those questions not answered during the larger discussion.

The facilitator must make every effort to involve everyone in the discussion and treat each group member's comments as valid and useful -- even if some of the comments may seem strikingly ridiculous. In effect, the facilitator must never "shut out" a participant by evaluating someone's statement in front of the group. The facilitator and the recorder must be good, active listeners and show interest in the comments made by the group's members. The recorder may also interject and ask follow-up questions or request clarification as necessary. The recorder may also summarize the feedback periodically to ensure that he or she has captured the group's thoughts accurately.

Since the sensing session is not a complaint session, the facilitator must remind the group to hold all complaints or personal issues until after the sensing session (if complaints begin to surface). The IG must never make a commitment or a promise during the session -- even if pressed to do so by a member of the group.

The facilitator must also be prepared to teach and train the group on aspects of the topic that the group may not understand. If a member of the group makes an incorrect statement about an existing standard or regulation, the facilitator should correct the individual to ensure that the group does not consider the person's statement to be correct and thus perpetuate some misinformation.

g. Ending the Session: The facilitator should begin ending (or winding down) the session 15 minutes before the scheduled completion time. If the group answers all questions before the time is over, then release the group early. Most of these Soldiers will have other things to do and will appreciate the extra time. The facilitator or recorder should summarize the key points made during the session before releasing the group. Be sure to thank them for their assistance and remind them one last time about the issue of confidentiality.

3. **Sample Introduction for a Sensing Session:** The following sample introduction is for a sensing session conducted as part of an inspection on Risk Management:

Risk Management Sensing Session Introduction

Hello, I am _____ of the _____ Inspector General office. This is my partner, _____.

- We are talking to you as part of an inspection that the IG is doing on the Army's Risk Management process to determine the process's integration and institutionalization in training, operations, and high-risk training. The commanding general directed this inspection.

- We are interviewing you to get your thoughts and opinions about Risk Management training and its function in your on- and off-duty activities. We will combine what you tell us with what other groups say. We will look for patterns and trends in the collective comments and perceptions and then report that information to the commanding general.

- We define Risk Management as "The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risk arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits" (AR 385-10, The Army Safety Program).

- Your unit may describe the program by a different name or term. If so, please let us know. If you do not recognize a term, please ask.

- We want you to feel perfectly at ease and talk freely with us. To this end, we propose these ground rules:

    - We are interested specifically in your thoughts, feelings, opinions, or anything relevant to the subject. Speak for yourself and avoid speeches or philosophical statements.

    - Respond to the questions we ask, stay on track, and avoid sidebars with your neighbors.

- Keep each other's input confidential; what is said in this room stays in this room.

- My partner will take notes to capture the essence of what you say. We will not use your name or in any way attribute what you say to who you are. We are sensitive to the fact that you might not talk as freely about things if you think your comments could later be attributed to you in a negative way.

- The only time we might attribute a name to a statement is in the unlikely event that you indicate that you have evidence of a crime, a security violation, or a serious breach of integrity. If that happens, we will discuss that issue following this session.

- We will take about one hour and 30 minutes of your time.

- Do you have any questions about the ground rules? Great! Let's begin!

Appendix A

Sensing Session Diagnostic Test

1. What is a sensing session?

a. A group interview.

b. A session where Soldiers are allowed to air complaints.

c. A rap session.

d. A command-climate survey.

2. Which of the following locations is best suited for a sensing session (assuming that the room meets your needs)?

a. Conference Room in the battalion headquarters.

b. IG's Conference Room.

c. Unit Dining Facility.

d. Classroom away from the unit area.

3. Which of the classroom set-ups mentioned below is best suited for a sensing session?

a. Three rows of chairs facing the facilitator.

b. Three rows of tables and chairs facing the facilitator and the recorder.

c. Chairs in a "U" shape with the facilitator and recorder at the open end of the "U."

d. Chairs in an "O" shape with the facilitator and the recorder in the middle of the "O."

4. What is the best way for selecting individual participants for a sensing session?

a. Randomly by the IG.

b. By the IG based upon a roster and Social-Security Numbers.

c. By the IG based upon pre-established criteria.

d. By the unit based upon criteria established by the IG.

5. How many participants are normally in a sensing-session group?

a. Fifteen for each IG present.

b. Thirty per facilitator.

c. Five to eight.

d. Eight to 15.

6. The preferred time for a sensing session is _____.

7. Sensing-session participants can be grouped by:

a. Grade.

b. Unit.

c. Gender.

d. Race.

e. All of the above.

8. The feedback you may gather from sensing-session participants can include:

a. Facts.

b. Opinions.

c. Perceptions.

d. Rumors.

e. All of the above.

9. Sensing sessions are designed to:

a. Provide commanders with individual complaints and problems.

b. Provide IG facilitators with the perceptions of particular groups.

c. Assess the climate of the command only.

d. None of the above.

10. The recorder should:

a. Never interrupt the sensing session.

b. Periodically summarize the feedback or ask questions for clarification.

c. Covertly take notes.

d. Record all comments verbatim.

11. Should you allow members of the chain of command to attend the sensing session?

a. Yes.

b. No.

12. The facilitator must set the ground rules for the sensing session.

a. True.

b. False.

13. The facilitator should inform the group that the sensing session is NOT a complaint session.

a. True.

b. False.

14. The facilitator's only job is to gather feedback on the issues and not to teach and train.

a. True.

b. False.

15. When closing a sensing session, the facilitator should:

a. Summarize the key points made during the session.

b. Remind the group about confidentiality.

c. Thank the group for participating.

d. All of the above.

Answer Key
1 - a
2 - d
3 - c
4 - d
5 - d
6 - 90 minutes
7 - e
8 - e
9 - b
10 - b
11 - b
12 - a
13 - a
14 - b
15 - d

Part 3

Inspector General Wartime Role

Table of Contents

Inspector General Wartime Role

Introduction

Inspector General Wartime Role

Our Army is serving our Nation at War ... This war will require all elements of our National power applied in a broad, unyielding, and relentless campaign. This campaign will take a long time, and will require our deep and enduring commitment."

General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
Commenting on the current Global War on Terrorism

Born under necessity during the American Revolutionary War, the Army IG system played a key role for more than two centuries in training our Army to standard and maintaining the Army's readiness during times of conflict. The IG's role as the eyes, ears, voice and conscience of the commander are especially relevant in times of war. By using the inherent functions of inspections, assistance, investigations, and teaching and training, the IG can help the commander identify and eliminate areas of friction -- both on and off the battlefield -- that adversely impact the readiness and warfighting capability of the unit.

General Westmoreland, while Commander, U.S. Army Vietnam (USARV), and later as Army Chief of Staff, promoted a large and active wartime IG system "to be alert and smell out and solve problems while they are small." His vast military experience taught him that Soldiers needed assistance and commanders needed the ability to inspect and investigate even in war. The IG's relevance during military operations has further increased in the three decades following the Vietnam era, especially with the dramatic increase in operational deployments since 1989.

Since September 11, 2001, we have been an Army fully mobilized for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). As of October 2009, we have over 266,000 Soldiers deployed in 80 countries around the world. The nation currently has 632,000 Soldiers serving on active duty with over 58,000 Army National Guard and almost 30,000 Army Reserve Soldiers mobilized or deployed. On any given day, we have numbers equivalent to an Army division of Soldiers supporting homeland security missions throughout the U.S. Most Soldiers are either deployed, preparing for deployment, or returning and refitting for the next deployment. This elevated operational tempo creates a high demand for the unique skills and qualifications of IGs who -- as fair and impartial fact-finders -- can take on the difficult issues for the commander and track them until they are resolved.

The purpose of this part on the IG's Wartime Role block is to provide IG's with the facts and tools needed to prepare them for their future role in deployments and military operations and to demonstrate to their commanders that –

- The conditions may change, but the tasks and standards for the IG functions remain the same as the operating environment transitions from peacetime operations to the full range of conflict and war.

- The IG provides important feedback to the commander during all phases of the deployment to assess the unit's readiness and warfighting capabilities.

- The IG is an essential part of the wartime staff at all levels of command.

Chapter 1

Historical Overview of the IG Wartime Role

Section 1-1

First Wartime Inspector Generals

The U.S. Army Inspector General system was born in wartime. The Continental Congress authorized the appointment of Inspectors General in the midst of the Revolutionary War (1775 - 1781) primarily to improve the training and warfighting efficiency of the American Army. These first IGs were charged with "reformation of the various abuses which prevail in the different departments ... to review, from time to time, the troops ... to see that every officer and soldier be instructed in the exercise and manoeuvers ... that rules of discipline be strictly observed and that officers command their soldiers properly and do them justice." (Papers of the Continental Congress, No. 152, V. folio 233). Major Revolutionary War IG issues were:

- Training and readiness (no standard drill regulations)
- Administration (accountability of personnel)
- Class I (no meat rations)
- Maintenance (sick horses)
- Pay
- Weapons security (loss of firearms)

Section 1-2

19th Century Wartime Inspector Generals

1. The position of Inspector General lost its prominence after the Revolutionary War but came back to life, at least in name, with the War of 1812 (1812 - 1814). Reauthorized by Congress and with duties specified by the War Department, the IG during this war was to assess discipline, facilities, and equipment; to conduct musters; and examine financial accounts. But the War Department also permitted the IG to command; and the Army's senior IG, Brigadier General Alexander Smyth, did just that during a campaign along the Niagara River. BG Smyth led so poorly that by the end of the campaign, his troops demonstrated their frustration and discontent by shooting at his tent. The Army released Smyth, and Congress abolished the position of IG.

2. The Regular Army expanded from 8,500 to more than 30,000 when the United States went to war with Mexico (1846 - 1848). This expansion included two authorized IGs. These IGs were deployed to the field with the troops not because Army senior leadership recognized the value of IGs as inspectors but because they had no concept of anything better for IGs to do. Instead, IGs were used as commanders, mustering agents, assistants to other generals, and to process Mexican prisoners of war.

3. The United States Army was authorized two IGs and five assistant IGs at the beginning of the Civil War (1861 - 1865). There was neither a formal IG department at the War Department level to give centralized guidance to these IGs nor was there an established, clearly defined duty description. But as the war advanced, wartime requirements forced the evolution of an IG organization and a clearer definition of its purpose.

4. An IG was assigned to the War Department staff in January 1863. This assignment proved significant because though it was not the birth of the Office of the Inspector General, it was the starting point whereby the IG became a permanent War Department fixture.

5. During the Civil War, the Secretary of War first used the IG on a regular basis to conduct inquiries and investigations. In January 1863, for instance, the Secretary of War ordered an IG to investigate a mutinous unit of the Army of the Cumberland, the Anderson Cavalry. The IG conducting the investigation found merit in the men's complaints that they had been misled about their assignments but recommended that examples be made of the more rebellious ringleaders.

6. Major Civil War IG issues were:

- Audits (e.g., quartermaster accounts)
- Care / utilization of horses
- Ordnance / equipment production and procurement
- Personnel (skill / specialty violations, pension applications)

- PX / Sutler operations (Sutlers were merchants who accompanied each regiment)
- Training (military college programs)

7. The Office of the Inspector General at the War Department did little inspecting during the Spanish-American War, and few unit IGs were able to transition out of their peacetime mode. Transportation calamities, epidemics in the southern camps, inedible or undelivered rations, and unit lack of preparedness for deployments overseas were among the major problems Soldiers faced in the Spanish-American War (1898). IGs should have detected and corrected all of these command and management inefficiencies, but they did not. The situation was only made worse when TIG said he felt it more honorable to be near danger with no particular job than to be safe at home on the staff. Thus, senior inspectors went to the field not to inspect or assist but to follow TIG's emotional guidance to advance toward the sound of the guns for one last time. The IG received considerable journalistic and Congressional criticism for failing to report trouble when it developed during this war. These problems nearly resulted in the abolishment of the IG as an office and position in the Army.

Section 1-3

World War I (1917-1918)

1. The U.S. Army entered World War I with 40 authorized IGs. This number peaked at 215 assigned officers. IG wartime activities were more centralized and inspection-oriented during World War I than in any previous war.

2. Continental United States (CONUS): The Office of the Inspector General inspected all combat divisions at least twice prior to their overseas deployment. Teams of inspectors were stationed at ports of embarkation with the authority to delay movement if they felt that personnel or equipment were not ready.

3. European Continent.

a. The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) IG, MG Andre W. Brewster, was among the original group of staff officers to accompany the AEF commander, GEN John J. Pershing, to France. Brewster remained on the Pershing's personal staff throughout the war.

b. IGs did not conduct periodic, routine, organizational inspections for the units in France. Inspections were general in nature and for the purpose of determining whether units were ready for service at the front. In addition, the AEF Commander required that at least one division in each corps receive a daily visit by an AEF IG.

c. As war casualties mounted and replacements arrived to fill the losses, IGs were often used as teachers and advisors to the inexperienced unit commanders. When the war ended, IGs evaluated the condition of units preparing for redeployment to CONUS and monitored the disposition of surplus property and the settlement of civilian claims.

4. Major WWI IG issues were:

- Administration
- Animal and motor transport
- Combat efficiency
- Equipment maintenance
- Fiscal / property accountability
- Leadership
- Morale
- Officer efficiency
- Preparation for overseas movement (POM)
- Purchasing oversight
- Readiness for deployment
- Training (e.g., care of animals, property accountability, debt collection)

Section 1-4

World War II (1941-1945)

1. There were 10 officers on duty in the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and 30 in the field in 1939, just two years prior to the United States' entry into World War II. This number rose to 219 officers in December 1941, 937 in November 1943, and over 3,000 by 1945. The Office of the Inspector General was one of the few departments to remain on the War staff after the Reorganization of 1942. It was a credit to senior Army leadership to realize that placing the IG anywhere else would handicap IG effectiveness.

2. Continental United States (CONUS).

a. The 1942 OIG consisted of Procurement, Construction, Field Service, Reviews, Inspection, Investigations, and Miscellaneous Divisions. The OIG later consolidated its functions into only two divisions: an Investigations Division and an Inspections Services. A third division, the Special Section, was established in June 1941 to monitor race relations.

b. As in World War I, IGs inspected units deploying overseas and were given the authority to determine whether a unit could depart. As the war progressed, investigation issues evolved from matters of sabotage, disloyalty, and defeatism to issues concerning the morale and welfare of enlisted personnel and finally to contract fraud, bribery, deficiencies in administration, treatment of POWs, and medical care.

c. Division-level IGs in CONUS spent most of their time concentrating on preparation for overseas movement (POM). The depth of their responsibilities varied in accordance with the wishes of their particular commander and the situation of their unit. The XII Corps IG, for example, was required to review the personnel and health records of every member of the command to ensure shots had been given, allotments made, and so forth. The 71st Infantry Division IG monitored insurance and War Bond briefings and administration. Tactical unit IGs were especially concerned with training and the packing, crating, and marking of organizational equipment. There are recorded cases where, at the port of embarkation, IGs gave, or arranged, classes on new equipment which had been issued to the unit at the last minute.

3. Outside Continental United States (OCONUS).

a. The Army organized the Overseas Inspections Division, OIG, in December 1942 to respond to problems affecting personnel and Department of the Army programs outside CONUS. The division monitored individual personnel problem trends such as consistently late pay in a given area and tried to determine the causes and solutions. The division did numerous surveys, inquiries, and investigations into topics ranging from general officer misconduct to replacement flow into the Pacific Theater. The division produced a final series of surveys late in the war to assist in demobilization planning and redeployment of overseas personnel. The final burst of wartime activity was spent investigating the statements of returned U.S. Prisoners of War as to their treatment and the circumstances of their surrender.

b. Army-level IGs averaged three to four command-directed investigations a month. Topics ranged from escaped prisoners and violations of the Geneva Convention to racial problems and the maintenance of motor vehicles. Commanders tasked several IGs to continue annual general inspections. For example, the Sixth Army IG in the Pacific inspected, on the average, four units a month even during the Philippine campaign. Major unit IGs were also given the task of coordinating inspections and staff visits from their level so they would not overwhelm subordinate units with visitors.

c. The trend was for IG sections to grow once units entered the combat zone. Unit IGs did many of the same duties they had stateside with modifications to accommodate the particular commands' desires or unique situations and requirements. A major IG concern was the timely distribution of publications and directives unique to the theater of operations and unit compliance with the new requirements.

4. The IG workload almost doubled with force demobilization issues after victory in Europe (VE-Day) and victory over Japan Day (VJ-Day). Major World War II IG issues were:

- Absentee voting
- Audits
- Black market; illegal currency transactions
- Casualty treatment
- Contracting
- Disloyalty
- Health records
- Inspection and evaluation of federalized National Guard units
- Looting / pilfering
- Maintenance
- Medical readiness / training
- Morale / welfare
- Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM)
- Prisoners of War (POW)
- Post Exchanges
- Race relations
- Readiness for deployment

Section 1-5

Vietnam (1965-1973)

1. The American Army that took to the field in Vietnam had an IG system with duties and procedures very similar to those of today. Some CONUS IGs developed inspection programs for units deploying to Vietnam; however, these programs were not DAIG-directed programs as they once had been in World Wars I and II.

2. The U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV), IG office was authorized 13 officers, 20 enlisted Soldiers, and two local support personnel. They worked complaints, assistance, investigations, and general inspections. In 1968, the Army Chief of Staff, General Westmoreland, directed that annual general inspections (AGIs) would be given Army-wide (to include units in Vietnam). The USARV IG conducted 130 unit AGIs from 1968 to 1971. USARV inspected all types of units in Vietnam but concentrated on those organizations which did not have detailed IGs assigned in their direct chain of command.

3. USARV regulations authorized those commanders with a detailed IG on their staffs to appoint acting IGs for any subordinate unit battalion-sized or higher. The 1st Cavalry Division in 1969 had acting IGs in each battalion because of its wide dispersion over large areas. The 25th Infantry Division, on the other hand, operated with only its detailed IG (and IG office / section) because it was much more geographically concentrated.

4. Investigations and complaint issues were similar to those encountered in earlier wars. It was noted that the number of complaints dropped as combat intensity increased. DAIG policy directed complaints to the lowest level where a detailed or acting IG was assigned.

5. At the joint level, the IG, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), had four officers and four enlisted members in 1967. This number grew to 115 U.S. officers and enlisted Soldiers and 15 Vietnamese interpreters before the war's end. This increased manning was a direct result of the IG's value to the command in uncovering and solving problems while they were still small. For example, in one year alone, the IG, MACV, performed 300 investigations and handled 20,000 IGARs.

6. Demonstrating this importance of the IG system to the Vietnam War effort was the fact that the joint, annual campaign plan routinely included an IG annex, Annex S. This annex outlined the scope and authority given the IG by the commander.

Section 1-6

Desert Shield / Desert Storm (1990-1991)

1. The IG experience in Desert Shield / Storm was initially similar to the Spanish-American War in one aspect. The war was brief and surprisingly successful in large part because combat, combat support, and combat service support units entered the conflict proficient with their equipment and trained in the latest Air-Land Battle doctrine. However, many IGs entered the war with procedures, plans, manning, and equipment tables based on almost 20 years of peacetime requirements.

2. For some IGs, the rapid transition out of the peacetime routine was difficult. But unlike IGs in the Spanish-American War, Desert Shield / Storm IGs adapted rapidly and positively to the changing situation.

3. As for command use of the IG during the war, the IG, 416th Engineer Command, after-action report says it best for the majority of cases: "The IG personnel in our command were not used for any other function than official IG business."

4. CONUS.

a. Unit IGs were initially involved in deployment activities ranging from ensuring units were doing the CG's mandatory pre-deployment training to monitoring convoy, rail-loading, and port of embarkation operations. As units physically left CONUS, the average IG staff section initially divided into two elements: one element remained at the unit's home station and the other accompanied the deploying force to Southwest Asia (SWA). In many cases, the deployed IG element had to further subdivide its people once in theater in order to serve the heavily dispersed command.

b. The home-station element maintained a full-service IG staff section for the non-deploying Soldiers and dependents. In almost all cases, this population far exceeded the number of troops deployed. IGs at installation level and below spent the majority of their time on mobilization, reserve component, and dependent support issues while DAIG focused on doing mobilization assessments with the objective of providing the Army leadership feedback on the process.

5. OCONUS.

a. Many IGs were in the "first string" sent to SWA as, for example, was the IG of the 3rd Armored Division. The first major obstacle to IG mission accomplishment was a lack of organic equipment. Some IGs that did arrive with assigned vehicles and adequate tentage, cots, light sets, and field desks did so in most cases only because they were lucky enough to hand-receipt such items from deactivating divisions (e.g., 8th Infantry Division). Later, some IG staff sections were issued leased vehicles through host-nation support agreements.

b. Lack of communications was another major obstacle for IGs. The majority of IGs had improper communications equipment for the situation or no equipment at all. The

Inspector General Worldwide Network (IGNET), the IG community's primary means of automated communications, was tested with one deployed corps IG office. IGNET did not do well in SWA because it was neither designed as a deployable system nor intended for the rigors of combat. The situation improved when IGs received the capability to link their e-mail into the Defense Data Network (DDN) via Terminal Access Control (TAC) points; but, for a considerable amount of time, IGs had to rely on couriers and telephones.

c. Many IGs in SWA found that assistance became their first priority, primarily because of the volume of complaints. IG inspections took less time and priority than IG assistance. Inspections were typically intense, short-duration efforts with rapid feedback provided to the unit leadership. IGs inspected units for safety and security, casualty evacuation plans, enemy prisoner of war (EPW) plans, and unit fighter management plans while waiting for the ground war to begin. The command IG also became a credible means of obtaining the latest changes to regulatory policies and procedures.

d. IGs did not get the opportunity to do much during the ground war because of its short duration (100 hours). However, IGs were prepared to inspect the handling of displaced civilians, reconstitution operations, personnel replacement, graves registration and civil military operations, and many other primarily combat service support issues.

e. Like past wars, the IGs' workload increased significantly with the war's end. They became involved with unit reconstitution, property accountability, awards and war-trophy accountability, and security. Major Desert Shield / Storm IG issues and associated tasks in addition to those already discussed were:

- Awards
- Conscientious objectors
- Deployability of Soldiers on permanent physical profiles
- Reserve component issues
- Pay entitlements for Reserve Components (RC)
- Abuse of command authority
- Theater living conditions
- Involuntary service beyond Expiration of Term of Service (ETS) / retirement
- Table(s) of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) augmentation (full mobilization not declared)
- Personnel policies (married / dual-service Soldiers, enlisted promotions)
- Mail
- NBC (optical inserts for protective masks)

Section 1-7

Operation Enduring Freedom / Operation Iraqi Freedom (2001-present)

1. The IG experience in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq built on experiences gained in 1990. These two conflicts shared in common an adaptive enemy, ethnic strife, political issues, and cultural challenges. Both operations involved large geographic areas and restricted mobility due to the advent of the improvised explosive device (IED). IEDs caused the services to convert rapidly an inventory of mainly thinned-skinned HMMWVs to up-armored HMMWVs. The Army and Marine Corps later invested in Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and an array of other specialized all-terrain, mine-resistant vehicles to protect the force from a very adaptive and creative enemy.

2. In October 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom (sometimes called the 'forgotten war' following the invasion of Iraq in 2003) began in Afghanistan. The rugged terrain and vast distances placed significant limits on IG inspections due to transportation requirements. Inspections and support to DAIG and DoD Inspection teams competed for these precious resources. Some IGs were able to obtain higher priority for air assets from their directing authorities to allow them to conduct IG operations more effectively. Force size and visibility remained low due to lower casualty rates in comparison to those inflicted later in OIF. Then in 2009, with a spike in enemy activity, the focus shifted to OEF with a gradual increase in forces and resources. Yet in 2009, there were still no Inspector General Worldwide Network (IGNET) servers in country. Though planned to be installed in 2010, the lack of IGNET servers is yet another factor that has made Afghanistan the most challenging place to conduct IG operations.

3. In March 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom began In Iraq. Post-invasion Iraq was characterized by attacks against coalition forces and among various sectarian groups. This situation soon led to the Iraqi insurgency, strife between many Sunni and Shia Iraqi groups, and al-Qaeda-led operations. This non-permissive environment -- with large expanses of deserts, mountains, and large cities -- complicated logistics and limited movement for IGs. DAIG installed IGNET servers in January 2009 to increase speed and connectivity.

4. The extensive use of the ARNG and USAR forces transformed both components from their historic role to a more operational one, which required IGs to become 'fluent' in all components since most commands were composed of all three components. National Guard Affairs and Army Reserve Affairs directorates provided assistance and expertise in reserve matters. The use of State IGs, CONUS IGs, and USAR CONUS IGs were important in providing accurate and timely support to reserve-component Soldiers.

5. CONUS.

a. Unit IGs were initially involved in deployment activities that ranged from ensuring units were conducting theater-mandated pre-deployment training to mobilization disputes. Those IG sections large enough or with enduring missions divided into two elements: one remained at the unit's home station and the other accompanied the deploying force to theater. For smaller IG staff sections, the entire section deployed after establishing support agreements for CONUS-based units not under the unit's command and control during the deployment.

b. The home-station element maintained a full-service IG section for the non-deploying units, Soldiers, and dependents. In many cases, this population far exceeded the number of troops deployed. IGs at the installation level and below spent much of their time on mobilization, medical board, reserve-component, and dependent-support issues. All CONUS-based IGs supported the deployed force in one form or another. Reserve-component IGs supported those deployed IGs with reserve-component units as part of their task organization. These reserve-component IGs provided familiarity with reserve-component policies, procedures, and policies and were well suited to support the IG in theater. This interaction also served to promote rear-detachment support and better awareness of issues facing the deployed organization.

6. OCONUS.

a. Multi-National Division (MND) IGs served their respective units within an ever-changing force structure and boundaries. Initially, a Corps Support Command (COSCOM) had command and control over the logistics force. When an Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) replaced the COSCOM in Iraq, a shortfall in IG authorizations resulted. This change in mission led to an enduring support arrangement of an organization not organically structured to provide IG support to an extremely large area or task organization, requiring three times the organic IG strength. Changes in force structure took place in both countries as they expanded and reduced in response to changing conditions. The role of the IG in the planning process, with identification of IG shortfalls, proved critical for future success in IG operations.

b. Initially, a lack of organic communications was an obstacle for IGs. More important than actual equipment was access to communications systems, to include Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet), Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet), intranet portal, iPerms, etc. IGNET access was initially limited but eventually developed with the theater. Equally important was establishing a separate place to conduct business were IGs could meet with Soldiers confidentially.

c. The use of IGs depended on the directing authority, type of command, mission, and location. IGs in combat units were more heavily involved in inspections and had a lower assistance mission than force sustainment organizations, which often had three times the assistance mission. Inspections varied with the priority of the commander. IGs routinely conducted training for leaders and Soldiers throughout the theater. The success of these training programs was due to the emphasis placed by the directing authority, giving the IG the authority to carry out training endorsed by the commander.

d. The deployed IG's workload had peaks and valleys coinciding with unit transfers of authority (TOAs). One trend that developed during this entire period was increased family-support requests. Starting at a low percentage of cases, family support saw a steady increase. Today, family-support cases are the number one IGAR composing 20 percent of IG cases Army-wide. Other common cases received during OIF / OEF were:

- Reserve component promotion issues
- Senior leader misconduct
- Mobilization of Soldiers with physical profiles
- Pay, bonus, and incentive pay entitlements for Reserve Component Soldiers
- Abuse of command authority
- Stop-loss issues
- Personnel policies (married / dual-service Soldiers, enlisted promotions).
- General Order Number 1 violations
- Rest and Recuperation policy (R&R)
- Emergency leave
- Awards

Chapter 2

Role of the IG during Full Spectrum Operations

Section 2-1

IG in Full Spectrum Operations

1. **Full Spectrum Operations**. Whether the purpose is to fight and win wars, deter war and resolve conflict, or promote peace, the IG is a relevant participant in the full spectrum of operations. FM 3-0, the Army's keystone doctrine for operations, depicts full spectrum operations as including any combination of these following elements:

- *Offensive Operations* aim at destroying or defeating an enemy force (i.e., the Coalition offensive to defeat the Iraqi armed forces and the collapse of the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein.
- *Defensive Operations* defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations (i.e., defense of Pusan, Korea in 1950).
- *Stability Operations* are military tasks, missions and activities conducted outside of the United States to promote and protect U.S. national interests by maintaining or reestablishing a safe environment in which governmental services can be established, restored, or developed. Stability operations include both coercive and constructive military actions. (i.e., current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan).
- *Civil Support Operations* are Department of Defense support to U.S civil authorities for domestic emergencies and designated law enforcement activities in the United States and its territories. These operations occur when the level of support exceeds the capability of domestic agencies (i.e., military support for Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005).

2. **IG and the Operations Process**.

a. FM 3-0 also describes how full spectrum operations follow a cycle of planning, preparation, execution, and continuous assessment. Known as the Operations Process, the graphic illustration below (figure 1) illustrates this cycle.



Figure 1. **The Operations Process**

b. In their role as fair and impartial fact-finders, IGs play a highly influential part in the assessment activities for the battle command. **Assessment** *is the continuous monitoring -- throughout planning, preparation, and execution -- of the current situation, the progress of an operation, and the evaluation of that operation against criteria of success to make decisions and adjustments.* The inspections, assistance, investigations, and teaching and training functions render the IG as a logical consultant to the commander on the readiness condition and efficiency of the command. IGs are uniquely qualified to help commanders identify any areas of weakness or vulnerability in a mission and prevent or eliminate problem areas that can interfere with mission accomplishment. In solving both the systemic problems through special inspections and the local problems through IG assistance and investigations, the IG can reduce any "friction points" occurring during the operations cycle.

Section 2-2

IG Functions during Operational Missions

Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war . . . The military machine -- the army and everything related to it -- is basically very simple, therefore seems easy to manage. But we should keep in mind none of its components is of one piece: each part is composed of individuals . . . the least important of whom may chance to delay things or somehow make them go wrong.

Karl Von Clausewitz

1. **IG Role in Military Operations**.

a. A distinguishing feature of the IG mission is that the four basic functions -- inspections, assistance, investigations, and teaching and training -- are applicable throughout the full range of military conflict from peacetime military engagement to major theater war. In other words, your role as an IG is never static. During military operations you still support your commander as an extension of the commander's eyes, ears, voice, and conscience. You still report issues that affect readiness, warfighting, discipline, and quality of life. The IG's priority of focus during military operations must be on tasks and systems that directly relate to the command's readiness during phases and types of military operations.

b. Just as the role of the IG is constant, the standards for IG activities remain the same during wartime as in a peacetime, garrison-like environment. AR 20-1 and IG doctrinal publications apply to IGs in wartime as in peacetime. Confidentiality, release of records, duty restrictions, reprisal prevention, directing authorities, and reporting requirements are all matters of policy that apply to IGs regardless of the difficulties surrounding an operational deployment. The doctrinal applications of the IG Action Process (IGAP) still apply in assistance and investigations cases. IGs conducting wartime inspections must still consider the use of the 17-step IG Inspections Process when planning, executing, and completing an inspection. In many cases, compressing this process becomes necessary.

c. Though the tasks and standards for the IG's mission remain unchanged during military operations, you can expect a change in conditions. These conditions will often cause more difficulties for IGs to perform their mission -- especially in a tactical environment. The tactical threat, geographic dispersion of units, diminished communications, harsh environment, and high operational tempo can create unique challenges for IGs.

2. **IG Functions in Military Operations.** Though they may be difficult to perform, the four IG functions of Inspections, Assistance, Investigations, and Teaching and Training are vital to ensuring the command's readiness during military operations. This section describes the relevance of each of the IG functions during operational missions and describes some of the expected conditions associated with these functions.

a. **Inspections.**

(1) Inspections are the most direct way an IG can influence the command's mission readiness during operations. The context of the IG's inspections function entails assisting commanders and staffs with their Organizational Inspection Programs (OIPs) as well as conducting IG Inspections and Intelligence Oversight Inspections as part of the OIP. The OIP ensures high standards for readiness and warfighting capability of the unit before, during, and after combat or other operations. A strong inspection program is one of the most proactive ways to reduce the battlefield frictions that jeopardize mission success or create an unnecessary composite risk of U.S. Soldiers dying from enemy threats or hazards-based accidents.

(2) During deployments, inspection plans (to include IG Inspections) are never static. The commander continually refines the topics and objectives of inspections to ensure they are tailored to resolve high-payoff issues. Commanders often direct the IG to inspect a function or process for feedback needed to make decisions critical to mission accomplishment. The commander's need to make timely decisions may require the IG to compress the Inspections Process (see AR 20-1 and Section 8-2 of The Inspections Guide for details on compressed inspections). Regardless of whether or not the inspection is compressed, the IG must always ensure that inspections are fair and impartial and gather enough information so the commander may make informed decisions. Here are some of the high-payoff issues the IG may consider during each phase of operational deployments:

Mobilization.

- Readiness / certification training
- Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP)
- Mobilization of Reserve Component (RC) units
- Family readiness issues
- Equipment readiness issues
- Rear Detachment procedures

Deployment.

- Reporting / accountability
- Load planning / load teams
- Fort-to-port operations
- Theater reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI)
- Rules of Engagement (ROE) / Geneva Convention / general orders training
- Force protection
- Supply / procurement procedures

Employment.

- Force protection / threat vulnerability assessments
- Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) / detainee operations
- Captured equipment processing
- Casualty evacuation
- Composite risk management
- Information management / net-centric operations
- Active Component (AC) / Reserve Component (RC) integration

Sustainment.

- Intelligence oversight
- Convoy operations
- Personnel replacement operations
- Weapons system replacement operations
- Morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) and fighter management programs
- Ammunition resupply
- Equipment readiness issues
- Combat feeding
- Line of duty investigations
- Mail services
- Supply accountability
- Awards and badges
- Contract support and procurement
- Sustainment training
- Finance and entitlements systemic issues

Redeployment.

- Accountability and serviceability of returning equipment
- Ammunition / excess equipment turn-in procedures
- Supply / contracting account terminations
- Camp clearances / turnovers
- Load planning / load teams
- Tactical Assembly Area (TAA)-to-port operations
- U.S. Customs / Agriculture clearances
- Port of embarkation procedures

Demobilization.

- Reverse SRP procedures
- Reception, integration, and Family reunification training
- Reconstitution of personnel and equipment
- Awards, evaluations, and personnel records systemic issues
- Finance and entitlements systemic issues

b. **Assistance**. Both deployed and supporting IGs can expect increases in requests for information and assistance. Studies of recent military operations indicate that assistance cases account for the majority of the deployed IG's workload. A thorough analysis of each phase of the operational spectrum will provide insights into the nature of requests that the IG can expect. For instance, whenever combat operations cease, IGs can expect and plan for an increase in IGARs. IG technical channels and increased flexibility are essential to responsive support to commanders, Soldiers, and other interested parties. Wherever possible, the deployed IG must forward inquiries initiated outside the theater of operations to the appropriate IG for resolution. Typical requests for assistance include the following:

- Early return of Family members
- Emergency leave procedures
- Rest and relaxation (R&R) and environmental leave procedures
- Other questionable leadership decisions / policies
- Nonsupport of Family members
- Reserve and National Guard Family support issues (ID card, health care, post exchange commissary privileges)
- Reserve Component (RC) entitlements (pay, promotion, etc.).
- Active Component (AC) / RC disparity issues
- Family care plans
- Information requests from members of the indigenous population (contract service disputes, request for information on captured / detained family members, civil affairs issues)
- Awards and decorations issues
- Intelligence Oversight (Procedure 15 Reports)

c. **Investigations**. The IG investigations function during military operations differs little from peacetime investigations. Investigations conducted while deployed are more difficult to complete because of the limited access to the directing authority (commander), time and distance factors, and a generally greater reliance upon technical-channel support from other IGs who may also be deployed. Records-release policies for IG records such as ROIs do not change during military operations. Typical allegations brought to the IG during military operations include:

- Misconduct or abuse of authority (leaders)
- Improper Mental Health Evaluations (MHE)
- Whistleblower reprisals
- Sexual harassment / misconduct
- Fraudulent purchasing practices
- Reports of Law of War violations (see DoD Directive 5100.77, DoD Law of War Program, Chapter 6 - Information Requirements)

d. **Teaching and Training**. During both peace and war, IGs have traditionally been the bridge that spans the gap of experience. The time-sensitive need for teaching and training Soldiers at all levels on fundamental tasks essential to mission success is an inherent IG function. As extensions of the eyes and ears of the commander, the IG should view the teaching and training function as a key factor in a unit's ultimate success and therefore plan its inclusion as a fundamental portion of all other IG activities. The IG's ability to acquire and understand rapidly the changing regulatory and policy standards inherent during major operations is especially important in this process. For instance, the IG should have knowledge of all the policies and procedures published for the operation in fragmentary orders (FRAGOs). A good understanding of information management operations will help the IG get timely access to mission requirements and standards and coordinate these requirements with units, functional proponents, and IGs operating in split locations. While most teaching and training is fundamentally integrated into other IG activities, the following are some proven approaches to bridge the knowledge gap in a more deliberate way:

- IG bulletins and an IG section in unit newsletters
- New commander / 1SG / CSM orientations
- New Soldier orientation briefings
- IG Handbooks for commanders and staff agencies (Web-based, media CDs, printed)

3. **Organization for Military Operations**. During military operations, the IG must consider both deployed and stay-behind capabilities in people and equipment. These considerations especially apply to IGs who serve both a tactical command and an installation. Deployment considerations must include the deploying IG's ability to provide coverage during all phases of the operation, to include split-based operations in the theater. Stay-behind IGs (or non-deploying supporting IGs) not only support the installation, non-deployed units, and rear detachments, but they also provide the deploying IG a "reach-back" capability to help resolve issues and allegations. The IG should consider the following factors in the planning process to assemble the best possible task organization to support the full range of requirements:

a. Identify the proper TOE and TDA personnel combinations to retain flexibility for the deploying elements while maintaining adequate resources at home station to meet supporting IG operational requirements. If RC units are assigned to the command for the

operational mission, the IG office must request augmenting IGs to represent the unique requirements and issues concerning these components.

b. Identify individual mobilization augmentees (IMA) and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) IG staffing needs. IGs should identify IMA personnel by name.

c. Determine training requirements for RC IG personnel upon activation.

d. Determine the method of coverage in the theater of operations where units may be widely dispersed. Indicate the methodology in the operation plan / operation order (OPLAN / OPORD).

e. Consider appointing and training acting IGs to cover assistance to Soldiers in remote locations. When possible, identify the acting IGs and request their appointment from the ACOM / ASCC / DRU commander prior to deployment. Strongly consider training the acting IGs at home station prior to deployment if time permits.

f. Determine the bases of IG operations required at home station, staging bases, and deployed locations, to include the command posts from which the IG will operate.

g. Given there may not be enough IG manpower to task organize the shop functionally (i.e. Inspections, Assistance and Investigations, Intelligence Oversight), the IG should ensure that all members of the deploying IG team are cross-trained to perform all functions when directed.

Section 2-3

Staff Planning and Operations

1. **Staff Estimates**. IGs are essential staff members in all scenarios during both peacetime and wartime operations. IG involvement in the military decision-making process (MDMP) from the receipt of the mission to the production of the order is continuous. The IG should have a clear understanding of the higher headquarters' order, the command's mission, and the commander's intent. The IG must ensure that the commander's expectations of the role and functions of the IG are addressed early in the mission-analysis process.

2. **IG Annex**. Once the IG understands the mission and the commander's intent, the IG is in a position to formulate or plan detailed mission requirements. This process should include anticipated IG actions (inspections, assistance, investigations, teaching and training) during each phase of the operation such as mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and reconstitution. You will not find a doctrinal IG annex or appendix to an operations plan or order in FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production. Where you publish your IG annex / appendix depends on the unit's Standing Operating Procedure (SOP). Most units publish the IG's operational information as an appendix to the service support annex. Appendix B to this part of The IG Reference Guide offers a template for crafting an IG appendix in an operations plan / order.

3. **Exercises**. As discussed in the previous section, the IG mission and standards by which we operate remain relatively constant, but the conditions and environment in which we operate in wartime can be dramatically different. Realistic training scenarios provide an excellent tool to determine how to operate in all types of environments. The old adage "*train as you fight"* holds true for the IG. As with any staff element, IGs must participate as full-fledged staff members in all command post exercises, field-training exercises, Combat Training Center rotations, and mobilization and deployment readiness exercises. Command IGs will not perform non-IG duties such as liaison officer, rear command post commander, or detachment noncommissioned officer in change (NCOIC) during training exercises that would detract from their wartime mission or compromise their ability to remain fair and impartial. Only the TIG can lift these duty restrictions on a case-by-case basis. During these exercises IGs should include concurrent, split operations training involving the home-station installation IG office in order to practice reach-back procedures and other techniques normally used during operational deployments.

Section 2-4

IG Mission Essential Task List

1. **IG Training Focus**. What should the IG be prepared to do when his or her unit is alerted, mobilized, deployed, and engaged in a combat environment? The answer is simple: do the essential things first. But determining the mission essential tasks for the IG in a given scenario will vary depending on many factors. For example, a CONUS-based division IG's initial areas of interest may be with deployment issues while a forward-deployed division IG is concerned with the issues associated with a no-notice, go-to-war scenario. For this reason, IGs should develop a Mission Essential Task List (METL), like all members of the battle staff, to focus training for wartime missions. Chapter 4 of FM 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations, explains the METL-development process.

2. **What is an IG METL?** FM 7-0 describes a METL as a compilation of collective mission**-**essential tasks that an organization must perform successfully to accomplish its doctrinal or directed mission. The METL development process is the catalyst to focus training on wartime operational missions and allows the IG to maximize all training opportunities, execute training to standard, train as the IG will fight, and develop Soldier and leader confidence among the IGs. In developing the METL, the IG should consider the following key points to ensure the METL has a battle focus and leads to "buy in" and commitment to the IG's training plans:

a. Wartime operational plans, enduring capabilities, operational environment, directed missions, and external guidance are all inputs to the IG's mission analysis and resulting IG METL. Along with the commander's guidance, the IG analysis considers these inputs when identifying and selecting tasks that make up the METL.

b. All key IG personnel must know and understand the METL so they can integrate their efforts and resources.

c. METL applies to the whole IG staff section. However, the supporting battle tasks may be different among various elements of the IG section.

d. The IG must brief the commander on the METL and gain the commander's approval of the list to ensure it meets the commander's intent and guidance.

e. Resource availability does not affect METL development. The METL is an unconstrained statement of tasks required to accomplish the wartime mission.

f. METL is not prioritized; however, all tasks may not require equal training time and resources.

3. **Sources for Input to the IG METL.** IGs derive their METL primarily from organizational war plans and related tasks in external guidance. The following are some sources for an IG METL:

- Authorization documents (e.g., TO&E)
- Tactical standing operating procedures (TSOPs or TAC SOP)
- Doctrinal manuals or policy documents (e.g., IG guides and regulations)
- Lessons-learned databases (e.g., Center for Army Lessons Learned)
- Readiness standing operating procedures (RSOP)
- Mobilization plans
- State operational contingency plans for ARNG

4. **Effects of Change in Mission.** In most cases, the IG's Core METL will not change when the organization is directed to conduct a mission other than its assigned wartime operational mission. These missions could range from major combat operations to providing humanitarian assistance or other types of stability and support operations. There are, however, some considerations in how the IG provides IG support if the unit is designated as a Joint Task Force (JTF) and augmented with additional joint assets. In these cases, Joint IG policies and doctrine apply and will likely result in adjustments to the Core METL.

5. **Battle Tasks**. After the commander approves the IG METL, the Command IG approves those tasks his or her subordinates IGs must accomplish that are critical to the success of the IG METL. For example, in the Assistance and Investigation (A&I) branch, some battle tasks might be:

- Conduct assistance inquiries.
- Conduct investigative inquiries and investigations of allegations.
- Manage a case in the IGARS database.

These tasks become IG battle tasks. The selection of these battle tasks allows the primary IG to focus on those tasks he or she wants to emphasize during internal planning, training, and evaluation of the shop. These tasks also enable the IG to prioritize the allocation of scarce resources such as time, TDY funds, and clerical support.

6. **Summary**. The METL is based on the wartime mission and provides the foundation for the IG training and readiness plans. IGs develop METLs because the IG section cannot necessarily maintain standards-based proficiency on every possible task. The METL-development process allows the IG to maximize all training opportunities, execute training to standard, train as the IG will fight, and develop Soldier and leader confidence among the IGs.

Chapter 3

IG in Today's Operating Environment

Section 3-1

The Army Campaign Plan

We must immediately begin the process of re-examining and challenging our most basic institutional assumptions, organizational structures, paradigms, policies, and procedures to better serve our Nation. The end result of this examination will be a more relevant and ready force -- a campaign-quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset.

From the Army Chief of Staff's paper (GEN Peter J. Schoomaker),
"The Way Ahead: Our Army at War ... Relevant and Ready"

1. **Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)**. The operating environment for our Army changed dramatically following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. When the President declared the global war on terrorism (GWOT) shortly thereafter, he forewarned the Nation and its Army that this would be a war fought like no other before, requiring our deep and enduring commitment. As of October 2009, the Army and its partners on the joint / coalition team are fighting across the globe and across the full range of military operations against rogue states and terrorists to prevent them from striking against the U.S., our allies, and our national interests. We currently have 98,000 Soldiers in Iraq and 44,000 Soldiers in Afghanistan fighting the most evident prosecution of the GWOT.

2. **The Army Campaign Plan**. To meet the Nation's strategic commitments around the world, the former Army Chief of Staff, GEN Schoomaker, launched the Army Campaign Plan (ACP) to "obtain a more relevant and ready campaign-quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary mindset". The ACP provides direction for the preparation and execution of a full range of transformation tasks necessary to provide relevant and ready land power to the Nation while maintaining the quality of the all-volunteer force. This is the most comprehensive transformation of Army forces since World War II. Because supporting Soldiers, civilians, and their Families have always been a critical part of the Army's ability to defend our Nation, the guiding principle of the ACP is that the Soldier remains the centerpiece of our units and our most important combat system. The ACP provides strategies to –

- **Stabilize** the force to reduce the stress on Soldiers and their Families that the current high-deployment tempo creates. The plan addresses the problem by making initial tour lengths longer, increasing the number of deployable units, creating predictability in the deployment schedule, and minimizes turbulence in units just prior and during deployments periods.

- Make the force more **modular** and capable at the brigade level. The creation of brigade-sized Units of Action (UA) with standardized unit designs and robust capabilities allows for "plug-and-play" responsiveness to the Combatant Commanders.

- **Rebalance** the force to optimize the capabilities of the units needed on today's battlefields. The plan creates more of the high-demand units by reducing some of the heavy forces and creating more infantry, military police, and civil affairs units.

- Redefine the **Army culture** by emphasizing the principle that every Soldier, regardless of specialty, is a fighter imbued with a "Warrior Ethos" as described in the Soldier's Creed (see Figure 2). The Army also defined its core competencies to: *1) train and equip Soldiers and grow leaders;* and *2) provide relevant and ready land power capability to the Combatant Commanders as part of the joint team.* The Army becomes a more joint, CONUS-based expeditionary force under the ACP.

3. **The IG During Transformation**. The IG must be vigilant for any systemic problems to ensure transformation does not interfere with mission accomplishment. The role of the IG is to ensure an organized and fluid transformation because IGs help leaders identify and prevent problem areas that are a by-product of any major change. Though major changes – as found in the Army Campaign Plan -- are necessary to adapt to today's operating environment, problems and inefficiencies are certain to arise. For example, stabilizing Soldiers in their initial duty location for several years should reduce some of the current stresses on the Soldier and Family members; however, it can also create an outcropping of issues when the timing of professional development schools for both officer and enlisted Soldiers is now in the control of brigade-level leadership. Likewise, there is little argument that the rebalancing of forces to ensure the right force mix for today's battlefield is necessary, but it can certainly create a number of residual issues as well. In some cases the systemic issue may rest with the particular policy or doctrine that is no longer relevant to the structure or capabilities of transformed units. By performing their four functions, IGs are exceptionally skilled in identifying these issues without regard to difficulty in resolution.

4. **Overseas Contingency Operations**. In March of 2009, emails and memorandums from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Defense Department's Office of Security began a shift in terminology from the terms 'Long War' and 'Global War on Terror' to Overseas Contingency Operations (OCOs). This new direction had its beginning in budgetary proposals, with an endorsement from the White House, and began entering the Department of Defense's lexicon. Although not yet recognized officially as a replacement catch-phrase for the "Global War on Terror"', OCO is steadily entering the Federal government's parlance as a way to characterize a fresh approach to external threats to the U.S.



Figure 2. **The Soldier's Creed**

Section 3-2

Organizational Inspection Program for Deployed Units

1. **The Organizational Inspection Program**. AR 1-201, Army Inspection Policy, requires all commanders to have an Organizational Inspection Program (OIP) to manage all inspections within the command. The OIP serves to coordinate inspections and audits into a single, cohesive program focused on command objectives. The commander's OIP provides him or her with an organized management tool to identify, prevent, and eliminate problem areas, to include problems that arise during deployments. Because inspections are such an important feedback mechanism for leaders, the commander should consider crafting an OIP focused on objectives related to the particular operation, especially for deployment cycles of greater than six months. An OIP for a deployed unit must be flexible and support the mission. In many cases the existing OIP must adapt to the tactical environment, the diversity and composition of the subordinate units, and time constraints. Regardless of the challenges, commanders should always have a plan for the OIP when deployed.

2. **Considerations for a Deployed Unit OIP**. As directed by AR 1-201, a deployed-unit OIP must include the command's priority and goals, explain the mechanism for scheduling and executing inspections, assign responsibility for scheduling and monitoring inspections, provide standards for inspectors, and discuss a way to track feedback and corrective action. The OIP should address the primary inspection categories of command, staff, and IG inspections. The following paragraphs address some of the additional considerations for each of the inspection categories:

- **Command Inspections**. During the full range of conflict, the policy for commanders to inspect their company-level commanders for compliance with applicable standards is still intact. The 90-day requirement to conduct the Initial Command Inspection (ICI) is especially important to teach and train new company-level commanders. The inspecting commander should focus the evaluation on areas that support the mission and have a direct impact on readiness and warfighting capability. During Subsequent Command Inspections (SCI), it is not necessary to reevaluate every area inspected in the ICI, but the commander should target those areas of weakness identified in the ICI and ensure that corrections from the previous inspection worked.

- **Staff Inspections.** There may be fewer opportunities for conducting Staff Inspections in a deployed environment, but these inspections are particularly useful in providing feedback to commanders on various functions and services related to mission accomplishment. Staff Inspections frequently identify local problems that the battle command can fix by providing resources or training. Similarly, Staff Assistance Visits (SAVs) are an excellent means to bridge any knowledge gaps in operational policies and procedures by teaching and training subordinate units. SAVs are especially critical when the tactical situation requires a change of mission for units not doctrinally organized for their new role. For example, during the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom, battlefield necessity required field artillery and air defense artillery units to perform assorted force protection missions, conduct

military traffic control, and establish training camps for Iraqi forces and police. SAVs can help by teaching and training these units to ensure they are organized and prepared to perform the assigned missions successfully.

- **IG Inspections.** Refer to Section 2-2 of this part of The IG Reference Guide.

3. Intelligence Oversight (IO) Inspections. IGs involved in full spectrum operations must be assertive in providing IO inspections of intelligence components within the command as part of the OIP while deployed. See Chapter 2 of The Intelligence Oversight Guide on methodology for the conduct of IO inspections. Recent high-profile cases of improper activities by military intelligence interrogators only highlight the necessity to have solid IO programs. AR 20-1 requires an IO inspection program, and it serves to ensure compliance with standards on intelligence activities; ensure that units know how to identify, investigate, and report questionable activities; deter inappropriate conduct by intelligence employees; and preserve the 'good name' of the Army. In all matters relating to IO, the IG should work closely with the Command's Operational Law Attorney. DAIG's Intelligence Oversight Division (SAIG-IO) also stands ready to assist in all matters concerning the identification and reporting of questionable activity.

Section 3-3

Contractors on the Battlefield

1. **Background.** The Army has a long history of using civilian contractors in times of war. During the Revolutionary War, General Washington used civilian wagon drivers to transport supplies on the battlefield. Sutlers, the merchants who accompanied each regiment, supported Union Soldiers during the Civil War. The Army contracted dockworkers, rail maintainers, and road construction crews to support the logistical demands in the Korean War. From Vietnam to present-day conflicts, the military has increasingly looked to contractors to support base operations and provide petroleum and water supply, ground transportation, and maintenance / technical support for high-technology systems. Today, the U.S. armed forces are becoming more reliant on contractors to perform functions beyond the traditional logistical support role. For example, we are now outsourcing a number of operational functions once performed by military members such as enemy interrogations, force protection / personal security functions, interpreter support, and various civil affairs functions to support current operations in Southwest Asia. In many cases, contractors are training Soldiers to use newly fielded equipment such as weapon systems, electronic sensors, communications systems, and other highly technical gear while the equipment is actively employed on the battlefield.

2. **IG Assistance**. With the increased presence of contractors on the battlefield and the Army's increased dependence on civilian contractors to support the operational mission, the question becomes – **to what extent should the IG support contractors?** AR 20-1 states that when IGs receive IGARs from contractor activities, they "must analyze the substance of complaints and requests for assistance from contractors involved in commercial activities, procurement activities, or contracting, to determine if they are proper for IG action." The IG Action Process (IGAP) is still applicable to complaints and issues from contract employees, but there are some specific considerations.

a. If the contracted employee presents matters concerning a contracting process or acquisition issues, there are normally other established avenues of redress. In these cases the IG can determine the best form of redress by contacting the supporting judge advocate, general counsel, or DAIG Legal Advisor.

b. Some issues and allegations may be beyond the IG's influence to resolve because they are not directly related to members of the military or concern military matters. For instance, there is little assistance you can provide to contract employees who complain about a pay problem or about decisions their supervisor made that are within that supervisor's discretion to make and do not violate laws or contract provisions.

c. When contract employees present criminal allegations, the IG should refer the allegations to the appropriate investigative authorities. Allegations against a member of the armed forces should go to the Provost Marshal or nearest Criminal Investigations Division (CID) detachment for resolution. The IG should forward criminal allegations against other contract employees or indigenous civilians to the Provost Marshal or to the

local civil authorities if applicable. Contact the command's SJA whenever there are questions on where to refer a particular criminal matter.

d. There are many circumstances where complaints of non-criminal issues and allegations from contract activities and employees may be appropriate for the IG to resolve. In deciding whether or not the issues and allegations are IG appropriate, he or she must first consider the following questions –

- *What is the impact, or potential impact, of the complainant's issue(s)?*
- *Does it affect readiness, warfighting capability, or responsible use of government resources (fraud, abuse, or waste)?*
- *Is there an impact on the good order, discipline, morale, or welfare of Soldiers?*
- *Could the issue bring discredit upon Soldiers, the Army, or the United States?*
- *What would be the impact if the IG does not accept the complaint from the contractor?*

e. Once the IG determines that accepting and resolving the IGAR from a contract employee is appropriate, he or she should consider the option of referring the issue for a commander or supervisor inquiry, especially when allegations or issues are against the contractor activity. The command or contracting official in charge of oversight of the contractor activity is normally in the best position to investigate because civilian-civilian employees in contracted activities may refuse an interview by an IG if the requirement to cooperate is not specified in the contract. However, the contractors normally cannot refuse to be interviewed by a contracting officer who has access to all facts and information affecting the contract. Regardless of who ultimately investigates and resolves a contract employee's issues or allegations, the IG follows the IGAP to render assistance and close the case in the IGARS database.

2. **IG Inspections.** With the pervasive use of contractors on today's battlefields, the commander and his or her IG need to consider the impact that contracted activities have on the unit's ability to perform the mission. When applicable, the IG should include contracted activities as part of applicable special inspections. In those cases, the IG should work through the contracting officer or the contracting officer's representative (COR) assigned oversight of the contract to ensure there is a provision for the contract employees to cooperate with the IG. (Note: IGs may need to provide some teaching and training up front to contract specialists to ensure that this IG cooperation provision appears in future contracts).

a. If, during the course of an inspection, the IG finds non-compliance of certain standards, the IG should crosswalk the information with the contracting officials and / or the SJA to determine the following:

- *Does the contract specify the appropriate standards for the particular service?*
- *Is there a failure of the contracting official to enforce the standard within the terms and conditions of the contract?*
- *Should the standard apply to contractor activities?*

- *Do the terms of the contract require changes to ensure compliance with guiding standards?*

b. Answers to these questions will be relevant to the root causes and recommendations the IG provides in the final inspection report to correct deficiencies.

Section 3-4

IGARs from Indigenous People

1. Though military IGs do not necessarily promote their services to people outside the U.S. armed forces, IGs should prepare themselves for the possibility that a person who is indigenous to the area of operations may request IG assistance on a matter of Army interest. The principle that anyone can submit an IGAR still applies in the deployed, full spectrum, operational environment. Recent cases from Operation Iraqi Freedom reveal that indigenous civilians or host-nation service members do occasionally file requests for assistance with Army IGs. In most cases, the IGARs are from local workers hired by U.S. forces. They seek out the IG because they either have some knowledge of the IG or a military member interested in getting the person some help with a problem refers them to the IG. Examples of IGARs from indigenous persons include:

- Requests to locate family members in the custody of U.S. forces (detainees, EPWs).
- Disputes over contracts for goods and services they provide to U.S. or coalition forces.
- Issue(s) relating to their work conditions on U.S. military camps.
- Complaints of discriminatory practices by local public services against tribal or political factions (i.e. discretionary pricing for gas, electricity, public transportation).
- Requests to cease culturally offensive public displays or activities.

2. The IGAP method still works for resolving IGARs from indigenous people, but there are some additional considerations. For instance, by-the-book answers do not exist when determining if the issues and allegations are appropriate for the IG to resolve. Prior to making these decisions, the IG should consider the following guiding questions:

- *What is the impact, or potential impact, of the indigenous complainant's issue(s)?*
- *Does it affect mission readiness, warfighting ability, or responsible use of government resources (fraud, abuse, or waste)?*
- *Could the issue / allegation bring discredit upon Soldiers, the Army, or the United States?*
- *Does the issue have an impact on keeping local order and stability in the region?*
- *Is there an impact on winning or losing the hearts and minds of the local people to support U.S. and coalition interests?*
- *What would be the impact if the IG does not accept or resolve the complaint?*

3. The steps and sub-steps of the IGAP are not a perfect design for resolving IGARs from indigenous persons in a deployed environment. For instance, when operating in an area with non-existent or unreliable telephone and postal networks, the IG may have to

develop some innovative alternatives for acknowledging receipt and making final notifications. Course-of-action selection and fact-finding plans will also be more difficult unless the IG has a good understanding of the activity related to the IGAR and the command and staff agencies in a position to help resolve the specific issue or allegation. Although these cases are often difficult, the underlying principle for the IG is to use good judgment and existing experience on how best to resolve these complaints.

Section 3-5

IG Considerations for Deployment

1. The greatest benefit of the IG system is that it works much the same way in a deployed, wartime environment as it does in the garrison, peacetime setting. However, it would be unwise not to consider prior to deployment some of challenges IGs can experience on the modern battlefield. This section offers some tips and considerations for IGs to perform their duties effectively during operational deployments.

• **Remain "tuned-in" to command priorities**. Periodic meetings between the IG and the commander are not enough to stay informed on the operational picture and the commander's guidance and objectives. The IG must be a regular participant in Battle Update Briefs (BUB), the commander's staff planning guidance, plans and orders briefs, and command briefs for visiting dignitaries. The IG is always looking for high-payoff issues and guidance -- relevant to the commander's objectives – which he or she can incorporate into inspection plans, assistance visits, and teaching and training forums.

• **Conduct cross training and refresher training** so your assistance and investigations (A&I) and inspections personnel are multifunctional. Especially with intra-theater split-operations, the IG may not have sufficient people to organize the shop functionally. The overarching principle is that every IG is a 'full-service IG'.

• **Anticipate and drill new challenges**. Because a deployment and battlefield situations often create unique challenges, you should consider developing contingency battle-drills for situations that IGs do not typically encounter at home station. Start by identifying some of the possible nuances of doing IG business during operations, such as --

- Contractors on the battlefield.
- IGARs from indigenous civilians.
- Use of translators in IG inspections and investigative work.

• **Establish your IG tech channels early**. If you know your command is replacing a particular command in theater, contact the IG from that command as soon as possible to get a "lay of the land" to ease the transition and ensure your IG task organization and load plans are viable. Likewise, contact through technical channels IGs at higher, lower, and possibly adjacent commands to establish rapport and gather existing trends and lessons learned.

• **Maintain a “reach-back capability”** with your home station. You should strongly consider maintaining a small IG presence at home station because, in most cases, some of the important factors in a deployed IG's inspection, assistance inquiry, or investigation are away from the battlefield. A home-station element can facilitate the mission accomplishment of the forward IG by providing technical assistance such as researching standards, interviewing witnesses, gathering information from proponents and subject-matter experts, referring cases to other agencies or commands, etc.

• **Read and save all OPORDS / FRAGOs**. They may become standards for later use in inspections, teaching and training, investigations, and assistance.

• **Stay on top of task organization changes**. IGs normally provide support to all units in their command's sector, to include those units attached, under operational control (OPCON), or in a direct supporting role. When units are added to your task organization, you should contact the commanders so they know where to go for IG support. When units are detached from the task organization, you may want to contact the gaining command's IG to alert them to the added forces to their organization that they can expect to support.

• **Know your USAR and National Guard (NG) points of contact both in country and CONUS.** Reserve-component advisors in country can assist in policy and procedural assistance in NG and USAR affairs. They are there to support leaders, Soldiers, and IGs with reserve-component issues, which may vary from State to State. Reach-back to USAR functional commands and NG State IGs can be of great assistance in expediting support and case resolution.

• **Address an in-theater OIP policy with your commander**, to include your IG Inspection Plans. Refer to Section 3-2 of this part of The IG Reference Guide for some OIP considerations while deployed.

• **Seek new opportunities to teach and train**. Look for forums and media outlets to teach and train leaders and Soldiers to prevent and eliminate systemic issues in the command in much the same way as in a home-station environment. Some examples of teaching and training opportunities typically used by IGs include:

- Deployment and Reception Team / Leader Briefs
- New Commander / CSM / 1SG Orientations
- Articles in Bulletins, Unit Newsletters, Web pages

Appendix A

Recommended Equipment Checklist for Deploying IG

Though not intended to be all-inclusive, the following list provides some equipment considerations for IG load plans when deploying in support of full spectrum operations.

☑ **Vehicles with secure radio communications**. The eyes, ears, voice, and conscience of the commander should have the mobility to perform those duties and be able to move and communicate on the battlefield.

☑ **Tactical phones** with associated communications wire**.** At a minimum the IG needs phone connectivity in the form of a Digital Non-secure Voice Terminal (DNVT) to communicate with commanders, staff members, and Soldiers. Also, to facilitate the use of world-wide IG technical channels, ensure the G-6 plans for the IG to have Defense Switched Network (DSN) access.

☑ **Secret and unclassified laptop computers with printer.** Both systems are equally important. Deployed IGs require access to SIPRNet because most of the battlefield information is exchanged through secret Web and e-mail systems. For instance, fragmentary orders (FRAGO) that may become standards for inspections, assistance, and investigations are posted on SIPRNet-based systems. Deployed IGs also have the requirement to access unclassified internet through the NIPRNet. The NIPRNet also provides access to the World-Wide Web sites required to research standards (for example www.apd.army.mil). Coordinate in advance with DAIG's Information Resource Management Division (SAIG-IR) for access to IGNET / IGARS while deployed.

☑ **Scanner or digital sender.** When passing documents through IG technical channels, scan and email documents, which is more reliable than sending by telephonic fax machines.

☑ **Basic load of office supplies** with plenty of highlighters, folders, paper, tabbed dividers, media storage, etc. Included in this basic load would be extra cassette tapes and batteries for the investigators' tape recorders or digital recorders with sufficient memory cards and associated computer software. When deploying to an immature theater, consider deploying with at least a 90-day supply of consumable office items to allow time for a re-supply or local procurement system to work.

☑ **Dry-erase or butcher boards** with markers. One or the other, or both, is useful for planning meetings, IG In-process Reviews (IPR), and activity reports.

☑ **Compact Discs (CD)** loaded with unit policies, common regulations and FMs, the IG guides, and SOPs. Most load plans do not allow room for robust reference libraries, and Internet access is not always an option or is not always reliable.

Appendix B

Sample IG Appendix to Service Support Annex

[Classification]

APPENDIX # (IG SUPPORT), TO ANNEX I (SERVICE SUPPORT), TO OPERATION PLAN / ORDER ## [code name] – [issuing headquarters]

References: AR 20-1, AR 1-201, _____.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: _____.

1. SITUATION. *Include information affecting IG functions during the operation not covered in paragraph 1 of the OPLAN / OPORD.*

a. Enemy. See Annex B (Intelligence) or intelligence estimate.

b. Friendly situation. List the higher

2. MISSION. *Example:* On order, the Inspector General provides the full range of IG functions (assistance, inspections, investigations, teaching and training) in support of assigned and attached units of ____ for the duration of this operation.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Scheme of inspector general operations. *State the IG's concept to employ IGs during all phases of the operation. Focus on commander's guidance, mission, and intent, and emphasize how IG operations reduce friction that affects readiness and warfighting capability.*

(1) Inspections. *Outline the inspection plan by phase based on CG's guidance and the compressed inspection plan for unanticipated inspection topics when directed. Inspection plans should focus on high-payoff issues for the commander related to each phase of the operation (e.g. mobilization, deployment, theater reception / integration, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and reconstitution). Include command guidance on Organizational Inspection Program (OIP) requirements in theater, to include command inspections, staff inspections, IG inspections, intelligence oversight inspections, and audits. Include request and tasking procedures for subject-matter experts to serve as Temporary Assistant IGs.*

(2) Assistance and Investigations. *Develop assistance coverage plan for subordinate units with considerations for geographically dispersed units and split-based operations. Description of coverage should include unit visitation plans and plans for use of Acting IGs for assistance. Emphasize the IG's role of underwriting the chain of command in addressing issues and allegations. The IG assistance plan should also address support for units under the operational control (OPCON) or direct-supporting (DS) role of the IG's organization (e.g. assistance support on an area-support basis).*

[Classification]

[Classification]

(3) Teaching and Training. *Detail plans for deliberate teaching and training tools such as deployment and reception briefs, IG bulletins and newsletters, new commander / first sergeant orientations, newcomer briefs, unit visits, IG handbooks, etc.*

b. Tasks to subordinate units. *Use this paragraph when necessary to list tasks and areas of responsibility for IGs and acting IG elements geographically separated from the principal IG.*

c. Coordinating instructions. *Include instructions for coordination between IG elements conducting split-based operations and coordination for reach-back assistance from non-deployed supporting IGs at home station. List coordination and reporting requirements to the higher command IG and other IG technical channels. List the units' reporting process for intelligence oversight Procedure 15 reports, law of war violations, Whistle-Blower reprisal allegations, and other DoD-level critical information requirements. List the standard "before-you-see-the-IG" checklist.*

.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. *Use this paragraph as necessary to describe the IG's plan for supply and services requirements, personnel, host-nation support, etc.*

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Command. *Identify current or future command post locations or map coordinate locations of IGs. Identify the IG chain of command if not addressed in unit SOP.*

b. Signal. *List signal instructions and net-centric instructions, to include call-signs, phone numbers, and addresses to reach the IG. Address unique digitization connectivity requirements or coordination to meet functional responsibilities (i.e. IGNET).*

ACKNOWLEDGE: (If distributed separately from base order)

[Authenticator's last name]
[Authenticator's rank]

DISTRIBUTION: (If distributed separately from base order)

[Classification]

Appendix C

Requests for Exception to IG Duty Restrictions

1. **IG Duties**. As the Inspector General, you support the commander. You address issues that affect readiness, warfighting ability, and quality of life. You are nominated and selected as IGs based on backgrounds that reflect outstanding performance and demonstrated adherence to Army values. You enter your IG tours as qualified officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians in your respective branches and career fields. Your IG training and experience marks a maturity and breadth of professional knowledge that may not be otherwise available to the commander.

2. **Exceptions**. Consequently, in times of crises and need, commanders may turn to you to assume responsibilities or provide services that are normally prohibited by AR 20-1. However, there may be operational necessities that require the use of an IG in a non-regulatory role. Commanders may submit requests for policy exceptions to The Inspector General (TIG) for case-by-case consideration and approval. The request should address the operational requirement, duty responsibilities, and the expected period of time. Requests must have the approval of the local Inspector General as well as the commander prior to submission.

3. **Considerations**. You support the commander. However, as an IG you also serve the commander's Soldiers and their Family members, civilian employees, retirees, and other civilians needing assistance with an Army matter. You have a sworn duty to be fair and objective fact-finders and problem solvers. As such, you are a valuable readiness resource for the commander when used in the IG role -- especially in times of war. Therefore, the continued availability of IG support to the command is a consideration for every exception-to-policy request regarding the non-regulatory use of IGs.

3. Contact the Office of the Inspector General Operations and Support Division with your questions, (703) 695-1511 (DSN prefix 225); Fax: (703) 697-8807 (DSN prefix 227)

Appendix D

Reporting Law of War Violations

1. **Background**. An Army at war must remain committed to the established laws of war. The DoD Law of War Program (DoD Directive 5100.77), implements the provisions of law and customs of land warfare from standing international treaties and agreements and regulates the conduct of our Soldiers during hostilities. As the command's senior operational law advisor, the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) is the lead staff agency on all matters concerning Law of War rights and responsibilities. The IG has an important role in reporting and, in some cases, investigating Law of War violations.

2. **Reportable Incidents**. A reportable incident is any possible, suspected, or alleged violation of the Law of War. DoD Directive 5100.77 describes the reporting requirements for Law of War violations as follows:

> "6.1. Reports of Incidents. All military and civilian personnel assigned to or accompanying a DoD Component shall report reportable incidents through their chain of command. Such reports also may also be made through other channels, such as the military police, a judge advocate, or an **Inspector General** [emphasis added]. Reports that are made to officials other than those specified in this paragraph shall, nonetheless, be accepted and immediately forwarded through the recipient's chain of command."

3. **What and Where to Report**. IMPORTANT NOTE: THE IG SHOULD CONTACT THE COMMAND'S SJA WITH ALL QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW OF WAR. Do not rely on your own experiences or training. When the IG finds or receives a report of a Law of War incident, his or her immediate action is to record the readily available facts surrounding the incident and report the incident to the command as soon as possible. Nearly simultaneously, the IG should notify the command's SJA to ensure he or she is aware of the incident and prepared to advise the commander. The IG should also inform the complainant of his or her intent to report the alleged Law of War violation to the command while at the same time striving to preserve the confidentiality of the complainant. As a courtesy, the IG should also report through IG technical channels to the next higher level IG in the operational chain of command to ensure that they are aware and tracking the reporting and investigation requirements for the Law of War incident.

4. **Law of War Investigations**. The commander may direct the IG to conduct an investigation into allegations of Law of War violations. The IG should use the same investigative tools provided in The Assistance and Investigations Guide, but the IG should always consult with the SJA on the investigative plan during IG Preliminary Analysis (IGPA). Depending on the nature of the allegations, the IG may consider requesting that an SJA attorney accompany the IG investigators during fact-finding as well.

Part 4

Joint References (Extracts)

Table of Contents

Joint References
Extracts

Introduction

Joint Reference Extracts

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this part is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) at all levels with readily available extracts from Joint publications related directly to Joint Task Forces and Joint doctrine overall.

2. **The Joint and Expeditionary Mindset:** The Army's senior leadership has established the Joint and Expeditionary Mindset as one of the Army's key focus areas. The Army must strive to educate future senior leaders now to function in a Joint environment while still providing our Nation with the campaign-quality forces needed to fight and win America's wars. All leaders within today's Army must be mindful of Joint doctrine and the impact of that doctrine on the Army's new modular brigades, which were previously labeled as Units of Action (UA). These brigades will respond quickly to crisis areas anywhere in the world – most likely as part of a larger Joint force. The bottom line is that the Joint Expeditionary Army of the future has arrived and will continue to grow, mature, and develop as we adapt to meet the challenges of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and other overseas contingency operations.

3. **The Joint Inspector General:** Army IGs will routinely find themselves thrust into Joint environments with little or no notice -- most likely as a JTF IG. An Army headquarters that becomes a Joint Task Force (JTF) must include an IG staff section that is both adaptable and responsive to the various services represented by that JTF. Army IGs must prepare for such a transition by understanding the basic elements of Joint operational doctrine, staying abreast of current and emerging Joint IG policy and doctrine, knowing fundamental differences between and among the other services' IG systems, and adapting the Army IG system to remain relevant and responsive to an Army commander charged with serving as a JTF commander. Army IGs must be able to adapt quickly to the Joint world as part of an expeditionary Army that must fight jointly in order to defeat the threat of global terrorism and other emerging threats.

4. **Joint Reference Extracts:** This part of The IG Reference Guide provides the Army IG student with extracts from Joint references that will prove useful and lead to other sources of Joint doctrine on the Internet and elsewhere. The references include:

a. Executive Summary from Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (dated 10 September 2002)
b. IG extract from Joint Publication 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters (dated 16 February 2007)
c. Extract from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3500.05, Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide (dated 15 April 1997)
d. Chapter 3 (Inspector General) from the Southern European Task Force (SETAF) Joint Standing Operating Procedure (SOP)
e. Chapter 12 (Inspector General) from European Directive (ED) 55-11, Joint Task Force Headquarters Organization and Standing Operating Procedures
f. USCINCEUR Policy Letter Number 99-01, USEUCOM Guidance on Review of On-Going Operations in Theater

These extracts merely serve as relevant examples of Joint doctrine and Joint Task Force IG Standing Operating Procedures and provide the IG student with a ready reference that will assist in the training of – and transition to – an IG in a Joint environment.

Chapter 1

Executive Summary to Joint Publication 3-0

1. **Purpose:** This chapter provides the IG student with the Executive Summary to Joint Publication 3-0.

2. **Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations:** Joint Publication 3-0 is the keystone document for the conduct of all Joint operations. This document explores the strategic context for Joint operations, the National Strategic Direction, the fundamentals of Joint operations, and the planning of Joint operations. This document is essential to a thorough understanding of the Joint environment; all IGs should read this publication in order to understand the Joint environment. The Executive Summary reproduced here is from the version dated 17 September 2006, which incorporates Change 1 dated 13 February 2008. A complete version of this publication is available on the Web at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Discusses the Strategic Security Environment, Strategic Considerations and the Nature of War as a context for Joint Operations**
- **Lists the Fundamental Principles of Joint Operations**
- **Discusses Joint Functions in Joint Operations**
- **Addresses Operational Art, Operational Design, Joint Operation Planning, and Assessment**
- **Describes the Key Considerations for the Conduct of Major Operations and Campaigns**
- **Discusses the Characteristics of and Specific Considerations for Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations**
- **Addresses the Characteristics of and Specific Considerations for Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence**

Strategic Security Environment

The strategic security environment is extremely fluid, with continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and new national and transnational threats constantly appearing, disappearing, or in remission.

The strategic security environment is extremely fluid, with continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and new national and transnational threats constantly appearing, disappearing, or in remission. The US military is well positioned to conduct operations, but must also be prepared to address emerging peer competitors and irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges. These challenges include irregular warfare (IW), catastrophic terrorism employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and disruptive threats to US ability to maintain its qualitative edge and to project power. Joint operations increasingly occur in urban terrain and the information environment. The operational area often contains humanitarian crisis conditions requiring humanitarian assistance. In addition to military forces and noncombatants, there may be a large number of other government agencies (OGAs), international government agencies (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), regional organizations, and elements of the private sector in the operational area.

Strategic Considerations

As a nation, the United States wages war employing all instruments of national power — diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. The President employs the Armed Forces of the United States to achieve national strategic objectives.

As a nation, the United States wages war employing all instruments of national power to achieve national strategic objectives. National strategic direction defines the strategic purpose that guides the employment of the military instrument of national power. At the crux of this understanding must be the strategic purpose, which may be attributed to the nature of and goals of the adversary, and the systems perspective of the operational environment. Decisive unified action provides unity of effort focused on those objectives and leads to the conclusion of operations on terms favorable to the United States.

Strategic Communications

The United States Government (USG) uses strategic communication (SC) to provide top-down guidance relative to using the informational instrument of national power in specific situations.

Strategic Communications's primary communication capabilities are coupled with defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) and military diplomacy activities to implement a holistic SC effort. The predominant military activities that support SC themes and messages are information operations (IO), public affairs (PA), and DSPD. IO are those military actions to attack an adversary's information and related systems while defending our own. PA are those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense (DOD). SC planning must be integrated into military planning and operations, documented in operation plans (OPLANs), and coordinated and synchronized with OGAs and multinational.

The Strategic Role of Combatant Commanders

Combatant commanders are the vital link between those who determine national security policy and strategy and the military forces or subordinate JFCs that conduct military operations.

Based on guidance from the President and SecDef, CCDRs develop strategies that translate national and multinational direction into strategic concepts or courses of action (COAs) to meet strategic and joint operation planning requirements. In joint operations, the supported CCDR often will have a role in achieving more than one national strategic objective. Some national strategic objectives will be the primary responsibility of the supported CCDR, while others will require a more balanced use of all instruments of national power, with the CCDR in support of other agencies.

Theater Strategy Determination

CCDRs and their staffs develop strategic estimates and concepts that facilitate development of courses of action and joint campaign/operation plans.

Theater Strategy consists of strategic concepts and courses of actions (COAs) directed toward securing the objectives of national and multinational policies and strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power. CCDRs develop **strategic estimates** after reviewing the operational environment, nature of anticipated operations, and national and multinational strategic direction. In the strategic estimate, commanders focus on the threat and consider other circumstances affecting the military situation as they develop and analyze COAs. **Theater strategic concepts** are statements of intent as to what, where, and how operations are to be conducted in broad, flexible terms. Theater strategic concepts consider, among many items, the law of war, implementation of national policies; and protection of US citizens, forces, and interests and identification of termination criteria.

The Nature of Warfare

Traditional war is characterized as a confrontation between nation-states or coalitions/alliances of nation-states.

Traditional war is characterized as a confrontation between nation-states or coalitions/alliances of nation-states. In the **traditional paradigm**, nation-states wage war for reasons as broad and varied as the array of national interests. This confrontation typically involves small-scale to large-scale, force-on-force military operations in which adversaries employ a variety of conventional military capabilities against each other in the air, land, maritime, and space physical domains and the information environment.

The context of irregular warfare (IW) is marked by a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population.

The context of **irregular warfare** (IW) is marked by a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. In IW, a less powerful adversary seeks to disrupt or negate the military capabilities and advantages of a more powerful, conventionally armed military force, which often represents the nation's established regime. An adversary using irregular warfare methods typically will endeavor to wage protracted conflicts in an attempt to break the will of the opponent and its population. IW typically manifests itself as one or a combination of several possible forms including insurgency, terrorism, disinformation, propaganda, organized criminal activity (such as drug trafficking). The specific form will vary according to the adversary's capabilities and objectives.

Range of Military Operations

The nature of the strategic security environment requires US joint forces to be able to operate effectively across the range of military operations. The United States employs military capabilities at home and abroad in joint operations that vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity to shape the operational environment, protect US interests, prevent surprise attack, or prevail against an enemy.

The United States employs its military capabilities at home and abroad in support of its national security goals in a variety of operations that vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity. The use of joint capabilities in **military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence** activities helps shape the operational environment and keeps the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence. A **crisis response or limited contingency operation** can be a single small-scale, limited-duration operation or a significant part of a major operation of extended duration involving combat. The associated general strategic and operational objectives are to **protect** US interests and **prevent** surprise attack or further conflict. When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to conduct a **major operation or campaign** involving large-scale combat, placing the United States in a wartime state. In such cases, the general goal is to **prevail** against the enemy as quickly as possible, conclude hostilities, and establish conditions favorable to the host nation (HN) and the United States and its multinational partners.

Joint operations may be conducted simultaneously, for multiple purposes , or on a global scale.

Simultaneous joint operations with different end states can be conducted within the GCC'c AOR. Some military operations may be conducted for one purpose; however, other military operations will have multiple purposed and be influenced by a fluid and changing situation . US joint forces have global reach and are capable of engaging threats, influencing potential adversaries, assuring friends and promoting peace and stability with a variety of capabilities. Consequently, as directed, the US military conducts operations on a global rather than a theater scale (e.g., special operations (SO) in the war on terror, network operations, space control).

Principles of Joint Operations

There are 12 principles of joint operations, but the chief principle for employment of US forces is to ensure achievement of the national strategic objectives through decisive action.

Although the historical **nine principles of war** have been consistent in joint doctrine since its inception, extensive experience in missions across the range of military operations has identified **three additional principles**; i.e., restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy; that also may apply to joint operations. Together, they comprise the **12 principles of joint operations**.

Levels of War

The three levels of war — strategic, operational, and tactical — help clarify the links between national strategic objectives and tactical actions.

The three levels of war — **strategic, operational, and tactical** — help clarify the links between national strategic objectives and tactical actions. The **strategic level** is that level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. The **operational level** links the tactical employment of forces to national and military strategic objectives through the design and conduct of operations using operational art. The **tactical level** focuses on planning and executing battles, engagements, and activities to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces.

Unified Action

Combatant commanders (CCDRs) play a pivotal role in unifying the actions of military and nonmilitary organizations.

Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) play a pivotal role in unifying actions; however, subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) also integrate and synchronize their operations directly with the activities and operations of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations in the operational area.

Joint forces likely will be employed within the framework of a multinational force that presents challenges in command and control (C2) and logistics among many other factors.

Joint forces should be prepared for operations with forces from other nations within the framework of an **alliance or coalition** under US or other-than-US leadership. The glue that binds the multinational force is trust and agreement, however tenuous, on common goals and objectives. **Language differences** often present the most immediate challenge. In all multinational operations, even when operating under the operational control (OPCON) of a foreign commander, US commanders will maintain the capability to report separately to higher US military authorities in addition to foreign commanders. Alliances typically have developed command and control (C2) structures, systems, and procedures. **Coalitions may adopt a parallel or lead nation C2 structure or a combination of the two.** Regardless of the command structure, coalitions and alliances require a significant **liaison structure**. The success of a multinational operation hinges upon timely and accurate information and intelligence sharing. **Multinational logistics is a challenge**; however, many issues can be resolved or mitigated by a thorough understanding of capabilities and procedures before operations begin. Multinational force commanders typically form multinational logistic staff sections early to facilitate logistic coordination and support multinational operations.

The CCDR's joint interagency coordination group establishes collaborative working relationships between nonmilitary and military planners.

CCDRs and subordinate JFCs are likely to operate with other governmental agencies (OGAs), foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in a variety of circumstances. Integration and coordination among the military force and OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs should not be equated to the C2 of a military operation. The **joint interagency coordination group**, an element of a CCDR's staff, establishes and/or enhances regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between OGA representatives and military operational planners. Another method to facilitate unified action and conduct on-site interagency coordination is to establish a **civil-military operations center**.

Organizing the Joint Force

Joint forces can be established on a geographic or functional basis in the form of a combatant command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force.

The first principle in joint force organization is that **JFCs organize forces to accomplish the mission based on the JFC's vision and concept of operations (CONOPS)**. Joint forces can be established on a **geographic or functional** basis. A **combatant command** is a unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander. When authorized, commanders of unified (not specified) commands may establish **subordinate unified commands** to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. A **joint task force (JTF)** is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), a CCDR, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing commander, JTF (CJTF) to accomplish missions with specific, limited objectives and which do not require overall centralized control of logistics.

Joint force commanders (JFCs) may conduct operations through Service or functional component commanders or a combination.

The JFC may conduct operations through the **Service component commanders** or, at lower echelons, Service force commanders. Conducting joint operations using Service components has certain advantages, which include clear and uncomplicated command lines. The JFC can establish **functional component commands** to conduct operations when forces from two or more Services must operate in the same domain or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. Normally, the Service component commander with the preponderance of forces to be tasked and the ability to C2 those forces will be designated as the functional component commander; however, the JFC will always consider the mission, nature, and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the C2 capabilities in selecting a commander. Joint forces often are organized with a

combination of Service and functional components with operational responsibilities.

Organizing the Operational Areas

The President and Secretary of Defense or geographic CCDRs may designate theaters of war and/or theaters of operations for each operation.

An **area of responsibility (AOR)** is a geographical area established on an enduring basis by the President and SecDef that is associated with a geographic combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander (GCC) has authority to plan and conduct operations. When warranted, the President and SecDef or GCCs may designate theaters of war and/or theaters of operations for each operation. The **theater of war** is that area of the air, land, and maritime domains that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of major operations and campaigns that may cross the boundaries of two or more AORs. A **theater of operations** is that area required to conduct or support specific military operations normally associated with major operations and campaigns. The **communications zone** usually includes the rear portions of the theaters of operations and theater of war (if designated) and reaches back to the continental United States base or perhaps to a supporting CCDR's AOR.

Subordinate JFC-level operational areas include the joint operations area, joint special operations area, joint security area, amphibious objective area, and the land and maritime force component commander's areas of operations.

A **joint operations area (JOA)** is a temporary geographical area comprising some combination of air, land, and maritime domains, defined by a GCC or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a CJTF) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A **joint special operations area** is a restricted geographical area comprising some combination of air, land, and maritime domains, defined by a JFC who has geographic responsibilities, for use by a joint special operations component or joint special operations task force for the conduct of special operations. A **joint security area** is a specific surface area within a JFC's operational area that may be designated by the JFC to facilitate protection and security operations of installations and forces supporting the joint force. The **amphibious objective area** is a geographical area within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by an amphibious force. JFCs may define **areas of operations (AOs)** large enough for land and maritime force component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces.

Understanding the Operational Environment

Understanding the operational environment helps commander's understand the results of various friendly, adversary, and neutral actions.

The JFC's operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses **physical areas and factors** (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains) and the **information environment**. Included within these are the **adversary, friendly, and neutral systems** that are relevant to a specific joint operation.

Joint Functions

C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment are the basic groups of common functions to joint operations.

Joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. Functions that are common to joint operations at all levels of war fall into **six basic groups — C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment**. Information operations core, supporting, and related capabilities are applied across the joint functions and independently.

JFCs exercise combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, or support through subordinate commanders and over assigned and attached forces.

C2 encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. JFCs exercise an array of **command authorities** (i.e., combatant command [command authority], OPCON, tactical control, and support) delegated to them by law or senior leaders and commanders over assigned and attached forces. **Control** is inherent in command to regulate forces and functions and execute the commander's intent. The **land and maritime force commanders** are the supported commanders within the AOs designated by the JFC. The JFC will normally designate a **joint force air component commander (JFACC)** who normally is the supported commander for the JFC's overall air interdiction and counterair effort.

Effective C2 makes use of collaboration among commanders and staffs and identifies decision points through the commander's critical information requirements.

Effective C2 demands that commanders and staffs **collaborate** in planning (e.g., determining the mission, operational objectives, desired effects, and tasks), preparing for, executing, and assessing joint operations. **Commander's critical information requirements** (i.e., priority intelligence requirements and friendly forces information requirements) are a key information management tool for the commander and help the commander assess the adversary, operational environment, and friendly capabilities; and identify decision points throughout the conduct of operations.

Intelligence provides an understanding of the operational environment.

Intelligence provides JFCs with an understanding of the operational environment. The intelligence function includes planning and direction to include managing counterintelligence activities, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback.

The fires function encompasses targeting, joint fire support, counterair, interdiction, strategic attack, electronic attack, and computer network attack.

The **fires** function encompasses a number of tasks (or missions, actions, and processes). **Targeting** is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. Targeting supports the process of linking the desired effects of fires to actions and tasks at the component level. **Joint fire support** includes joint fires that assist forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters. Air superiority is achieved through the **counterair mission**, which integrates both offensive counterair and defensive counterair operations from all components to counter the air and missile threat. **Interdiction** is a tool used by JFCs to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise meet objectives. JFCs also conduct **strategic attacks** — offensive action against a target; whether military, political, economic, or other; that is specifically selected to achieve national or military strategic objectives — when feasible. **Computer network attack** operations disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks (relying on the data stream to execute the attack), or the computers and networks themselves. **Electronic attack** involves the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying adversary combat capability.

The air, land, and maritime component commanders; and other military force commanders in support of other governmental agencies (OGAs) conduct various forms of interdiction.

The JFACC normally is the supported commander for the JFC's overall air interdiction effort, while land and maritime component commanders are supported commanders for interdiction in their AOs. Military forces also provide civil support (CS) to OGAs responsible for execution of law enforcement interdiction activities, although federal law and Department of Defense (DOD) policy impose significant limitations on the types of support that may be provided. This support may include actions taken to divert, disrupt, delay, intercept, board, detain, or destroy, as appropriate, suspect vessels, vehicles, aircraft, people, and cargo.

Movement involves the deployment of forces into an operational area and maneuver is their employment in combination with fires to achieve positional advantage.

Movement and maneuver includes moving or deploying forces into an operational area and conducting maneuver to operational depths for offensive and defensive purposes. Forces, sometimes limited to those that are forward-deployed or even multinational forces formed specifically for the task at hand, can be positioned within operational reach of enemy centers of gravity (COGs) or decisive points to achieve decisive force at the appropriate time and place. **Maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy.**

JFC protect the joint force's fighting potential through active offensive and defensive measures, passive measures, the application of technology and procedures, and emergency management and response. Protection extends beyond force protection to the civil infrastructure of friendly nations and nonmilitary participants.

The **protection function** focuses on conserving the joint force's fighting potential in **four primary ways** — (1) **active defensive measures** (e.g., air defense) that protect the joint force, its information, its bases, necessary infrastructure, and lines of communications from an adversary's attack; (2) **passive measures** (e.g., concealment) that make friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy; (3) **applying technology and procedures** to reduce the risk of fratricide; and (4) **emergency management and response** to reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to accidents, health threats, and natural disasters. The protection function extends beyond **force protection** — preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions **against DOD** personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information — to encompass protection of US noncombatants; the forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of friendly nations; and OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. Protection capabilities apply domestically in the context of homeland defense and CS.

JFCs strive to ensure the sustainment of personnel, logistics, and other support throughout joint operations.

Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations until mission accomplishment. Key considerations include employment of logistic forces, facilities, environmental considerations, health service support, host-nation support, contracting, disposal operations, legal support, religious support, and financial management.

Joint Operation Planning

Planning joint operations uses two integrated, collaborative, and adaptive processes — the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System and the joint operation planning process.

Planning for joint operations is continuous across the full range of military operations using two closely related, integrated, collaborative, and adaptive processes — the **Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)** and the **joint operation planning process (JOPP)**. While JOPES activities span many organizational levels, **the focus is on the interaction which ultimately helps the President and SecDef decide when, where, and how to commit US military capabilities**. Joint operation planning includes two primary sub-

categories: **contingency planning** and **crisis action planning**. The **JOPP steps** are initiation, mission analysis, course of action (COA) development, COA analysis and wargaming, COA comparison, COA approval, and plan or order development.

Operational Art

Operational art is the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs that integrates ends, conditions, ways, and means to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

Operational art is the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art governs the deployment of forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from a joint operation, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means and considers risk across the levels of war.

Operational Design

Operational design involves the construction of a framework that underpins a joint operation plan.

Operational art is applied during operational design – the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or joint operation plan and its subsequent execution. Operational design is particularly helpful during COA determination. During execution, commanders and their staffs continue to consider design elements and adjust both current operations and future plans as the joint operation unfolds.

A systems perspective of the operational environment provides a picture of the adversary's interrelated systems by identifying each system's nodes and the links between them.

A **systems perspective of the operational environment** is fundamental to operational design. It considers more than just an adversary's military capabilities, it also strives to provide a perspective of the interrelated systems that comprise the operational environment relevant to a specific joint operation. It helps with COG analysis and operational design by identifying nodes in each system and the links (relationships) between the nodes.

JFCs and their staffs use the operational design elements to visualize the arrangement of joint capabilities in time, space, and purpose.

JFCs and their staffs use a number of **operational design elements** (e.g., termination, end state and objectives, effects, COG, decisive points, lines of operations, arranging operations) to help them visualize the arrangement of actions in time, space, and purpose to accomplish their mission. The result of this process should be a framework that forms the basis for the joint campaign or operation plan and the conceptual linkage of ends, ways, and means.

Operational Design and the Campaign

Operational design elements are applied in joint campaigns — a series of related military operations.

Operational design elements can be used selectively in any joint operation. However, their application is broadest in the context of a **joint campaign — a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space**. There are three general types of campaigns: global, theater, and subordinate.

Key Plan Elements

The mission statement, commander's intent, and concept of operations are key plan elements that result from mission analysis and the planning process.

Key elements that result from mission analysis and the planning process include a draft mission statement, commander's intent, and CONOPS. The **mission statement** should be a short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization's essential task (or tasks) and purpose — a clear statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The **commander's intent** is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the military end state. The **CONOPS** describes how the actions of the joint force components and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to accomplish the mission, including potential branches and sequels.

Phasing (e.g., shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority) a joint operation plan provides a flexible arrangement of smaller, related operations.

Phasing assists JFCs and staffs to visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. The actual number of phases used will vary (compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) with the joint campaign or operation and be determined by the JFC. Although the JFC determines the number and actual phases used during a joint campaign or operation, use of the **six-phase model (i.e., shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority)** provides a flexible arrangement for smaller, related operations.

Assessment

Assessment measures progress toward mission accomplishment using measures of performance and measures of effectiveness tools.

Assessment is a process that measures progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. The assessment process begins during mission analysis when the commander and staff consider what to measure and how to measure it **to determine progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective**. The assessment process uses **measures of performance** to evaluate task performance at all levels of war and **measures of effectiveness** to measure effects and determine the progress of operations toward achieving objectives.

Major Operations and Campaigns

Major operations and campaigns are the most complex and JFCs must integrate and synchronize stability operations with offensive and defensive operations within each phase of the campaign or operation.

Major operations and campaigns are the most **complex** and require the greatest diligence in planning and execution due to the time, effort, and national resources committed. They normally will include some level of **offense and defense** (e.g., interdiction, maneuver, forcible entry, fire support, counterair, computer network defense, and base defense). To reach the national strategic end state and conclude the operation/campaign successfully, **JFCs must integrate and synchronize stability operations —** missions, tasks, and activities to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitarian relief — **with offensive and defensive operations** within each major operation or campaign phase. **Planning for stability operations should begin when joint operation planning is initiated.**

Considerations for Shaping

JFCs should organize and train forces, rehearse key actions, establish operational area access, secure space capabilities, and conduct stability operations as needed during the "shape" phase of a major operation of campaign.

Organizing and training forces to conduct operations throughout the operational area can be a deterrent. **Rehearsing** key combat and logistic actions allows participants to become familiar with the operation and to visualize the plan. JFCs **establish and maintain access to operational areas** where they are likely to operate, ensuring forward presence, basing, freedom of navigation, and cooperation with allied and/or coalition nations to enhance operational reach. **Space capabilities** help shape the operational environment by providing strategic intelligence and communications. **Stability operations** may be required to quickly restore security and infrastructure or provide humanitarian relief in select portions of the operational area to dissuade further adversary actions or to help ensure access and future success.

Considerations for Deterrence

JFCs can dissuade planned adversary actions by implementing military and nonmilitary flexible deterrent options.

At the advent of a crisis or other indication of potential military action, JFCs examine available intelligence estimates and focus intelligence efforts to refine estimates of enemy capabilities, dispositions, intentions, and probable COAs within the context of the current situation and identify additional intelligence requirements. Both military and nonmilitary flexible deterrent options — preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions carefully tailored to bring an issue to early resolution without armed conflict — can be used to dissuade actions before a crisis arises or to deter further aggression during a crisis. Special operations forces (SOF) play a major role in preparing and shaping the operational area and environment by setting conditions that mitigate

risk and facilitate successful follow-on operations. Joint force planning and operations conducted prior to commencement of hostilities also should establish a sound foundation for operations in the "stabilize" and "enable civil authority" phases. **JFCs strive to isolate enemies by denying them allies and sanctuary and to separate the main enemy force from both its strategic leadership and its supporting infrastructure.** Weather, terrain, sea conditions, and other factors of the physical environment such as urban and littoral areas can significantly affect operations and logistic support of the joint force and should be carefully assessed before sustained combat operations.

Considerations for Seizing the Initiative

JFCs seize the initiative and exploit friendly advantages by conducting forcible entry operations; directing operations immediately against enemy centers of gravity; seeking superiority in the air, land, maritime, and space domains and the information environment; while protecting the joint force, host nation infrastructure, and logistic support.

As operations commence, the JFC needs to exploit friendly advantages and capabilities to shock, demoralize, and disrupt the enemy immediately. Consequently, the JFC must sequence, enable, and protect the opposed or unopposed deployment of forces to achieve early decisive advantage. Forcible entry operations (amphibious, airborne, and air assault operations) may be required to seize and hold a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition for the continuous landing of forces. As part of achieving decisive advantages early, joint force operations may be directed immediately against enemy COGs using conventional and special operations forces and capabilities. JFCs also seek superiority early in air, land, maritime, and space domains and the information environment to prepare the operational area and information environment and to accomplish the mission as rapidly as possible. Operations to neutralize or eliminate potential "stabilize" phase adversaries and conditions may be initiated. National and local HN authorities may be contacted and offered support. Key infrastructure may be seized or otherwise protected. Intelligence collection on the status of enemy infrastructure, government organizations, and humanitarian needs should be increased. JFCs must strive to conserve the fighting potential of the joint/multinational force at the onset of combat operations. Further, HN infrastructure and logistic support key to force projection and sustainment of the force must be protected. Commanders must be aware of those situations that increase the risk of fratricide and institute appropriate preventive measures.

Considerations for Dominance

JFCs conduct sustained combat operations by simultaneously employing conventional and special operations forces throughout the operational area and by optimizing leverage through the integration and synchronization of interdiction and maneuver.

During sustained combat operations, JFCs simultaneously employ conventional and SOF and capabilities throughout the breadth and depth of the operational area in **linear and nonlinear** orientations. **Direct and indirect attacks of enemy COGs** should be designed to achieve the required military strategic and operational objectives per the CONOPS, while limiting the potential undesired effects on operations in follow-on phases. The synergy achieved by integrating and **synchronizing interdiction and maneuver** assists commanders in optimizing leverage at the operational level. **Within their AOs, land and maritime commanders are designated the supported commander for the integration and synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction.** Accordingly, land and maritime commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs. Further, **in coordination with the land or maritime commander, a component commander designated as the supported commander for theater/JOA-wide interdiction has the latitude to plan and execute JFC prioritized missions within a land or maritime AO**. **If those operations would have adverse impact within a land or maritime AO, the commander must readjust the plan, resolve the issue with the appropriate component commander, or consult with the JFC for resolution.**

Considerations for Stabilization

JFCs pursue attainment of the national strategic end state as sustained combat operations wane by conducting stability operations independently or in coordination with indigenous civil, US Government, and multinational organizations.

Operations in the "stabilize" phase ensure the national strategic end state continues to be pursued at the conclusion of sustained combat operations. **Several lines of operations may be initiated immediately** (e.g., providing humanitarian relief, establishing security). Consequently, the JFC may need to realign forces and capabilities or adjust force structure to begin stability operations in some portions of the operational area, even while sustained combat operations still are ongoing in other areas. Of particular importance will be civil-military operations initially conducted to secure and safeguard the populace, reestablish civil law and order, protect or rebuild key infrastructure, and restore public services. US military forces should be prepared to lead the activities necessary to accomplish these tasks when indigenous civil, US Government, multinational, or international capacity does not exist or is incapable of assuming responsibility. Once legitimate civil authority is prepared to conduct such tasks, US military forces may support such activities as required/necessary.

Considerations for Enabling Civil Authority

Once legitimate civil authority has been enabled to manage the situation without military assistance, usually after an extended period of conducting stability operations, the joint operation will be terminated and redeployment of the joint force completed.

The joint operation normally is terminated when the stated military strategic and/or operational objectives have been met and redeployment of the joint force is accomplished. This should mean that a **legitimate civil authority has been enabled** to manage the situation without further outside military assistance. JFCs may be required to transfer responsibility of operations to another authority (e.g., United Nations [UN] observers, multinational peacekeeping force, or North Atlantic Treaty Organization) as the termination criteria. This probably will occur after an extended period of conducting joint or multinational stability operations as described above. **Redeployment** must be planned and executed in a manner that facilitates the use of redeploying forces and supplies to meet new missions or crises. Upon redeployment, units or individuals may require refresher training prior to reassuming more traditional roles and missions.

Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

JFCs may be tasked to conduct joint operations in response to a crisis that requires, among many contingency possibilities, noncombatant evacuation, foreign humanitarian assistance, or support of US civil authorities.

The ability of the United States to respond rapidly with appropriate options to potential or actual crises contributes to regional stability. **Thus, joint operations often may be planned and executed as a crisis response or limited contingency.** Crisis response and limited contingency operations are typically limited in scope and scale and conducted to achieve a very specific objective in an operational area. They may be conducted as stand-alone operations in response to a crisis or executed as an element of a larger, more complex joint campaign or operation. Typical crisis response and limited contingency operations include noncombatant evacuation operations, peace operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, recovery operations, consequence management, strikes, raids, homeland defense operations, and civil support operations.

Crisis response and limited contingency operations are not always short in duration; and often require human intelligence sources to be effective and implementation of appropriate force protection measures regardless of the operational environment.

Short duration crisis response or limited contingency operations are not always possible, particularly in situations where destabilizing conditions have existed for years or where conditions are such that a long-term commitment is required to achieve strategic objectives. As soon as practical after it is determined that a crisis may develop or a contingency is declared, JFCs and their staffs begin a systems analysis and determine the intelligence requirements needed to support the anticipated operation. **Human intelligence** often may provide the most useful source of information. Even in permissive operational environments, **force protection** measures will be planned commensurate with the risks to the force. The impartiality of the force

and effective engagement with local community members often contribute to force protection in these operations.

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

CCDRs and subordinate JFCs conduct a wide range of military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities in support of OGAs and intergovernmental agencies to prevent unstable situations from escalating into larger conflicts.

Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is tasked to support OGAs and cooperate with IGOs (e.g., UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and other countries to protect and enhance national security interests and deter conflict. GCCs shape their AORs through security cooperation activities by continually employing military forces to complement and reinforce other instruments of national power. Joint force presence often keeps unstable situations from escalating into larger conflicts. Presence can take the form of forward basing, forward deploying, or pre-positioning assets. Various joint operations (e.g., show of force or enforcement of sanctions) support deterrence by demonstrating national resolve and willingness to use force when necessary.

Emergency preparedness, combating terrorism, and show of force operations, among many others, contribute to national security and the deterrence of harmful adversary actions.

Emergency preparedness, arms control and disarmament, combating terrorism, DOD support to counterdrug operations, enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, nation assistance, protection of shipping, show of force operations, counterinsurgency operations, and support to insurgency all contribute to national security and/or deterrence. To plan and conduct these operations and activities, there is an increased need for the military to work with OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, and HN authorities; share information; and obtain a firm understanding of the HN's political and cultural realities.

CONCLUSION

This publication is the keystone document of the joint operations series. It provides fundamental principles and doctrine that guide the Armed Forces of the United States in the conduct of joint operations across the range of military operations.

Chapter 2

IG Extract to Joint Publication 3-33

1. **Purpose:** This chapter provides the IG student with the IG extract from Joint Publication 3-33.

2. **Joint Publication 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters:** Joint Publication 3-33 is the operational-level doctrine for the formation and employment of Joint Task Forces (JTFs). Annex E to Appendix A, Personal Staff: Inspector General, represents the only available doctrine for Joint IGs at any level. This doctrine addresses the basic formation of JTF IG offices; their personnel and equipment requirements; and their tasks, functions, and procedures. This doctrine does not address procedures for the conduct of each of the IG functions. Annex E appears here in its entirety from the 16 February 2007 version of Joint Publication 3-33. A complete version of this publication is available on the Web at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_33.pdf.

PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides joint doctrine for the formation and employment of a joint task force (JTF) headquarters to command and control joint operations. It provides guidance on the JTF headquarters role in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing JTF operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by

the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WALTER L. SHARP
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff

ANNEX E TO APPENDIX A
PERSONAL STAFF: INSPECTOR GENERAL

1. General

a. The IG is an extension of the eyes, ears, voice, and conscience of the CJTF. The CJTF should strive to have this function as part of the JTF. The IG provides the CJTF with a sounding board for sensitive issues, and typically is a trusted agent in the command. The IG is a candid broker and an impartial fact finder. The rank of the IG should be commensurate with the overall JTF organization.

(1) Basic IG functions are inspecting, assisting, and investigating.

(2) IG responsibilities may include:

(a) Monitoring, evaluating, assessing, or inspecting operational and other areas essential to mission performance; and assessing the ability of all echelons of the JTF to accomplish assigned missions.

(b) Responding to operational matters; however, at the direction of the CJTF the IG may inspect any matter within the scope of the CJTF's authority.

(c) Providing assistance to all members of the JTF. The IG will refer cases, to include those dealing with family members to the supported CCDRs' or component commanders' IGs as appropriate.

(d) Reviewing and assisting with JTF member morale and welfare, family, and other issues as appropriate.

(e) Conducting inquiries and investigations as necessary.

(f) Serving as the point of contact for coordination with the supported CCDR's IG, to include coordination relevant to assessment of the JTF.

b. The JTF IG may provide support on site, from "a normal working location," or through a combination of regular site visits and reachback based on the situation and the CJTF desires. The JTF IG will maintain points of contact with IGs of the supported CCDR and each of the JTF component commanders to facilitate referring cases that are Service-specific. The JTF IG will ensure that information on how to contact the supported CCDR's IG, component commanders' IGs, and the DOD IG Hotline is displayed at all times in a conspicuous JTF location.

c. Typical JTF IG actions include assessing and reporting to the CJTF on the following:

(1) Mission: orders, documents, and agreements; mission clarity, mission rules for termination or extraction, and "mission creep."

(2) Resources: equipment and personnel appropriate to mission(s) and sufficiency of administration, support, and logistics.

(3) Operational readiness: joint planning and conduct of operations, joint doctrine, readiness reporting, OPSEC, intelligence oversight, communications, and the discipline of assigned and attached personnel.

(4) Welfare and morale of assigned and attached personnel.

(5) Fraud, waste, and abuse.

(6) Other duties as specified by the CJTF.

2. Organization

a. **General.** The JTF HQ IG office should be tailored to suit the mission, size, scope, and expected duration of the JTF. Other factors that must be considered are the geographic location, dominant Service, and political environment. The following guidelines should be considered:

(1) The JTF IG should be a field grade officer (0-4 or above) with grade directly linked to the level of JTF employed, e.g., 2-star JTF = 0-4/0-5 IG, 3-star JTF = 0-5/0-6 IG, and for a 4-star JTF = 0-6 officer.

(2) To be effective, the JTF IG must work for and have access to the CJTF and all elements and activities within the command.

(3) The JTF IG office must draw on augmentees to gain the functional expertise needed for inspection teams.

b. **JTF IG Minimum Personnel Requirements.** If the JTF maintains an IG function on-site, the minimum recommended staff would include the IG (0-4 or above) and an E7 assistant. A notional JTF IG organization is provided in Figure A-E-1.

c. **JTF IG Minimum Equipment Requirements**

(1) Means of transportation to visit all JTF locations.

(2) Unclassified phone and fax (with access to classified phone and fax).

(3) Computer system with software compatible with systems in use by the JTF.



Figure A-E-1. Notional Inspector General Organizational Structure

3. Tasks, Functions, and Procedures

a. The JTF IG is concerned with operational matters and compliance with policies and procedures at the JTF level. For cases that deal solely with a single-Service issue and do not affect the joint force, the JTF IG normally will refer the matter to the respective Service component.

b. The JTF IG will prepare an activity plan for approval by the CJTF. The activity plan will show inspections, assistance visits, and any IG-related activity directed by the CJTF.

c. The JTF IG will ensure that IGs of subordinate units establish contact upon assignment or arrival in the JOA. The JTF IG will provide technical guidance to subordinate IGs, and coordinate common IG activities.

4. Considerations

a. Become involved, early on, in the CJTF's planning process to understand the commander's intent and CONOPS.

b. Focus on high-payoff issues that impact on the JTF's ability to rapidly deploy, sustain itself, conduct operations, redeploy, and prepare for the next mission or reconstitution. These

issues may include, but are not limited to, unit readiness for deployment, training, ammunition distribution, mail service, standards of discipline, and other Service member welfare issues.

c. IGs can expect an increasing frequency of requests for information and assistance. Historically, assistance cases account for the majority of the deployed IG's workload.

5. Planning Rhythm

The JTF IG battle rhythm is synchronized with and responsive to JTF operational requirements. It will include:

a. Conducting scheduled inspections.

b. Providing assistance to members of the JTF as required.

c. Conducting investigations as directed.

6. Reports

The IG will report directly to the CJTF on the results of each inspection or investigation.

Checklist. *To further assist the JTF IG and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex J, "Checklist for Inspector General," to Appendix B, "Checklists."*

ANNEX J TO APPENDIX B
CHECKLIST FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL

❑ Is the inspector general (IG) prepared to accept and work an increased number of assistance cases? Typical requests for assistance include:

- ❑ Early return of family members.
- ❑ Emergency leave procedures.
- ❑ Nonsupport of family members.
- ❑ Family support issues (identification card, health care, post exchange, and commissary privileges).
- ❑ Service member entitlements.
- ❑ Shipment or storage of household goods.
- ❑ Family care plans.

❑ Have inspections been scheduled and announced? Inspections should verify the status of:

- ❑ Personnel and equipment readiness.
- ❑ Joint task force operational readiness or effectiveness.
- ❑ Processing for overseas movement.
- ❑ Ports of debarkation processing.
- ❑ Casualty affairs and graves registration.
- ❑ Deployment operations.
- ❑ Pre-operational training.
- ❑ Ammunition resupply operations.
- ❑ Operational feeding.
- ❑ Enemy prisoners of war or detainees processing.

- ❑ Mail services.
- ❑ Reconstitution.
- ❑ Replacement system.
- ❑ War trophies or contraband.
- ❑ Accountability and serviceability of returning equipment.

❑ Information management and information operations.

- ❑ Operations security.

❑ Force protection and safety.

❑ Is the IG prepared to conduct investigations? Investigations are normally more difficult to complete because:

- ❑ Of limited access to the commander, joint task force.
- ❑ Of time and distance factors.
- ❑ Of a greater reliance upon technical channel support from other IGs.

Chapter 3

Extract from
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.05

1. **Purpose:** This chapter provides the IG student with the cover letter, Chapter 1, and Master Training Guide (MTG) Task Number 100-00-CJTF from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.05.

2. **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3500.05, Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide:** CJCSM 3500.05 is the standing doctrinal manual for the establishment of a Joint Task Force (JTF). Designed like an Army Mission Training Plan (MTP), CJCSM 3500.05 outlines specific tasks for establishing a JTF and its headquarters. Each task is identified to a specific element within the JTF and has a Master Training Guide (MTG) task number associated with it. Each task outlines clearly defined standards for the completion of that task. The extracts contained in this part of The IG Reference Guide are the cover letter for the manual; Chapter 1, which provides an Introduction and Overview that describes the JTF force and staff structure in detail; and the MTG task for establishing the JTF command group (Task Number 100-00-CJTF). The IG is not addressed as part of the command and staff group in this particular task or elsewhere in the manual. The version reproduced here is dated 15 April 1997 and is available on the Web at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsm/m3500_05.pdf.

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MANUAL

J-7 CJCSM 3500.05
DISTRIBUTION: A, B, C, J, S 15 April 1997

JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS MASTER TRAINING GUIDE

Reference(s): a. CJCSI 3500.01 Series, "Joint Training Policy of the Armed Forces of the United States."
b. CJCSM 3500.03 Series, "Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States."
c. CJCSM 3500.04 Series, "Universal Joint Task List."

1. Purpose. To provide a descriptive, performance-oriented training guide to assist leaders in training their units and serve as a guide for the JTF Headquarters in actual operations.

2. Cancellation. None.

3. Applicability. This CJCSM applies to the Joint Staff, Military Services, combatant commands, and activities and agencies responsive to the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff.

4. Procedures. Detailed procedures for implementing joint training policy are contained in references a, b, and c.

5. Additional Copies of Manuals. Joint Staff directorates may obtain a limited number of copies of this instruction from Records Management and Automation Support Branch, Room 2B917. The Services, CINCs, Defense agencies, and all other holders are authorized to reproduce, print, and stock additional copies to meet their internal distribution requirements.

6. Effective Date. This manual is effective upon receipt.

For the Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff

Enclosure(s):
See Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW

1-1. Purpose. This Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide (JTF HQ MTG) is primarily a training document designed to assist probable or designated JTF commanders and staffs in training and assessing the performance of individual and collective command and staff tasks during crisis situations. The JTF HQ MTG serves in:

a. **Planning** for JTF HQ Training/Operations

b. **Conducting** JTF HQ Training/Operations

c. **Assessing** JTF HQ performance in Training/Operations

1-2. Structure.

a. This document is designed to be part of a series of publications that provide joint tasks, conditions and standards for the training of joint organizations. These publications will be specific to the following units:

(1) Commander-in-Chief, Unified (Theater) Command Headquarters (CINC HQ)

(2) Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQ)

(3) Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)

(4) Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC)

(5) Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC)

(6) Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)

(7) Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF)

(8) Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF)

b. An illustration of the relationship between the JTF HQ MTG and other MTGs is depicted in Figure 1-1.



FIGURE 1-1
MTG HIERARCHY

c. Service component (Army Forces, Navy Forces, Marine Forces, Air Force Forces and Coast Guard Forces) tasks, conditions and standards are provided in appropriate Service publications. No attempt has been made to duplicate those items in this publication.

1-3. Contents.

a. The JTF HQ MTG is organized into six chapters. They are:

(1) Chapter 1 - **Introduction & Overview**. This chapter is a general explanation of the JTF HQ MTG's purpose, function, organization and structure.

(2) Chapter 2 - **Task Matrices**. This chapter shows the relationship between the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) and the command and staff tasks in the MTG. It also provides matrices to show relationships between JTF missions, and the tasks that both the JTF HQ and the JTF units perform to accomplish those missions or tasks, and either what command or staff element is responsible for those missions or tasks or what unit can perform them.

(3) Chapter 3 - **Training Plans**. This chapter provides guidance for the development of training plans to improve JTF HQ training.

(4) Chapter 4 - **Training Exercises**. This chapter consists of information on certain types of joint training exercises and how the JTF HQ MTG can serve in the development of these exercises.

(5) Chapter 5 - **Training & Assessment Outlines**. This chapter first shows the operational level Universal Joint Tasks (UJT), and which MTG tasks relate to them from a command and staff perspective. Where the UJT are specifically component unit tasks, the requirement to develop a unit task description is identified by a “To Be Published (TBP)” entry. The chapter then contains the tasks and task steps for the JTF command and staff elements . These tasks are organized in sections that correspond to the "life-cycle" of a JTF (see Figure 1-3). Chapter 5 also includes JTF boards, centers, etc.

(6) Chapter 6 - **Assessments**. This chapter provides information concerning the assessment of joint training and an example of a methodology for conducting that assessment.

b. The structure of the chapters closely follows the Joint Training Cycle, as defined in the Joint Training Manual (CJCSM 3500.03) . The relationship of the JTF HQ MTG to the Joint Training Cycle is depicted in Figure 1-2 below.



FIGURE 1-2
RELATIONSHIP OF JTF HQ MTG TO THE JOINT TRAINING CYCLE

1-4. Development.

a. The JTF HQ MTG uses the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) as the basic hierarchy of tasks to be accomplished. However, as stated above, the JTF HQ MTG organizes these tasks somewhat differently than the UJTL. It describes them in groups consistent with the normal sequential nature of a JTF's "life-cycle" (Figure 1-3).



FIGURE 1-3
ARRANGEMENT OF JTF HQ MTG TASKS

b. Additionally, the UJTL does not specify the means for completing or who should complete the task, nor does it distinguish between **unit tasks** (components) and **JTF Commander/staff tasks** (JTF HQ). An example of how the JTF HQ MTG establishes a heirarchy of MTG tasks and MTG task steps (derived from the UJTL) is illustrated in Figure 1-4. This example shows those tasks that should be performed by:

(1) JTF Components (unit tasks): "Support Command and Control Warfare (C2W)."

(2) JTF Hq (staff tasks):

"Form C2W Staff" - Performed during the "Form the JTF HQ" phase of the JTF "life-cycle."

"Plan C2W" - Performed during the "Crisis Action Planning" phase.

"Control C2W" - Performed during the "Execution" phase.



FIGURE 1-4
JTF HQ MTG TASKS DERIVED FROM THE UJTL

1-5. Joint Task Force Organization.

a. JTF Component Structure. In accordance with Joint Pub 0-2, United Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), the Commander of a Joint Task Force (CJTF) has a variety of organizational options for command and control of the JTF. The CJTF can conduct operations through:

(1) Service Components.
- Army Forces (ARFOR)
- Navy Forces (NAVFOR)
- Air Force Forces (AFFOR)
- Marine Corps Forces (MARFOR)
- Coast Guard Forces (CGFOR)

(2) Functional Components.
- Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)
- Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC)
- Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC)
- Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC); commonly referred to as the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)
- Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF)
- Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF)

(3) Combination. Most often, JTFs are organized with a combination of Service and functional components with operational responsibilities.

b. For the purposes of this publication, the JTF is organized with a combination of components as depicted in Figure 1-5 below:



NOTE: A joint force contains Service components (because of logistic and training responsibilities) even when operations are controlled by other components -- based on Figure II-3 JP 3-0

FIGURE 1-5
POSSIBLE COMPONENTS IN A JTF

c. JTF Headquarters.

(1) The CJTF may organize the JTF HQ staff as he determines necessary to carry out his duties and responsibilities. The CINC who establishes the JTF should make provision to furnish the necessary personnel, facilities, and/or equipment. In accordance with Joint Pub 5-00.2, "Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures," the JTF headquarters force module will contain the following elements at the minimum:

- Command and Staff
- Augmentation Detachments
- Communications Support
- HQ Support and Sustainment
- Security Support

(2) For the purposes of this publication, the Command and Staff, Augmentation Detachments, and the Headquarters Support & Sustainment will be addressed. Figure 1-6 depicts those elements.



FIGURE 1-6
JTF HEADQUARTERS STRUCTURE

CHAPTER 5



FIGURE 5-I-1
FORM THE JTF HEADQUARTERS
FORM JTF BOARDS/CENTERS

ELEMENT: **CJTF**/DCJTF/COS

MTG TASK: **ESTABLISH JTF COMMAND GROUP** **(Task Number 100-00-CJTF)**
(Relates to UJTL Task OP 5.5)

MTG TASK SITUATION: The CINC designates a JTF (for planning purposes) during the Deliberate Planning Process, and appoints the CJTF, assigns the mission, and activates the JTF normally in Crisis Action Planning (CAP) Phase III or earlier. The JTF plans and executes (on order) a contingency operation that may include a wide variety of military operations. Operations may involve ground, maritime, air forces and special operations in any combination executed unilaterally or in cooperation with other nations. The CINC develops the concept and issues the warning order to the JTF commencing Course of Action (COA) development in CAP Phase III. CJTF establishes the JTF Command Group to direct and support COA development and prepare appropriate estimates, annexes and/or other planning products.

MTG TASK PURPOSE: To assist the JTF Command Group in developing and issuing guidance for the planning and conduct of joint operations, and directing and supervising JTF staff actions.

REFERENCES: JP 3-0, JP 3-56, **JP 5-00.2**

MTG TASK STEPS

1. Identify the JTF HQ base unit (Task Number 100-01-**CJTF**
   a. Designated base unit functions solely as JTF HQ -- does not function as both JTF and component headquarters base
   b. Designated base unit has the requisite experience and training to lead in the planning and direction of anticipated JTF operations
   c. Designated base unit possesses sufficient Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) capability to begin planning and sponsor formation of the joint headquarters

2. Identify key staff and command group personnel (Task Number 100-02-**CJTF**)
   a. Exploits existing staff/working relationships during crisis action planning and subsequent operations
   b. Achieves joint perspective and interoperability

3. Provide guidance on JTF HQ organizational structure (Task Number 100-03-**CJTF**)
   a. Describe nature/mix of augmentation required to achieve joint perspective/ interoperability
   b. Define special role/relationship with liaison teams, both to/from JTF HQ
   c. Identify requirement/role of special JTF boards, centers, bureaus, offices. May include:
      (1) Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB)
      (2) Intelligence centers
      (3) Operations centers
      (4) Logistics centers, boards
      (5) Medical boards
      (6) Personnel centers, boards

(7) Communications centers, offices
(8) Joint Information Bureau
(9) Visitors bureau
(10) Special operational organizations -- Joint Evacuation Control Center, Joint Search and Rescue Center, etc.

d. Define duties/roles/relationships that differ from Service organization or are otherwise necessary for joint operations. Include:
(1) DCJTF
(2) COS
(3) J3/J5 relationship
(4) Joint Operations Center
(5) Future Operations Cell
(6) Joint Planning Group (JPG)
(7) Media support
(8) US Government (USG)/nongovernment agencies
(9) International agencies
(10) Various observers
(11) METOC

4. Advise CJTF on organization of JTF HQ (Task Number 100-04-**DCJTF/COS**)
a. See guidance notes in Task Number 100-03-CJTF
b. Identification of key staff codes

5. Represent CJTF (when and how authorized) (Task Number 100-05-**DCJTF/COS**)
a. Identifying JTF HQ requirements
b. Coordinating with supported CINC, JTF components
c. Providing directive guidance
d. Chairing/directing JTF boards/operating centers
e. Other specific functional responsibilities
f. Issuing plans, orders

6. Coordinate overall formation/organization of JTF Staff (Task Number 100-06-**COS**)
a. Approve/validate staff requirements
(1) Establish special staff offices, as required -- Staff Judge Advocate, Provost Marshal, etc.
(2) Approve personnel augmentation requirements
(3) Approve equipment augmentation requirements
(4) Approve communications/connectivity requirements
(5) Approve staff transportation requirements
(6) Approve liaison requirements
(7) Approve Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL) input
b. Approve/disseminate staff operating policies
c. Coordinate operations of JTF liaison
(1) Coordinate dispatch of liaison from JTF HQ

(2) Coordinate reception and operation of liaison to JTF HQ

d. Form Executive/Flag Secretary section for the administrative support of the command group

Chapter 4

Examples of Joint Task Force IG SOPs

1. **Purpose:** This chapter provides the IG student with two recent examples of Joint Task Force (JTF) IG Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs).

2. **Joint Task Force IG SOPs:** The two JTF IG SOPs reproduced here are from the Southern European Task Force (SETAF) in Vicenza, Italy, and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) in Stuttgart, Germany. These two chapters, identified below in two separate sections, serve as examples of how an Army IG can plan ahead and establish responsibilities and procedures for potential deployment as part of a JTF headquarters. The two chapters reproduced here are examples only and not intended to be all-inclusive or prescribed solutions.

Section 4-1: Chapter 3 (Inspector General) to Volume 14 (Command Group) of the U.S. Southern European Task Force (SETAF) (Airborne) Joint Task Force Headquarters Joint Standing Operating Procedures (JSOP), dated 20 January 2004.

Section 4-2: Chapter 12 (Inspector General) of European Directive (ED) 55-11, Joint Task Force Headquarters Organization and Standing Operating Procedures.

Section 4-1

U.S. Southern European Task Force JTF IG SOP

1. **Purpose:** This section provides the IG student with Chapter 3 (Inspector General) to Volume 14 (Command Group) of the U.S. Southern European Task Force (SETAF) (Airborne) Joint Task Force Headquarters Joint Standing Operating Procedures (JSOP), dated 20 January 2004.

CHAPTER 3 (INSPECTOR GENERAL) TO VOLUME 14 (COMMAND GROUP)

1. PURPOSE: This section defines the responsibilities, organization, procedures, and general information concerning joint inspector general operations when SETAF stands up as the core of a JTF. The IG is on the COMJTF's personal staff, serving as an extension of the commander's eyes, ears, voice and conscience.

2. RESPONSIBILITIES:

A. The JTF IG is responsible to the COMJTF for monitoring, evaluating, assessing, and/or inspecting operational and other areas essential to mission performance, and for assessing the ability of all echelons of the command to accomplish assigned missions.

B. The JTF IG will conduct inquires, inspections and investigations, as necessary.

C. The JTF IG will provide assistance to all members of the JTF and will refer cases, as appropriate, to the component IGs or commanders.

D. The JTF IG will work JTF member morale and welfare issues, family issues and other issues, as appropriate.

E. The SETAF IG will maintain one IG team (officer, NCO and required equipment) ready to deploy with the JTF Forward.

F. Upon SETAF's activation as the core of a JTF, the SETAF IG will stand up and man the Joint Inspector General Office, Room 124, Building 1, Longare and/or the designated location in the Joint Operations Center, Building 10, Longare. Depending on the nature of the mission, the JTF IG may provide full time support on site, or through regular site visits.

G. Maintain JTF Sanctuary IG Office with all references and supplies in place for up to two IGs to begin immediate operations.

3. ORGANIZATION:

A. General. The JTF IG Office must be tailored to meet the mission, force composition, scope and expected duration of the JTF. The geographic location, political environment and dominate Service should also be considered.

1) The SETAF IG will serve as the JTF IG when the SETAF Commander is designated COMJTF. If another commander is named, the SETAF IG, at the discretion of the SETAF Commander, will serve as the JTF IG until relieved by an IG from the proper command.

2) The JTF IG will develop his staff based on the standing JMD, ED 55-11 and specific mission requirements.

3) The JTF IG will normally deploy with the COMJTF, unless mission duration or forces assigned do not require deployed support. The JTF Sanctuary will be manned on either a full- or part-time basis depending on mission requirements. In either event, the IG rear element will be continually available to support the deployed JTF IG.

B. Augmentation. Both the JTF IG Office and the SETAF IG Office may require augmentation.

1) JTF IG Office. Augmentation will be done IAW ED 55-11 and based on mission requirements. The SETAF IG will work closely with the J1 to rapidly define JTF IG requirements.

2) SETAF IG Office. In the event the SETAF IG deploys, or is fully committed at the JTF Sanctuary such that he is unable to perform the duties of a detailed IG for the local community, the SETAF IG will require full- or part-time augmentation. U'R IG Office will provide this backfill support upon request, should it be required. This officer is not part of the JTF but provides detailed IG support previously provided to the community by the SETAF IG. This U'R IG augmentee will be incorporated into at least one JTF training exercise a year. Specific details are covered in the SETAF OIG Internal SOP.

C. Minimum Equipment Requirements.

1) Transport. Means of transport for IGs to visit all JTF locations.

2) Deployment equipment. The SETAF IG Office will maintain a footlocker with all required references and supplies needed to establish a field IG site. See SETAF OIG Internal SOP for packing list.

3) JTF Sanctuary. The SETAF IG Office will maintain furnishings, telephone and SIPR/NIPR computer hook ups, and supplies sufficient to execute the full range of IG operations in Room 124, Building 1, Longare. IGNET will be available at the SETAF IG Office. IG augmentees must bring their own automation and all required TA-50 or mission specific equipment. The JTF IG Office in the Sanctuary will have in an operational condition:

a) 2 SIPR and 2 NIPR connections
b) 3 telephone connections
c) 2 STU III telephones
d) 1 fax machine with telephone
e) 1 shredder
f) 1 four drawer filing cabinet
g) 2 two drawer filing cabinets
h) 2 desks
i) 4 chairs
j) 1 dry eraser board
k) 1 trash can

l) Miscellaneous office supplies

m) JTF, SETAF and local telephone rosters

n) Applicable references (See SETAF OIG Internal SOP)

4. PROCEDURES AND GENERAL INFORMATION:

A. General. The JTF IG will be primarily concerned with operational matters; however, at the direction of the JTF Commander, the IG may inspect any matter within the scope of the commander's authority. IG procedures in JTF operations remain the same as those in peacetime and those specific procedures outlined in Chapter 12, ED 55-11. Service matters that do not affect the joint force will fall within the responsibility of that specific branch of Service.

B. The JTF IG will be present and involved during all phases of the operation and maintain situational awareness through involvement in planning, participation in battle update briefs and other informational and decision briefings.

C. The JTF IG will regularly update its list of recommended inspections. With the consent of the COMJTF, the IG will immediately share inspection results in an effort to rapidly correct any noted deficiencies.

D. Typical JTF IG actions in addition to the above will include assessing and reporting on:

1) Operational readiness. Joint planning and conduct of operations, readiness reporting, force protection, communications, and discipline of forces.

2) Resources. Equipment and personnel appropriate for the mission, sufficiency of administration and logistics.

3) Morale and welfare.

4) Fraud, waste and abuse.

5) Other duties as assigned by the COMJTF.

E. POC list for component IGs is below. If units are added from outside of EUCOM, the JTF IG will update this list.

1) USEUCOM IG: DSN 430-5556
2) USAREUR IG: DSN 370-8767
3) USAFE IG: DSN 480-6574
4) NAVEUR IG: DSN 235-4488

Section 4-2

U.S. European Command JTF IG SOP

1. **Purpose:** This section provides the IG student with Chapter 12 (Inspector General) of European Directive (ED) 55-11, Joint Task Force Headquarters Organization and Standing Operating Procedures.

Chapter 12

INSPECTOR GENERAL

1. **Purpose** This chapter will outline the responsibilities, organization, procedures, essential references, and general information pertaining to Inspector General (IG) functions in support of Joint Task Force operations.

2. **Responsibilities**

a. The IG is responsible to the commander for monitoring, evaluating, assessing, and/or inspecting operational and other areas essential to mission performance, and for assessing the ability of all echelons of the command to accomplish assigned missions.

b. The IG will be principally concerned with operational matters; however, at the direction of the JTF Commander, the IG may inspect any matter within the scope of the commander's authority.

c. The IG will provide assistance to all members of the JTF. The IG will refer cases as appropriate to the component IGs.

d. The component establishing a JTF is responsible for providing IG support to the JTF. The component IG may provide support on site, from the component headquarters or through a combination of regular site visits and reachback support. If the nature of the JTF warrants, an IG may be assigned to the JTF to provide IG support. In either case, the IG providing support will maintain points of contact with IGs at each USEUCOM component command to facilitate referring assistance cases that are service-specific. If an IG is not present with the JTF, the component IG will ensure that information is displayed in the JTF location on how to contact the HQ USEUCOM IG, USAREUR IG, USAFE IG, NAVEUR IG and the DoDIG Hotline.

e. The IG responsible for the JTF will serve as the point of contact for coordination with the HQ USEUCOM IG, to include coordination relevant to assessment of the JTF under the provisions of USCINCEUR Policy Letter 99-01, *USEUCOM Guidance on Review of On-Going Operations in Theater,* 16 May 1999.

3. **Organization**

a. General. The IG office of a JTF headquarters should be tailored to suit the mission, size, scope, and expected duration of the JTF. Other factors that must be considered are the geographic location, dominant service, and political environment. The following general guidelines should be considered:

1) The JTF IG should be a field grade officer (0-4 or above) with grade directly linked to the level of JTF employed, e.g., 2-star JTF = 0-4/0-5 IG, 3-star JTF = 0-5/0-6 IG, and for a four-star JTF HQ, the IG should doctrinally be an 0-6 officer.

2) To be effective, the IG must work for and have access to the Commander and all elements and activities within the command.

3) The IG office must draw on augmentees to gain the functional expertise needed for inspection teams.

b. JTF IG Minimum Personnel Requirements. If the JTF maintains an IG function on-site, the minimum recommended office would include the IG (04 or above) and an E7 assistant.

c. JTF IG Minimum Equipment Requirements

1) Means of transportation to visit all JTF locations.

2) Unclassified phone and fax.

3) Computer system with software compatible with systems in use by the JTF

4. Procedures

a. The JTF IG is principally concerned with operational matters and compliance with policies and procedures at the JTF level. The JTF IG will avoid dealing with matters of a single-service origin that do not affect the joint force and that fall within the responsibility and authority of service channels.

b. The JTF IG will prepare an activity plan for approval by the CJTF. The activity plan will show inspections, assistance visits, and any activity directed by the CJTF.

c. The JTF IG will ensure that IGs of subordinate units establish contact upon assignment or arrival in the AO. The JTF IG will provide technical guidance to subordinate unit IGs.

5. Essential References

a. **Critical Publications**.

1) DOD Directive 5106.4, *Inspectors General of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.*

2) HQ USEUCOM Directive 125-4, *The EUCOM Inspector General*

3) AR 1-201, 17 May 93, *Army Inspection Policy*

4) AR 20-1, 16 Apr 01 *Inspector General Activities and Procedures*

5) USCINCEUR Policy Letter 99-01, *USEUCOM Guidance on Review of On-Going Operations in Theater,* 16 May 1999

6) AFI 90-201, 26 Oct 00, Inspector General Activities

7) AFI 90-301, 30 Jan 01, Inspector General Complaints

8) SECNAVINST 5430.57 F, Inspector General Missions and Functions

b. **Essential POC's/Phone #'s**

1) HQ USEUCOM IG: DSN 430-5556

2) USAREUR IG: DSN 370-8767

3) USAFE IG: DSN 480-6574

4) NAVEUR IG: DSN 235-4488

6. General Information

a. The JTF IG may be required to be present for all phases—establishment, pre-deployment, deployment, post-deployment, and disestablishment, or the IG may be required for only one or two phases depending on mission, etc. The requirement for the presence of the IG is a CJTF decision.

b. Typical JTF IG actions include assessing and reporting to the CJTF on the following:

1) Mission: Orders, documents, and agreements; mission clarity, mission rules for ENDEX or extraction, and mission creep.

2) Resources: Equipment and manpower appropriate to mission(s) and sufficiency of administration, support, and logistics.

3) Combat Readiness: Joint planning and conduct of operations, joint doctrine, readiness reporting, OPSEC, intelligence oversight, communications, and the discipline of assigned and attached personnel.

4) Welfare and morale of assigned and attached personnel.

5) Fraud, waste and abuse.

6) Other duties as specified by CJTF.

Chapter 5

USCINCEUR Policy Letter Number 99-01

1. **Purpose:** This chapter provides the IG student with a copy of the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR), Policy Letter Number 99-01.

2. **Joint Task Force Assessment Guidance:** The policy letter reproduced here is an example of how a Combatant Commander, in this case also serving at the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (SACEUR), can provide guidance on conducting assessments or evaluations of JTFs that are in existence longer than 120 days. The guidance captured in this policy letter is worthy of consideration for all IGs who may serve on the staff of a JTF commander or who may support another Joint command. The message here is that inspections and assessments are essential to the continued viability and readiness of standing JTFs, which may rotate units in and out of the Area of Operations on a routine basis. Inspections can serve as the readiness check that a JTF commander needs to ensure that systemic and other issues are addressed and standards are met.

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
UNIT 30400, BOX 1000
APO AE 09128

ECCC

16 May 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR USEUCOM STAFF AND COMPONENTS

SUBJECT: USCINCEUR Policy Letter Number 99-01 (USEUCOM Guidance on Review of On-Going Operations in Theater)

1. References:

a. Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNNAF).

b. European Directive 55-11, Joint Task Force Headquarters Organization and Standing Operating Procedures.

c. European Directive 125-4, Mission, Function, and Inspection Procedures for the USEUCOM Inspector General.

d. SM 125-2, Command Inspection Program.

2. This memorandum establishes policy and procedures for the conduct of periodic operational assessments of JTFs/CTFs assigned to or under the operational control (OPCON) of USCINCEUR.

3. Within European Command, joint and combined task forces (JTF/CTF) are the preferred way to conduct joint and multi-national operations. These JTFs and CTFs are organized and activated to accomplish specific missions that we project to be of limited duration. When such operations exist over an extended period of time, they are subject to evolutionary changes and may assume a semi-permanent status. The changes that occur are the result of perceived or real changes in threat, resources, and mission.

4. To ensure that the mission, guidance, and operating procedures of longer-term task forces are current and appropriate, periodic operational assessments are required. Reference (a) places the responsibility for mission accomplishment upon commanders of the Unified Commands. This responsibility requires CINCs to establish and maintain a system for evaluating the forces under their combatant command or operational control.

5. The assessment program's intent is to determine whether USEUCOM policies and guidance concerning the task force require revision in light of changing conditions affecting the task force. The end state of each operational assessment is a healthier, more capable task force operating

under policies and procedures that are relevant to and specifically address the unique character of its operational environment. In accomplishing the above, the following guidance applies:

a. A USCINCEUR-directed operational assessment will be conducted of each JTF/CTF (or other operation as directed) assigned or OPCON to USCINCEUR not later than 120 days after the task force assumes control of operations, that is, after receipt by the JTF of the execute order. Periodic re-assessments will be conducted every 12-18 months or as directed by USCINCEUR. Assessments will be conducted under the direction of the DCINC and will be coordinated with all affected major subordinate commands. The assessment team will, as a minimum:

(1) Review the originally stated U. S. objectives.

(2) Examine the evolution of the mission.

(4) Assess the clarity of guidance from CJCS, HQ USEUCOM and HQ JTF/CTF.

(5) Determine if command and control relationships, policies and procedures adequately address the current mission.

(6) Assess whether the rules of engagement (ROE) and protective measures adequately address the operational and force protection requirements.

(7) Provide recommendations to USCINCEUR.

(8) Assess the composition of the JTF to ensure billets are classified correctly and that the JTF is manned appropriately to best meet the requirements of the mission.

b. Team Composition: The team will:

(1) Possess the expertise to assess each task force function.

(2) Evaluate major systems involved in performance of the task force.

(3) Represent every component/service assigned to the JTF . Other team members may be required by the team chief to address the expertise and component requirements and provide the administrative support necessary to conduct the assessment. The specific mission and organization of each task force will dictate team composition. As a planning baseline, the team will include the following personnel.

Position	Provided by
Team Chief	ECIG
Deputy Team Chief	ECIG
Manpower/personnel representative	ECJ1
Intelligence representative	ECJ2
Operations representative	ECJ3
Logistics representative	ECJ4
Plans/policy representative	ECJ5
C4I representative	ECJ6
Comptroller representative	ECCM
Legal representative	ECJA
Surgeon representative	ECMD
Public affairs representative	ECPA
Security matters representative	ECSM
Chaplain Representative	ECCH
Senior Enlisted Representative (grade E-9)	ECSE
Team Executive Officer	ECIG

(4) Directorate and staff agencies may fulfill JTF assessment team taskings through the use of a component-provided subject matter expert.

c. Methodology. ECIG will host a series of pre-departure team meetings to ensure the activities of the assessment team are fully coordinated with the task force. These meetings will also cover the team member training and assessment preparation described in greater detail in reference (d). While every assessment will be tailored to fit the particular needs of the task force and its operational environment, assessments will generally include:

(1) Interviews with key staff and forward-deployed commanders.

(2) A review of operative CJCS, USEUCOM, and JTF/CTF directives.

(3) Observation of the task force conduct of operations (to include all major weapon systems).

(4) Visits to forward locations where significant task force elements are deployed.

d. Reporting. The team will outbrief the task force commander or the commander's representative prior to departure. In most cases, the Team Chief will require completion of a draft written report prior to departing the task force location. In support, each member of the team will provide, prior to the outbrief of the task force:

(1) A written assessment of findings.

(2) Identification of problem areas.

(3) Recommendations for changes to task force and EUCOM operations and directives.

(4) Recommended timeline and focus for a follow-on assessment.

6. This concept for periodic joint operational assessments will be incorporated into references (b), (c) and (d).

7. ECIG will review this letter for currency every 12 months.

Wesley K Clark

WESLEY K. CLARK
General, U.S. Army

Part 5

Ethics and Standards of Conduct

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Ethics and Standards of Conduct
References and Extracts

Introduction

Ethics and Standards of Conduct

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this part of The IG Reference Guide is to provide Inspectors General (IGs) at all levels with readily available extracts from selected publications and documents related directly to ethics and the Army values.

2. **Army Values and the Warrior Ethos:** The values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage are the mainstay of the Army's culture of excellence. These values represent the very fabric and foundation of everything for which the Army stands and represents. All IGs must not only adhere strictly to -- and personally emulate -- these values, but they must reinforce them within their respective commands routinely as part of the IG Teaching and Training function. Paragraph 2-9 b of Army Regulation 600-100, Army Leadership, charges The Inspector General -- and all Army IGs -- with assisting commanders in "teaching and training leaders on the fundamentals of the Army ethic." The Soldier's Creed -- which expounds upon the fundamental nature of the Warrior Ethos -- translates and codifies the Army values into a guidepost for all Soldiers and captures the essence of 'good soldiering':

I am an American Soldier.
I am a Warrior and a member of a team.
I serve the people of the United States and live the Army Values.
I WILL ALWAYS PLACE THE MISSION FIRST.
I WILL NEVER ACCEPT DEFEAT.
I WILL NEVER QUIT.
I WILL NEVER LEAVE A FALLEN COMRADE.
I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills.
I will always maintain my arms, my equipment, and myself.
I am an expert, and I am a professional.
I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.
I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.
I am an American Soldier.

3. **References and Extracts:** This part provides the Army IG student with extracts from selected publications and other sources that will prove useful to a greater understanding of the nature of ethics, the Army values, and the Warrior Ethos. The references include:

a. Extract of Chapters 1 and 2 from Army Regulation 600-100, Army Leadership
b. Extract from Field Manual 22-100, Army Leadership
c. Memorandum for
d. Principles of Ethics for Government Employees
e. Ethics Scenario and Practical Exercise

These extracts merely serve as relevant examples of Army policy and doctrine related to ethics and the Army values and provides IGs with a ready reference that will assist in the training of all Army leaders on the fundamental aspects of ethical behavior.

Chapter 1

Extract of Chapters 1 and 2 from Army Regulation 600-100

1. **Purpose:** This chapter provides IGs with an extract of Chapters 1 and 2 from Army Regulation 600-100, Army Leadership.

2. **Army Regulation 600-100:** This regulation outlines the responsibility of leadership and leader development and describes the Army ethic and individual values. A complete version of this publication is available on the Web at www.apd.army.mil.

Chapter 1
General

1–1. Purpose

This regulation—

a. Establishes Army policy for leadership, by defining key terms associated with leadership, assigning responsibilities for management of leadership policy, and clarifying responsibilities and definitions among the Army leadership policy proponent, Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G–1, the Army leader development policy proponent (DCS, G–3/5/7), and the Center for Army Leadership proponent, the United States (US) Army Training and Doctrine Command/ Combined Arms Center (TRADOC/CAC) with the goal of successfully synchronizing all leadership and leader development policy.

b. Provides direction and guidance to the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) (through TRADOC/CAC) for research, doctrine development, leadership assessment, training, and evaluation in all areas pertaining to Army leadership.

1–2. References

Required and related publications and prescribed and referenced forms are listed in appendix A.

1–3. Explanation of abbreviations and terms

Abbreviations and terms used in this regulation are explained in the glossary.

1–4. Leadership overview

a. The Army defines leadership as influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation, while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.

b. The Department of the Army (DA) mission is to provide necessary forces and capabilities to combatant commanders to support national security and defense strategies. The Army's strategic objectives clearly state the Army's purpose: provide relevant and ready land power for the 21st century security environment; train and equip Soldiers to serve as warriors and grow as adaptive leaders; sustain an all-volunteer force composed of highly competent Soldiers that are provided an equally high quality of life; and provide infrastructure and support to enable the force to fulfill its strategic roles and missions. The means of this strategy are people more specifically, leaders. This regulation focuses on leaders at all levels and in all cohorts: officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, Soldiers, and DA civilians. These leaders represent the means for the Army to achieve its desired end.

c. The DA develops competent and multifaceted military and civilian leaders who personify the Army values and the warrior ethos in all aspects from warfighting, to statesmanship, to enterprise management. The Army develops qualities in its leaders to enable them to respond effectively to what they will face. The DA describes the leaders it is creating as "Pentathletes," whose versatility and athleticism - qualities that reflect the essence of our Army - will enable them to learn and adapt in ambiguous situations in a constantly evolving environment. Pentathlete leaders are innovative, adaptive, and situationally aware professionals who demonstrate character in everything that they do, are experts in the profession of arms, boldly confront uncertainty, and solve complex problems. They are decisive and prudent risk takers who effectively manage, lead, and change organizations. Pentathletes are professionally educated, and dedicated to lifelong learning; resilient, mentally and physically agile, empathetic, and self-aware; and confidently lead Soldiers and civilians, build teams, and achieve the Army's over-arching strategic goals, while engendering loyalty and trust.

d. Leaders must be able to operate independently in an ambiguous, dynamic, and politically sensitive environment. Leaders at all levels must be able to communicate, coordinate, and negotiate with a variety of personnel, including joint and coalition forces, interagency partners, nongovernmental organizations, local leaders, U.S. and foreign media, civilians, contractors, and people of different cultures and languages.

e. Leaders must maintain tactical and technical competence, as applicable in their designated fields; keep abreast of, and remain adept in advances in information technology; and maintain their knowledge of the standards of conduct, policy, law, rules of engagement, and the Geneva Conventions.

f. Leaders must be competent, full spectrum warfighters, and professionals who understand the strategic implications of their actions, behaviors, and decisions on Army, Department of Defense (DOD), and national objectives. They must understand that failure to act can impede operational progress by delaying development and delivery of required resources, through increased anti-American sentiment and enemy resistance, and by strengthening the appeal of ideas propagated by U.S. adversaries. Leaders must reinforce the view that actions which are counter to Army values and the standards of conduct can compromise the nation's strategic objectives. Requirements of today's leaders are extensive but necessary, given the contemporary operating environment (COE) in which they will lead.

1–5. Army Culture and leadership

a. Army culture is a consequence of customs, traditions, ideals, ethos, values, and norms of conduct that have existed for more than 230 years. DA culture promotes certain norms of conduct, and leaders who manage operations

affected by the law of land warfare, require the highest level of individual and organizational discipline and moral values. The law of land warfare, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and the standards of conduct structure the discipline imperative to which leaders must adhere. The moral and ethical tenets of the U.S. Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and the Army Values (figure 1–1) characterize the Army's professionalism and culture, and describe the ethical standards expected of all Army leaders.

Army Values

Loyalty. Bear true faith and allegiance to the US Constitution, the Army, your unit, and other soldiers. This means supporting the military and civilian chain of command, as well as devoting oneself to the welfare of others.
Duty. Fulfill your obligations. Duty is the legal and moral obligation to do what should be done without being told.
Respect. Treat people as they should be treated. This is the same as do unto others as you would have done to you.
Selfless service. Put the welfare of the Nation, the Army, and subordinates before your own. This means putting the welfare of the Nation and accomplishment of the mission ahead of personal desires.
Honor. Live up to all the Army values. This implies always following your moral compass in any circumstance.
Integrity. Do what's right—legally and morally. This is the thread woven through the fabric of the professional Army ethic. It means honesty, uprightness, the avoidance of deception, and steadfast adherence to standards of behavior.
Personal courage. Face fear, danger, or adversity (physical or moral). This means being brave under all circumstances (physical or moral).

Figure 1–1. Army Values

b. Army culture includes a unique service ethic expected of every Soldier to make personal sacrifices in selfless service to the nation. Commitment to this ideal is embodied in the Warrior Ethos (figure 1–2). Army leaders develop and sustain the Warrior Ethos through discipline, realistic training, commitment to the Army Values, and pride in the Army's heritage. Soldiers show their commitment to these guiding values and standards by willingly performing their duty and subordinating their personal welfare without expecting reward or recognition. Everything Soldiers do for the nation is supported by Army civilians and family members; consequently, Army leaders are committed to developing values-based leadership and seeing to the well-being of Soldiers and their families. Combined with the Warrior Ethos, the Soldiers Creed (figure 1–3) and the Civilian Creed (figure 1–4) embody the Army service ethic.

Warrior Ethos

I will always place the mission first
I will never accept defeat
I will never quit
I will never leave a fallen comrade

Figure 1–2. Warrior Ethos

Soldier's Creed

I am an American Soldier
I am a warrior and a member of a team
I serve the people of the United States and live the Army Values
I will always place the mission first
I will never accept defeat
I will never quit
I will never leave behind a fellow comrade
I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained, and proficient
In my warrior tasks and drills
I always maintain my arms, my equipment, and myself
I am an expert and I am a professional
I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat
I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life
I am an American Soldier

Figure 1–3. Soldier's Creed

Civilian Creed

I am an Army Civilian – a member of the Army Team
I am dedicated to our Army, our Soldiers, and Civilians
I will always support the mission
I provide stability and continuity during war and peace
I support and defend the Constitution of the United States
and consider it an honor to serve our Nation and our Army
I live the Army values of Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless
Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage
I am an Army Civilian

Figure 1–4. Civilian Creed

1–6. Core leader competencies

a. To support the Army's strategic objective - "Trained and Equipped Soldiers and Developed Leaders" - the Army has identified core leader competencies that pertain to all levels of leadership - military and civilian. Core leader competencies are related leader behaviors that lead to successful performance, are common throughout the organization, and are consistent with the organizational mission and values. Core leader competencies support the Executive core competencies (ECQs) that civilian leaders are expected to master as they advance in their careers.

b. The following core leader competencies are described in more detail in Field Manual (FM) 6–22.

(1) *Leads others:* Leaders motivate, inspire, and influence others to take the initiative, work toward a common purpose, accomplish tasks, and achieve organizational objectives.

(2) *Extends influence beyond the chain of command:* Leaders must extend their influence beyond direct lines of authority and chains of command. This influence may extend to joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and other groups, and helps shape perceptions about the organization.

(3) *Leads by example:* Leaders are role models for others. They are viewed as the example and must maintain standards and provide examples of effective behaviors. When Army leaders model the Army Values, they provide tangible evidence of desired behaviors and reinforce verbal guidance by demonstrating commitment and action.

(4) *Communicate:* Leaders communicate by expressing ideas and actively listening to others. Effective leaders understand the nature and power of communication and practice effective communication techniques so they can better relate to others and translate goals into actions. Communication is essential to all other leadership competencies.

(5) *Creates a positive organizational climate:* Leaders are responsible for establishing and maintaining positive expectations and attitudes, which produce the setting for positive attitudes and effective work behaviors.

(6) *Prepares self:* Leaders are prepared to execute their leadership responsibilities fully. They are aware of their limitations and strengths and seek to develop and improve their knowledge. Only through preparation for missions and other challenges, awareness of self and situations, and the practice of lifelong learning and development can individuals fulfill the responsibilities of leadership.

(7) *Develops others:* Leaders encourage and support the growth of individuals and teams to facilitate the achievement of organizational goals. Leaders prepare others to assume positions within the organization, ensuring a more versatile and productive organization.

(8) *Gets results:* Leaders provide guidance and manage resources and the work environment, thereby ensuring consistent and ethical task accomplishment.

1–7. Leadership levels

The three levels of leadership are direct, organizational, and strategic; leader competencies apply to all levels. Each leadership level has requirements that differ in the mix, scope, depth, and breadth related to the core leader competencies. As leaders progress through the levels, their assignments become more complex and interdependent, and require more responsibility, accountability, and authority. Leaders at each level must be able to address unanticipated situations, as many may have to make decisions in stressful situations that can easily have strategic or political implications. Each leadership level is discussed in greater detail in FM 6–22.

a. Direct level leadership is frontline leadership that includes leaders from squad through battalion levels of tactical units, and from branch through division levels in Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) organizations. Direct leaders build cohesive teams, empower subordinates, and develop and execute plans which implement policies and accomplish missions. The face-to-face interpersonal leadership required at this level influences human behavior, values, and ethics. Direct-level leaders must develop and refine their analytical and intuitive decision-making techniques; communication and interpersonal skills; and be able to operate independently - within the limits of the commander's

intent, assigned missions, task organization, and available resources. Direct leaders focus on short-range planning and mission accomplishment, from 3 months to 1 year or more.

b. Organizational level leadership exists in more complex organizations and includes leaders at brigade through corps levels, directorate through installation levels (TDA organizations), and assistant through undersecretary of the Army level. In addition to direct level leader requirements, organizational leaders tailor resources to organizations and programs, manage multiple priorities, establish long-term vision, and empower others to perform the mission. They deal with more complexity, more people, greater uncertainty, and a greater number of unintended consequences. Their influence is exhibited more through policy-making and systems integration than face-to-face contact. Organizational leaders must be competent in synchronizing systems and organizations and in planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE). Their policies influence the command climate, and they must be adept in communication, negotiation, critical reasoning, and interpersonal skills. They must be skilled at complex decision-making and problem solving and have a good understanding of the entire range of full-spectrum operations. These leaders focus on midrange planning and mission accomplishment ranging from 1 to 5 years or more.

c. Strategic level leadership exists at the highest levels of the Army and includes military and civilian leaders at division and corps level through the national level. Strategic leaders set the organizational structure, allocate resources, and articulate the strategic vision. Strategic leadership involves running the Army; developing strategic plans, policies, guidance, and laws; determining force structure designs based on future mission requirements and capabilities; prioritizing over-arching Army programs against competing interests; and articulating Army programs and policies to the highest levels of DOD and the government. Strategic leaders scan the external environment to maintain focus and understand the context of future organizational roles. They must be adept in corporate level business management and prudent managers of taxpayer dollars. They work closely with higher-level leadership and dignitaries, and their decisions impact the political arena, personnel and resources, and have wide-ranging consequences. In addition to direct and organizational level responsibilities, strategic leaders must possess knowledge of the force structure change process and DOD, governmental, and legislative processes. Interpersonal skills must facilitate consensus building, negotiation, and influence peers and policy makers. Strategic leaders must be adept at complex decision-making, problem solving, and critical reasoning, and set the example by their words, decisions, and actions. They must convey messages indicating their professional integrity, priorities, and direction, and that support Army traditions, values, and ethics. Strategic leaders focus on the long-range vision for their organization ranging from 5 to 20 years or more.

1–8. Leader development

a. Leader development is the deliberate, continuous, sequential, and progressive process, grounded in Army values, that grows Soldiers and civilians into competent and confident leaders capable of decisive action. Leader development is achieved through lifelong synthesis of the knowledge, skills, and experiences gained through institutional training and education, organizational training, operational experience, and self-development. Commanders and other organizational leaders play the key role in leader development that ideally produces competent, confident, and agile leaders who act with boldness and initiative in dynamic and complex situations.

b. The Army training and leader development model (figure 1–5) identifies important interactions for training Soldiers and developing leaders. It requires lifelong learning and identifies three developmental domains that shape critical learning experiences: operational, institutional, and self-development. The model portrays the development of trained and ready units led by competent and confident leaders, and depicts a continuous cycle of education, assessment, and feedback. For each domain, specific measurable actions are required and each domain uses assessment and feedback from various sources to maximize mission readiness and to develop leaders. (See DA Pamphlet (Pam) 350–58 for a detailed discussion of the model.)

Figure 1–5. Army training and leader development process

(1) *Training and leader development domains.* The three domains of leader development (institutional training and education, operational assignments, and self-development) are dynamic and interconnected. The individual gains knowledge and skills and enhances abilities at the institution and practices them during operational assignments. Self-development enhances, sustains, and expands the knowledge, skills, and abilities gained from assignments and institutional learning.

(a) Institutional training and education. The Army's school system provides leaders with the education (how to think) and training (how to do) needed to perform duty position requirements. The Army's progressive, sequential, and parallel education systems that support Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) will help ensure future leaders are armed with the knowledge base they will need to succeed in modular formations. Leaders attend institutional training courses following appropriate career development models.

(b) Operational assignments. Operational assignments translate theory into practice by placing leaders in positions to apply the knowledge and skills they acquired during institutional training and education. Repetitive performance of duty position requirements - coupled with self-awareness, assessment, and feedback - refines leader skills, broadens knowledge, and shapes attitudes and subsequent behavior.

(c) Self-development. Self-development initiatives focus on maximizing leader strengths, reducing weaknesses, and achieving individual leader development goals. Self-development is a continuous process that takes place during institutional training and education, and during operational assignments; it should stretch and broaden the individual beyond the job or training. Another aspect of self-development that helps Army leaders prepare for future responsibilities and grow professional expertise is civilian education or training at universities or colleges.

(2) The Army training and leader development management process was developed and implemented as a means to recommend improvements to training and leader development policy, strategy, and capabilities needed to provide trained and ready Soldiers, leaders, and units to combatant commanders. The management process starts with Councils of Colonels (COC) and culminates with providing recommendations to the Army leadership through the Training and Leader Development General Officer Steering Committee (for more information, see DA Pam 350–58).

c. All leaders have a responsibility to develop those junior to them to the fullest extent possible. In addition to institutional training and education, leaders can facilitate development through the knowledge and feedback they provide through counseling, coaching, and mentoring.

(1) *Counseling.* Counseling is a standardized tool used to provide feedback to a subordinate. Counseling focuses on the subordinate by producing a plan outlining actions the subordinate can take to achieve individual and organizational goals. It is central to leader development and should be part of a comprehensive program for developing subordinates. A consistent counseling program includes all subordinates, regardless of the level of each ones potential.

(2) *Coaching.* The original meaning of coaching refers to the function of helping someone through a set of tasks. In the military, coaching occurs when a leader guides another persons development in new or existing skills during the practice of those skills. Unlike mentoring or counseling where the mentor/counselor generally has more experience than the supported person, coaching relies primarily on teaching and guiding to help bring out and enhance current

capabilities. A coach helps those being coached to understand and appreciate their current level of performance and their potential, and instructs them on how to reach the next level of knowledge and skill.

(3) *Mentorship.* Mentorship is the voluntary developmental relationship that exists between a person of greater experience and a person of lesser experience that is characterized by mutual trust and respect. The focus of mentorship is voluntary mentoring that extends beyond the scope of chain of command relationships and occurs when a mentor provides the mentee advice and counsel over a period of time. Effective mentorship will positively impact personal and professional development. Assessment, feedback, and guidance are critical within the mentoring relationship and should be valued by the mentee in order for growth and development to occur.

d. As future battlefields evolve into increasingly dynamic and fluid environments, systems that facilitate the acceleration of leader development are needed. The Army training and leader development model and tools, such as counseling, coaching, and mentorship, are development multipliers that can enhance and influence maturity, self-awareness, adaptability, and conceptual and team-building skills in all leaders.

Chapter 2
Responsibilities

2–1. General

Every leader will—

a. Set and exemplify the highest ethical and professional standards as embodied in the Army Values.

b. Accomplish the unit mission.

c. Ensure the physical, moral, personal, and professional wellbeing of subordinates.

d. Effectively communicate vision, purpose, and direction.

e. Build cohesive teams and empower subordinates.

f. Teach, coach, and counsel subordinates.

g. Build discipline while inspiring motivation, confidence, enthusiasm, and trust in subordinates.

h. Develop their own and their subordinates' skills, knowledge, and attitudes.

i. Anticipate and manage change and be able to act quickly and decisively under pressure.

j. Use initiative to assess risk and exploit opportunities.

k. Treat subordinates with dignity, respect, fairness, and consistency.

l. Foster a healthy command climate.

Chapter 2

Extract from Field Manual 6-22

1. **Purpose:** This chapter provides IGs with an extract from Chapter 2 of Field Manual 6-22, Army Leadership.

2. **Field Manual 6-22:** Field Manual 6-22 represents the Army's doctrine for -- and practical application of -- Army leadership. Through historical vignettes and scenarios, the manual explains the true nature of Army leadership, its historical application, and the numerous challenges and dilemmas faced by leaders in the past. A complete copy of this field manual is available on the Web through the Reimer Digital Library at www.adtdl.army.mil. Users may access the site using their Army Knowledge Online (AKO) log-in and password information.

PART TWO

The Army Leader: Person of Character, Presence and Intellect

Army leadership doctrine concerns itself with all aspects of leadership, the most important of which is the Army leader. Part Two examines that person and highlights critical attributes that all Army leaders can bring to bear, in order to reach their full professional potential on a career path from direct leader to strategic leader. It demonstrates that when Soldiers and Army civilians begin as leaders, they bring certain values and attributes, such as family-ingrained values and the aptitude for certain sports or intellectual abilities, such as learning foreign languages. Army institutional training, combined with education, training, and development on the job, aims at using these existing qualities and potential to develop a well-rounded leader with sets of desired attributes forming the leader's character, presence, and intellect. Development of the desired attributes requires that Army leaders pay attention to them through consistent self-awareness and lifelong learning. Appendix A lists the set of leader attributes and core leader competencies.

Chapter 4

Leader Character

Just as fire tempers iron into fine steel so does adversity temper one's character into firmness, tolerance, and determination….

Margaret Chase Smith
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force Reserve and United States Senator
Speech to graduating women naval officers at Newport, RI (1952)

4-1. Character, a person's moral and ethical qualities, helps determine what is right and gives a leader motivation to do what is appropriate, regardless of the circumstances or the consequences. An informed ethical conscience consistent with the Army Values strengthens leaders to make the right choices when faced with tough issues. Since Army leaders seek to do what is right and inspire others to do the same, they must embody these values.

4-2. American Soldier actions during Operation Desert Storm speak about values, attributes, and character.

Soldier Shows Character and Discipline

On the morning of 28 February 1991, about a half-hour prior to the cease-fire, a T-55 tank pulled up in front of a U.S Bradley unit, which immediately prepared to engage with TOW missiles. A vehicle section consisting of the platoon sergeant and his wingman tracked the Iraqi tank, ready to unleash two deadly shots.

Suddenly, the wingman saw the T-55 tank stop and a head popped up from the commander's cupola. The wingman immediately radioed to his platoon sergeant to hold his fire, believing that the Iraqi was about to dismount the vehicle, possibly to surrender.

The Iraqi tank crew jumped off their vehicle and ran behind a sand dune. Sensing something was not right, the platoon sergeant immediately instructed his wingman to investigate the area around a nearby dune, while he provided cover with his weapons. To everyone's surprise, the wingman and his crew soon discovered 150 enemy combatants ready to surrender.

To deal with this vast number of prisoners, the American unit lined them up and ran them through a gauntlet to disarm them and check them for items of intelligence value. Then the unit called for prisoner of war handlers to pick them up.

Before moving on, the platoon sergeant had to destroy the T-55 tank. Before blowing it in place, the NCO instructed it moved behind a sand berm to protect his people and the prisoners from the shrapnel of the tank's on-board munitions.

When the tank suddenly exploded and the small arms cooked-off, sounding as if small arms were fired, the prisoners panicked, believing the Soldiers would shoot them. Quickly, the Soldiers communicated that this would not happen, one of them telling the Iraqis, "Hey, we're from America, we don't shoot our prisoners!"

4-3. The Soldier's comment captures the essence of Army values-based character. There is a direct connection between the leader's character and his actions. Character, discipline, and good judgment allowed the platoon sergeant and his wingman to hold fire for the proper surrender of enemy combatants. Sound reasoning and ethical considerations guided the platoon sergeant in his decision to safeguard his own men and the prisoners from the dangerous debris caused by the T-55's explosion. He and his Soldiers safeguarded the Army Values and standards of conduct by reassuring the prisoners that they would be unharmed.

4-4. Character is essential to successful leadership. It determines who people are and how they act. It helps determine right from wrong and choose what is right. The factors, internal and central to a leader, which make up the leader's core are—

- Army Values.
- Empathy.
- Warrior Ethos.

ARMY VALUES

4-5. Soldiers and Army civilians enter the Army with personal values developed in childhood and nurtured over many years of personal experience. By taking an oath to serve the Nation and the institution, one also agrees to live and act by a new set of values—Army Values. The Army Values consist of the principles, standards, and qualities considered essential for successful Army leaders. They are fundamental to helping Soldiers and Army civilians make the right decision in any situation.

4-6. The Army Values firmly bind all Army members into a fellowship dedicated to serve the Nation and the Army. They apply to everyone, in every situation, anywhere in the Army. The trust Soldiers and civilians have for each other and the trust of the American people, all depend on how well a Soldier embodies the Army Values.

4-7. The Army recognizes seven values that must be developed in all Army individuals. It is not coincidence that when reading the first letters of the Army Values in sequence they form the acronym "LDRSHIP":

- Loyalty.
- Duty.

- Respect.
- Selfless service.
- Honor.
- Integrity.
- Personal courage.

LOYALTY

Bear true faith and allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, the Army, your unit, and other Soldiers.

> *Loyalty is the big thing, the greatest battle asset of all. But no man ever wins the loyalty of troops by preaching loyalty. It is given him by them as he proves his possession of the other virtues.*
>
> Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall
> *Men Against Fire (*1947)

4-8. All Soldiers and government civilians swear a sacred oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. The Constitution established the legal basis for the existence of our Army. Article I, Section 8, outlines congressional responsibilities regarding America's armed forces. As a logical consequence, leaders as members of the armed forces or government civilians have an obligation to be faithful to the Army and its people.

4-9. Few examples better illustrate loyalty to country, the Army, its people, and self better than that of World War II General Jonathan Wainwright.

Loyal in War and in Captivity

The Japanese invaded the Philippines in December 1941. In March 1942, GEN Douglas MacArthur left his Philippine command and evacuated to Australia. Although GEN MacArthur intended to stay in command from Australia, GEN Jonathan Wainwright, a tall, thin and loyal general officer assumed full command from the Malinta Tunnel on Corregidor, while Major General Edward King replaced Wainwright as commander of the American Forces and Filipino Scouts defending Bataan.

Soon, the Japanese grip on the islands tightened and the Philippine defenders at Bataan were surrounded and without any support other than artillery fire from Corregidor. Disease, exhaustion, and malnutrition ultimately accomplished what thousands of Japanese soldiers had not done for 90 days—Bataan was lost.

When Bataan fell to the Japanese, more than 12,000 Filipino Scouts and 17,000 Americans became prisoners. On the initial march to Camp O'Donnell, the Japanese beheaded many who became too weak to continue the trip. Other prisoners were used for bayonet practice or pushed to their deaths from cliffs.

The situation at Corregidor was no better. Soldiers were weary, wounded, malnourished, and diseased. GEN Wainwright directed the defenses with the limited resources available. Wainwright made frequent visits to the front to check on his men and to inspire them personally. He never feared coming under direct fire from enemy soldiers. A tenacious warrior, he was used to seeing men next to him die and had often personally returned fire on the enemy.

GEN Wainwright was a unique kind of frontline commander—a fighting general who earned the loyalty of his troops by sharing their hardships.

GEN Wainwright and his steadfast troops at Corregidor were the last organized resistance on Luzon. After holding the Japanese against impossible odds for a full six months, Wainwright had exhausted all possibilities—no outside help could be expected.

On 6 May 1942, GEN Wainwright notified his command of his intent to surrender and sent a message to the President of the United States to explain the painful decision. He was proud of his country and his men and he had been forthright and loyal to both. His Soldiers had come to love, admire, and willingly obey the fighting general. President Roosevelt reassured GEN Wainwright of the Nation's loyalty and in one of his last messages to him wrote: "You and your devoted followers have become the living symbol of our war aims and the guarantee of victory."

Following the surrender, the Japanese shipped the defenders of Corregidor across the bay to Manila where they were paraded in disgrace. To humiliate him personally, GEN Wainwright was forced to march through his defeated Soldiers. Despite their wounds, their illness, their broken spirit, and shattered bodies, Wainwright's Soldiers once again demonstrated their loyalty and respect for their leader. As he passed among their ranks, the men struggled to their feet and saluted.

During his more than three years of captivity as the highest-ranking and oldest American prisoner of war in World War II, GEN Wainwright kept faith and loyalty with his fellow prisoners and suffered many deprivations, humiliation, abuse, and torture.

Despite his steadfast posture in captivity, GEN Wainwright feared the moment of his return to America, expecting to be considered a coward and a traitor for his surrender at Corregidor. Americans at home had not forgotten and remained loyal to the fighting general and his courageous troops. To honor him and his men, GEN Wainwright stood behind GEN of the Army MacArthur together with British GEN Percival, during the signing of Japan's official surrender on board the battleship USS Missouri, on 2 September 1945.

GEN Jonathan Wainwright subsequently returned home not to experience shame, but a hero's welcome. During a surprise ceremony on 10 September 1945, President Truman awarded Jonathan Wainwright the Medal of Honor.

4-10. The bond of loyalty not only encompasses the institution and the Nation's legal foundation, but also reaches into every unit and organization. At unit and organizational levels, loyalty is a two-way commitment between leaders and subordinates.

> *There is a great deal of talk about loyalty from the bottom to the top. Loyalty from the top down is even more necessary and much less prevalent.*
>
> General George S. Patton
> *War As I Knew It* (1947)

4-11. The loyalty of subordinates is a gift given when a leader deserves it. Leaders earn subordinates' loyalty by training them well, treating them fairly, and living the Army Values. Leaders who are loyal to their subordinates never let Soldiers be misused or abused. Subordinates who believe in their leaders will stand with them no matter how difficult the situation.

4-12. Research and historical data agree that Soldiers and units fight for each other. Loyalty bonds them together. Without a doubt, the strongest bonds emerge when leading people in combat. While combat is the most powerful bonding experience, good units can build loyalty and trust during peacetime.

4-13. Loyalty and trust are extremely important ingredients for the successful day-to-day operations of all organizations, many of them a mix of Army civilians and Soldiers. The logistical and political demands of modern war have greatly expanded the roles of civilians, regardless if employed by contractors or the Department of the Army. Whether stationed at home or in forward-deployed operational theaters, their contributions are vital to many mission accomplishments. They are loyal partners of the Army team, running logistical convoys, repairing infrastructure, maintaining complex equipment, and feeding Soldiers.

4-14. To create strong organizations and tight-knit small-unit brotherhoods, all team members must embrace loyalty—superiors, subordinates, peers, civilians, and Soldiers. Loyalty encompasses all Army components, including the National Guard and Army Reserve who shoulder an increasingly growing share of the Army's long-term operational commitments. Ultimately, the bonds of loyalty also extend to other

Services. While many think they can easily go it alone, the reality of modern, multidimensional war shows that joint capabilities are essential to successful mission outcomes.

DUTY

Fulfill your obligations.

> *I go anywhere in the world they tell me to go, any time they tell me to, to fight anybody they want me to fight. I move my family anywhere they tell me to move, on a day's notice, and live in whatever quarters they assign me. I work whenever they tell me to work…. And I like it.*
>
> James H. Webb
> Former U.S. Marine and Secretary of the Navy (1987-1988)

4-15. Duty extends beyond everything required by law, regulation, and orders. Professionals work not just to meet the minimum standard, but consistently strive to do their very best. Army leaders commit to excellence in all aspects of their professional responsibility.

4-16. Part of fulfilling duty is to exercise initiative—anticipating what needs to be done before being told what to do. Army leaders exercise initiative when they fulfill the purpose, not merely the letter, of the tasks they have been assigned and the orders they have received. The task is not complete until the intended outcome is achieved. When a platoon sergeant tells a squad leader to inspect weapons, the squad leader only fulfills a minimum obligation when checking weapons. If the squad leader finds weapons that are not clean or serviced, a sense of duty alerts the leader to go beyond the platoon sergeant's instructions. To fulfill that duty, squad leaders must correct the problem and ensure that all the unit's weapons are up to standard. When leaders take initiative, they also take full responsibility for their actions and those of their subordinates. Conscientiousness is a human trait where duty is internalized. Conscientiousness means having a high sense of responsibility for personal contributions to the Army, demonstrated through dedicated effort, organization, thoroughness, reliability, and practicality. Conscientiousness consistently alerts the leader to do what is right—even when tired or demoralized.

4-17. In rare cases, a leader's sense of duty also has to detect and prevent an illegal order. Duty requires refusal to obey it—leaders have no choice but to do what is ethically and legally right.

RESPECT

Treat people as they should be treated.

> *The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an army. It is possible to impart instruction and to give commands in such manner and such a tone of voice to inspire in the soldier no feeling but an intense desire to obey, while the opposite manner and tone of voice cannot fail to excite strong resentment and a desire to disobey. The one mode or the other of dealing with subordinates springs from a corresponding spirit in the breast of the commander. He who feels the respect which is due to others cannot fail to inspire in them regard for himself, while he who feels, and hence manifests, disrespect toward others, especially his inferiors, cannot fail to inspire hatred against himself.*
>
> Major General John M. Schofield
> Address to the United States Corps of Cadets, 11 August 1879

4-18. Respect for the individual is the basis for the rule of law—the very essence of what the Nation stands for. In the Army, respect means treating others as they should be treated. This value reiterates that people are the most precious resource and that one is bound to treat others with dignity and respect.

4-19. Over the course of history, America has become more culturally diverse, requiring Army leaders to deal with people from a wider range of ethnic, racial, and religious backgrounds. An Army leader should prevent misunderstandings arising from cultural differences. Actively seeking to learn about people whose culture is different can help to do this. Being sensitive to other cultures will aid in mentoring, coaching,

and counseling subordinates. This demonstrates respect when seeking to understand their background, see things from their perspective, and appreciate what is important to them.

4-20. Army leaders should consistently foster a climate in which everyone is treated with dignity and respect, regardless of race, gender, creed, or religious belief. Fostering a balanced and dignified work climate begins with a leader's personal example. How a leader lives the Army Values shows subordinates how they should behave. Teaching values is one of a leader's most important responsibilities. It helps create a common understanding of the Army Values and expected standards.

SELFLESS SERVICE

Put the welfare of the Nation, the Army, and subordinates before your own.

> *…[A]sk not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country.*
>
> John F. Kennedy
> Inaugural speech as 35th President of the United States (1961)

4-21. The military is often referred to as "the Service." Members of the Army serve the United States of America. Selfless service means doing what is right for the Nation, the Army, the organization, and subordinates. While the needs of the Army and the Nation should come first, it does not imply family or self-neglect. To the contrary, such neglect weakens a leader and can cause the Army more harm than good.

4-22. A strong but harnessed ego, high self-esteem, and a healthy ambition can be compatible with selfless service, as long as the leader treats his people fairly and gives them the credit they deserve. The leader knows that the Army cannot function except as a team. For a team to excel, the individual must give up self-interest for the good of the whole.

4-23. Selfless service is not only expected of Soldiers. Civilians, supporting many of the Army's most critical missions, should display the same value. During Operation Desert Storm, many of the civilians deployed to Southwest Asia volunteered to serve there, filling vital roles in supporting Soldiers and operations.

4-24. On 11 September 2001, after the attack on the Pentagon, that selfless team effort between military personnel and civilian workers did not come as a surprise. Civilians and Soldiers struggled side-by-side to save each other's lives, while together they ensured that critical operations around the world continued without loss of command and control.

4-25. Often, the need for selflessness is not limited to combat or emergencies. Individuals continue to place the Army's needs above their own as retirees volunteer for recall, members of the Reserve Components continue to serve beyond their mandatory service dates, and Army civilians volunteer for duty in combat zones.

HONOR

Live up to all the Army Values.

> *War must be carried on systematically, and to do it you must have men of character activated by principles of honor.*
>
> George Washington
> Commander, Continental Army (1775-81) and President of the United States (1789-97)

4-26. Honor provides the moral compass for character and personal conduct for all members of the Army. Honor belongs to those living by words and actions consistent with high ideals. The expression "honorable person" refers to the character traits an individual possesses that the community recognizes and respects.

4-27. Honor is the glue that holds the Army Values together. Honor requires a person to demonstrate continuously an understanding of what is right. It implies taking pride in the community's acknowledgment of that reputation. Military ceremonies recognizing individual and unit achievements demonstrate and reinforce the importance the Army places on honor.

4-28. The Army leader must demonstrate an understanding of what is right and take pride in that reputation by living up to the Army Values. Living honorably, in line with the Army Values, sets an example for every member of the organization and contributes to an organization's positive climate and morale.

4-29. How leaders conduct themselves and meet obligations define them as persons and leaders. In turn, how the Army meets the Nation's commitments defines the Army as an institution. Honor demands putting the Army Values above self-interest and above career and personal comfort. For Soldiers, it requires putting the Army Values above self-preservation. Honor gives the strength of will to live according to the Army Values, especially in the face of personal danger. It is not coincidence that our military's highest award is the Medal of Honor. Its recipients clearly went beyond what is expected and beyond the call of duty.

Honor, Courage, and Selfless Service in Korea

On 14 June 1952 SGT David B. Bleak, a medical aidman in Medical Company, 223rd Infantry Regiment, 40th Infantry Division volunteered to accompany a combat patrol tasked to capture enemy forces for interrogation. While moving up the rugged slope of Hill 499, near Minari-gol, Korea, the patrol came under intense automatic weapons and small arms fire several times, suffering several casualties. An enemy group fired at SGT Bleak from a nearby trench while he tended the wounded.

Determined to protect the wounded, the brave aidman faced the enemy. He entered the trench and killed two enemy soldiers with his bare hands and a third with his trench knife. While exiting, SGT Bleak detected a concussion grenade as it fell in front of a comrade. Bleak quickly shifted to shield the man from the blast.

Disregarding his own injury, he carried the most severely wounded comrade down a hillside. Attacked by two enemy soldiers with bayonets, Bleak lowered the wounded man and put both adversaries out of action by slamming their heads together. He then carried the wounded American Soldier to safety.

SGT Bleak's courageous actions saved fellow Soldiers' lives and preserved the patrol's combat effectiveness. For his actions, President Dwight D. Eisenhower awarded him the Medal of Honor on 27 October 1953.

INTEGRITY

Do what's right—legally and morally.

> *No nation can safely trust its martial honor to leaders who do not maintain the universal code which distinguishes between those things that are right and those things that are wrong.*
>
> General Douglas MacArthur
> *Patriot Hearts* (2000)

4-30. Leaders of integrity consistently act according to clear principles, not just what works now. The Army relies on leaders of integrity who possess high moral standards and who are honest in word and deed. Leaders are honest to others by not presenting themselves or their actions as anything other than what they are, remaining committed to the truth.

4-31. Here is how a leader stands for the truth: if a mission cannot be accomplished, the leader's integrity requires him to inform the chain of command. If the unit's operational readiness rate is truly 70 percent, despite the senior commander's required standard of 90 percent, a leader of integrity will not instruct subordinates to adjust numbers. It is the leader's duty to report the truth and develop solutions to meet the standard with honor and integrity. Identifying the underlying maintenance issues and raising the quality bar could ultimately save Soldiers' lives.

4-32. If leaders inadvertently pass on bad information, they should correct it as soon as they discover the error. Leaders of integrity do the right thing not because it is convenient or because they have no other choice. They choose the path of truth because their character permits nothing less.

4-33. Serving with integrity encompasses more than one component. However, these components are dependant on whether the leader inherently understands right versus wrong. Assuming the leader can make the distinction, a leader should always be able to separate right from wrong in every situation. Just as important, that leader should do what is right, even at personal cost.

4-34. Leaders cannot hide what they do, but must carefully decide how to act. Army leaders are always on display. To instill the Army Values in others, leaders must demonstrate them personally. Personal values may extend beyond the Army Values, to include such things as political, cultural, or religious beliefs. However, as an Army leader and a person of integrity, these values should reinforce, not contradict, the Army Values.

4-35. Conflicts between personal and Army Values should be resolved before a leader becomes a morally complete Army leader. If in doubt, a leader may consult a mentor with respected values and judgment.

PERSONAL COURAGE

Face fear, danger, or adversity (physical and moral).

> *Courage is doing what you're afraid to do. There can be no courage unless you're scared.*
>
> Captain Eddie Rickenbacker
> U.S. Army Air Corps, World War I

4-36. As the Army Air Corps World War I fighter ace, Captain Eddie Rickenbacker, put it—personal courage is not the absence of fear. It is the ability to put fear aside and do what is necessary. Personal courage takes two forms: physical and moral. Good leaders demonstrate both.

4-37. Physical courage requires overcoming fears of bodily harm and doing one's duty. It triggers bravery that allows a Soldier to take risks in combat in spite of the fear of wounds or even death. One lieutenant serving during World War II displayed such courage despite serving in a time when he and his fellow African-American Soldiers were not fully recognized for their actions.

Courage and Inspiration for Soldiers Then and Now

Of all the Medals of Honor awarded during World War II, none went to an African-American. In 1993, the Army contracted Shaw University in Raleigh, North Carolina, to research racial disparities in the selection of Medal of Honor recipients. As a result, the Army ultimately decided to recommend seven for the award.

Fifty-two years after they earned them, the medals were awarded along with the nation's silent apology for being ignored by the once-segregated Army. The only soldier still alive to receive his award was Vernon J. Baker, an exceptionally courageous and inspirational leader.

On 5 and 6 April 1945, Second Lieutenant Baker of the 370th Infantry Regiment had demonstrated leadership by example near Viareggio, Italy, during his company's attack against strongly entrenched German positions in mountainous terrain.

When his company was stopped by fire from several machine gun emplacements, LT Baker crawled to one position and destroyed it, killing three German soldiers. He then attacked an enemy observation post and killed two occupants. With the aid of one of his men, LT Baker continued the advance and destroyed two more machine gun nests, killing or wounding the soldiers occupying these positions. After consolidating his position, LT Baker finally covered the evacuation of the wounded personnel of his unit by occupying an exposed position and drawing the enemy's fire.

On the night following his heroic combat performance, LT Baker again volunteered to lead a battalion advance toward his division's objective through enemy mine fields and heavy fire. Two-thirds of his company was wounded or dead and there were no reinforcements in sight. His commander ordered a withdrawal. Baker, in tears protested, "Captain, we can't withdraw. We must stay here and fight it out."

LT Baker stands as an inspiration to the many African-American Soldiers who served with him and since that time. He stood courageously against the enemy and stood proudly to represent his fallen comrades when he received his Medal of Honor.

Long after he saw combat in Italy, Vernon J. Baker still thought of his black comrades who died around him as they awaited reinforcements that never came. In a CNN interview, he summed up his feelings with the following modest words: "This day will vindicate those men and make things right."

4-38. Moral courage is the willingness to stand firm on values, principles, and convictions. It enables all leaders to stand up for what they believe is right, regardless of the consequences. Leaders, who take full responsibility for their decisions and actions, even when things go wrong, display moral courage.

4-39. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was a leader of great moral courage during his service as the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces Europe. He displayed this moral courage in a handwritten note he prepared for public release, in case the Normandy landings failed.

> *Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based upon the best information available. The troops, the air, and the Navy did all that bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone—June 5.*

4-40. Moral courage also expresses itself as candor. Candor means being frank, honest, and sincere with others. It requires steering clear of bias, prejudice, or malice even when it is uncomfortable or may seem better to keep quiet.

> *The concept of professional courage does not always mean being as tough as nails, either. It also suggests a willingness to listen to the soldiers' problems, to go to bat for them in a tough situation and it means knowing just how far they can go. It also means being willing to tell the boss when he is wrong.*
>
> William Connelly
> Sergeant Major of the Army (1979-1983)

4-41. One can observe candor when a company commander calmly explains to the first sergeant that a Soldier should receive a lower-level punishment, although the first sergeant insists on a company-grade Article 15. Likewise, a candid first sergeant respectfully points out a company commander might be overreacting for ordering remedial weekend maintenance for the entire company, when only one platoon actually failed inspection. Trust relationships between leaders and subordinates rely on candor. Without it, subordinates will not know if they have met the standard and leaders will not know what is going on in their organization.

EMPATHY

4-42. Army leaders show a propensity to share experiences with the members of their organization. When planning and deciding, try to envision the impact on Soldiers and other subordinates. The ability to see something from another person's point of view, to identify with and enter into another person's feelings and emotions, enables the Army leader to better care for civilians, Soldiers, and their families.

4-43. Competent and empathetic leaders take care of Soldiers by giving them the training, equipment, and all the support they need to keep them alive in combat and accomplish the mission. During wartime and difficult operations, empathetic Army leaders share the hardships with their people to gauge if their plans and decisions are realistic. Competent and empathetic leaders also recognize the need to provide Soldiers

and civilians with reasonable comforts and rest periods to maintain good morale and mission effectiveness. When a unit or organization suffers injuries or death, empathetic Army leaders can help ease the trauma and suffering in the organization to restore full readiness as quickly as possible.

4-44. Modern Army leaders recognize that empathy also includes nourishing a close relationship between the Army and Army families. To build a strong and ready force, Army leaders at all levels promote self-sufficient and healthy families. Empathy for families includes allowing Soldiers recovery time from difficult missions, protecting leave periods, permitting critical appointments, as well as supporting events that allow information exchange and family teambuilding.

4-45. The requirement for leader empathy extends beyond civilians, Soldiers, and their families. Within the larger operational environment, leader empathy may be helpful when dealing with local populations and prisoners of war. Providing the local population within an area of operations with the necessities of life often turns an initially hostile disposition into one of cooperation.

THE WARRIOR ETHOS

4-46. General Eric Shinseki, former Army Chief of Staff, described the need for a common Warrior Ethos with emphasis on the uniformed members of the Army team:

> *Every organization has an internal culture and ethos. A true warrior ethos must underpin the Army's enduring traditions and values…. Soldiers imbued with an ethically grounded warrior ethos clearly symbolize the Army's unwavering commitment to the nation we serve. The Army has always embraced this ethos but the demands of Transformation will require a renewed effort to ensure that all Soldiers truly understand and embody this warrior ethos.*

4-47. The Warrior Ethos refers to the professional attitudes and beliefs that characterize the American Soldier. It echoes through the precepts of the Code of Conduct and reflects a Soldier's selfless commitment to the Nation, mission, unit, and fellow Soldiers. The Warrior Ethos was developed and sustained through discipline, commitment to the Army Values, and pride in the Army's heritage. Lived by Soldiers and supported by dedicated Army civilians, a strong Warrior Ethos is the foundation for the winning spirit that permeates the institution.

4-48. U.S Army Soldiers embrace the Warrior Ethos as defined in the Soldier's Creed. (See figure 4-1.)



Figure 4-1. The Soldier's Creed

4-49. The Warrior Ethos is more than persevering in war. It fuels the fire to fight through any demanding conditions—no matter the time or effort required. It is one thing to make a snap decision to risk one's life for a brief period. It is quite another to sustain the will to win when the situation looks hopeless and shows no indication of getting better, when being away from home and family is already a profound hardship. The Soldier who jumps on a grenade to save comrades is courageous without question—that action requires great mental and physical courage. Pursuing victory over extended periods with multiple deployments requires this deep moral courage, one that focuses on the mission.

> *Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men. It is the spirit of the men who follow and of the man who leads that gains the victory.*
>
> General George S. Patton
> *Cavalry Journal* (1933)

4-50. The actions of all who have fought courageously in wars past exemplify the essence of the Army's Warrior Ethos. Developed through discipline, commitment to the Army Values, and knowledge of the Army's proud heritage, the Warrior Ethos makes clear that military service is much more than just another job. It is about the warrior's total commitment. It is the Soldiers' absolute faith in themselves and their comrades that makes the Army invariably persuasive in peace and invincible in war. The Warrior Ethos forges victory from the chaos of battle. It fortifies all leaders and their people to overcome fear, hunger, deprivation, and fatigue. The Army wins because it fights hard and with purpose. It fights hard because it trains hard. Tough training is the path to winning at the lowest cost in human sacrifice.

4-51. The Warrior Ethos is a component of character. It shapes and guides what a Soldier does. It is linked tightly to the Army Values such as personal courage, loyalty to comrades, and dedication to duty. During the Korean War, one leader displayed these traits and surpassed traditional bounds of rank to lead his Soldiers.

Task Force Kingston

LT Joseph Kingston, a boyish-looking platoon leader in K Company, 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, was commanding the lead element for his battalion's move northward. The terrain was mountainous in that part of Korea, the weather bitterly cold—the temperature often below zero—and the cornered enemy still dangerous.

LT Kingston inched his way forward, the battalion gradually adding elements to his force. Soon, he had anti-aircraft jeeps mounted with quad .50 caliber machine guns, a tank, a squad (later a platoon) of engineers, and an artillery forward observer under his control. Some of the new attachments were commanded by lieutenants who outranked him, as did the tactical air controller—a captain. LT Kingston remained in command, and battalion headquarters began referring to his growing force as, "Task Force Kingston."

Bogged down in Yongsong-ni with casualties mounting, Task Force Kingston received reinforcements that brought its strength to nearly 300. 1LT Kingston's battalion commander wanted him to remain in command, even though he pushed forward several more officers who outranked LT Kingston. One of the attached units was a rifle company, commanded by a captain. Nonetheless, the cooperative command arrangement worked—because LT Kingston was a very competent leader.

Despite tough fighting, the force advanced. Hit while leading an assault on one enemy stronghold, Kingston managed to toss a grenade, just as a North Korean soldier fired a shot that glanced off his helmet. The Lieutenant's resilience and personal courage inspired every Soldier from the wide array of units under his control.

Task Force Kingston succeeded in battle because of a competent young leader who inspired his people by demonstrating many attributes common to the Warrior Ethos and the Army Values that the Army currently espouses.

4-52. The Warrior Ethos requires unrelenting and consistent determination to do what is right and to do it with pride across the spectrum of conflicts. Understanding what is right requires respect for both comrades and all people involved in complex missions, such as stability and reconstruction operations. Ambiguous situations, such as when to use lethal or nonlethal force, are a test for the leader's judgment and discipline. The Warrior Ethos helps create a collective commitment to win with honor.

4-53. The Warrior Ethos is crucial but also perishable. Consequently, the Army must continually affirm, develop, and sustain it. The martial ethic connects American warriors of today with those whose sacrifices have sustained our very existence since America's founding. The Army's continuing drive to be the best, to triumph over all adversity, and to remain focused on mission accomplishment, does more than preserve the Army's institutional culture—it sustains the Nation.

4-54. Actions that safeguard and sustain the Nation occur everywhere there are Soldiers and civilian members of the Army team. All that tireless motivation comes in part from the cohesion that springs from the Warrior Ethos. Soldiers fight for each other and their loyalty runs front to rear as well as left to right. Mutual support is a defining characteristic of Army culture, present regardless of time or place.

CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT

4-55. People join the Army as Soldiers and Army civilians with their character, pre-shaped by their background, beliefs, education, and experience. An Army leader's job would be simpler if merely checking the team member's personal values against the Army Values and developing a simple plan to align them sufficed. Reality is much different. Becoming a person of character and a leader of character is a career-long process involving day-to-day experience, education, self-development, developmental counseling, coaching, and mentoring. While individuals are responsible for their own character development, leaders are responsible for encouraging, supporting, and assessing the efforts of their people. Leaders of character can develop only through continual study, reflection, experience, and feedback. Leaders hold themselves and subordinates to the highest standards. The standards and values then spread throughout the team, unit, or organization and ultimately throughout the Army.

4-56. Doing the right thing is good. Doing the right thing for the right reason and with the right goal is better. People of character must possess the desire to act ethically in all situations. One of the Army leader's primary responsibilities is to maintain an ethical climate that supports development of such character. When an organization's ethical climate nurtures ethical behavior, people will, over time, think, feel, and act ethically. They will internalize the aspects of sound character.

CHARACTER AND BELIEFS

4-57. Beliefs matter because they help people understand their experiences. Those experiences provide a start point for what to do in everyday situations. Beliefs are convictions people hold as true. Values are deep-seated personal beliefs that shape a person's behavior. Values and beliefs are central to character.

4-58. Army leaders should recognize the role beliefs play in preparing Soldiers for battle. Soldiers often fight and win against tremendous odds when they are convinced of the beliefs for which they are fighting. Commitment to such beliefs as justice, liberty, and freedom can be essential ingredients in creating and sustaining the will to fight and prevail. Warrior Ethos is another special case of beliefs.

4-59. Beliefs derive from upbringing, culture, religious backgrounds, and traditions. As a result, different moral beliefs have, and will, continue to be shaped by diverse religious and philosophical traditions. Army leaders serve a Nation that protects the fundamental principle that people are free to choose their own beliefs. America's strength derives and benefits from that diversity. Effective leaders are careful not to require their people to violate their beliefs by ordering or encouraging illegal or unethical actions.

4-60. America's Constitution reflects fundamental national principles. One of these principles is the guarantee of freedom of religion. The Army places a high value on the rights of its Soldiers to observe tenets of their respective religious faiths while respecting individual differences in moral background and personal conviction. While religious beliefs and practices remain a decision of individual conscience, Army leaders are responsible for ensuring their Soldiers and civilians have the opportunity to practice their

religion. Commanders, in accordance with regulatory guidance, normally approve requests for accommodation of religious practices unless they will have an adverse impact on unit readiness, individual readiness, unit cohesion, morale, discipline, safety, and/or health. At the same time, no leader may apply undue influence, coerce, or harass subordinates with reference to matters of religion. Chaplains are staff officers with specialized training and specific responsibilities for ensuring the free exercise of religion and are available to advise and assist Army leaders at every level.

4-61. A common theme expressed by American prisoners of war during the Korean and Vietnam wars was the importance of beliefs instilled by a common American culture. Those beliefs helped them to withstand torture and the hardships of captivity.

He Never Gave In

In a park in Alexandria, Virginia is the life size statue of an American Soldier with two small Vietnamese children. Near them is a wall with the names of 65 other Alexandrians who died during the Vietnam conflict.

This memorial came almost forty years after CPT Humbert "Rocky" Versace, a prisoner of war, was executed by his captors in North Vietnam. It honors a man who never gave up his beliefs during extreme hardships and never gave in to the enemy, even in the face of death.

CPT Versace was a West Point graduate assigned to the military assistance advisory group as an intelligence advisor during October 1963.

While accompanying a Civilian Irregular Defense Group engaged in combat operations in the An Xuyen Province, Versace and two fellow Special Forces Soldiers, LT Nick Rowe and SFC Dan Pitzer, were attacked by a Viet Cong main force battalion. Versace, shot in the leg and back, was taken prisoner along with the others.

They were forced to walk barefoot a long distance, deep into the jungle. Once there, Versace assumed the position of senior prisoner and demanded the captors treat them as prisoners, not war criminals. They locked him in an isolation box, beaten and interrogated. He tried to escape four times, once crawling through the surrounding swamp until he was recaptured. He garnered most of the attention of the Viet Cong so that life was tolerable for his fellow prisoners. He was their role model.

He refused to violate the Code of Conduct, giving the enemy only information required by the Geneva Convention which he would recite repeatedly, chapter and verse.

When other Soldiers would operate in those remote areas, they heard stories of Versace's ordeal from local rice farmers. Versace spoke fluent Vietnamese and French and would resist his captors loudly enough that local villagers could hear him. They reported seeing him led through the area bare footed, with a rope around his neck, hands tied, and head swollen and yellow from jaundice. His hair had turned white from the physical stress. The rice farmers spoke of his strength and character and his commitment to his God and his country.

On 26 September 26 1965, after two years in captivity, he was executed in retaliation for three Viet Cong killed in Da Nang. For his bravery, Versace was awarded the Medal of Honor and inducted into the Ranger Hall of Fame at Fort Benning.

Versace's remains were never found, but a tombstone bearing his name stands above an empty grave in Arlington cemetery. The statue across town is a tribute to who Captain Versace was. Ironically, he was just weeks from leaving the Army and studying to become a missionary before being captured. He wanted to return to Vietnam and help the orphaned children. Most of all, he will be remembered as someone with strong character and beliefs who never gave in.

Chapter 3

Memorandum from the President

1. **Purpose:** This chapter provides IGs with a copy of President George W. Bush's 19 November 2001 memorandum to members of the Senior Executive Service entitled "Dedicated to Serving America."

2. **Presidential Memorandum:** A little more than two months after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, President Bush issued a memorandum to senior leaders in the Federal government that reinforced his vision for dedicated service to the country. President Bush placed this dedication to service within the context of high ethical behavior and standards -- in effect a clarion call to all who serve our country to do what is right and to expend our Nation's resources wisely.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 19, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE

SUBJECT: Dedicated to Serving America

On October 15, I had the privilege of meeting with many of you at Constitution Hall. Whether or not you were in the Hall that afternoon, I want you to know that I am proud of your unwavering commitment to excellence in public service and your love of our great country.

The American people are looking to the Federal Government now as never before to protect them and to defeat those who are trying to destroy us. The American people also expect us to provide leadership on other key fronts, such as education and the economy.

In living up to these expectations, I want us to resist the pressure to unwisely expand Government. Our Federal Government should be limited and effective. It should welcome market-based competition whenever possible. And it should respect the role and authority of State and local governments, because they are closest to the people.

I also want us all to abide by the following few key values and principles:

- First, we must always maintain the highest ethical standards. In addition to asking, "what is legal," we must also ask, "what is right."
- We must confront the tough problems, not avoid them. We are here to serve the public's long-term interests, not just to apply quick, short-term fixes.
- We must remember that political and career employees are part of the same team. The American people do not distinguish between them, and neither do I. The American people and I have high expectations for our entire Government. To meet those expectations, we need to work together.
- Finally, we should always remember that every dollar we spend is the taxpayer's money. People worked hard to earn it, and we should spend it wisely and reluctantly.

As I said at Constitution Hall, I am honored to be your leader. I look forward to your support as we work together in serving our great Nation.



Chapter 4

Principles of Ethics for Government Employees

1. **Purpose:** This chapter provides IGs with a list of 14 ethics principles for government employees.

2. **Principles of Ethics:** The following list of 14 principles derives from an unknown source but represents the basic precepts of ethical behavior required for all who serve the Nation both in and out of uniform. Those principles are as follows:

a. Public service is a public trust, requiring employees to place loyalty to the Constitution, the laws, and ethical principles above private gain.

b. Employees shall not hold financial interests that conflict with the conscientious performance of duty.

c. Employees shall not engage in financial transactions using non-public Government information or allow the improper use of such information to further any private interest.

d. An employee shall not, except as permitted, solicit or accept any gift or other item of monetary value from any person or entity seeking official action from, doing business with, or conducting activities regulated by the employee's agency, or whose interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of the employee's duties.

e. Employees shall put forth honest effort in the performance of their duties.

f. Employees shall not knowingly make unauthorized commitments or promises of any kind purporting to bind the Government.

g. Employees shall not use public office for private gain.

h. Employees shall act impartially and not give preferential treatment to any private organization or individual.

i. Employees shall protect and conserve Federal property and shall not use it for other than authorized activities.

j. Employees shall not engage in outside employment or activities, including seeking or negotiating employment, that conflict with official Government duties and responsibilities.

k. Employees shall disclose fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption to appropriate authorities.

l. Employees shall satisfy in good faith their obligations as citizens, including all just financial obligations, especially those -- such as Federal, State, or local taxes -- that are imposed by law.

m. Employees shall adhere to all laws and regulations that provide equal opportunity for all Americans regardless of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or handicap.

n. Employees shall endeavor to avoid any actions creating the appearance that they are violating the law or the ethical standards set forth in this part. Whether particular circumstances create an appearance that the law or these standards have been violated shall be determined from the perspective of a reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant facts.

Chapter 5

Ethics Scenario and Practical Exercise

1. **Purpose:** This chapter provides IGs with an ethics scenario and practical exercise for in-class use.

2. **Practical Exercise:** A description of the issues and dilemmas associated with the scenario follows the practical exercise outlined below.

GENERAL SITUATION:

DATE: Today

PLACE: Fort Von Steuben.

YOUR IDENTITY: An Assistant IG at the Fort Von Steuben IG Office

YOUR MISSION: Identify any ethical dilemmas associated with the scenario outlined below.

One day, while dropping off an inspection report at HQ, you run into your friend, CPT Les Klew, who works in the Secretary of General Staff's (SGS) office. While there, CPT Klew asks if you've seen the new flyer that he just produced in the office for the upcoming Friends of Fort Von Steuben (FOFVS) Membership Campaign and Fundraiser Dinner Dance. Les explains that the Chief of Staff, Fort Von Steuben, made him the FOFVS Treasurer and official Fort Von Steuben liaison to the FOFVS. The Chief told him to provide "everything the Friends needed!" He even told Les how to vote on FOFVS board actions! The FOFVS really appreciated the work that CPT Klew had done and had presented him with a gold Seiko watch as an "end-of-tour" gift.

While listening to this information, you read the flyer. It announces the 3rd Annual FOFVS Membership Drive and Fundraiser dinner dance. At the bottom of the flyer is a note in the Commanding General's handwriting, which says, "One of the many great organizations supporting Soldiers and The Army -- See you on the High Ground!"

The flyer also notes that the door prizes for the Dinner Dance will be miniature busts of Baron Von Steuben donated by the Fort Von Steuben Director of Logistics (DOL) Machine shop.

CPT Klew then says, "Hey, you ought to come. It will be great ... dinner, dancing, the Division chorus, the Color Guard -- very cool, very hooah! In fact, the Chief told me that I had a mission to bring three buddies and their wives. We've even arranged to use the Chief's Government van and driver to pick us up in the housing area and drive to the club so we don't need designated drivers! Want to come?"

Something bothers you about this situation...

ISSUES:

Support to Private Organization (PO) (appointed as treasurer; provide "everything"; voting)
Conflict of Interest (Liaison)
Use of Government resources (flyer; Klew's time)
Gift (watch)
Use of Government Resources (statute; giving away)
Endorsement of PO and Fundraising (Commanding General?? Also raises senior-official issue)
Support to PO (Chorus; color guard, attendance "mission")
Use of non-tactical vehicle and driver

ETHICAL DILEMMA:

Loyalty (to Commanding General, Chief of Staff, and friend)
Duty (to report misdeeds)
Selfless Service - gifts and improper benefits
Honor - following the JER even when it hurts!
Integrity - internalizing the values
Personal Courage - What do you do now, IG??

Part 6

The Army Components' Inspectors General

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Inspector General Support Across the Army Components

Introduction

Inspector General Support Across the Army Components

1. **Introduction**. FM 3-0, Operations, makes it clear that the Army expects to be engaged in an era of “persistent conflict” for the foreseeable future and that Soldiers will remain the centerpiece and foundation of the Army. The operational environment requires a high degree of flexibility and dexterity; organizations, leaders, and Soldiers must possess these attributes to transition from offensive and defensive operations to stability and civil support operations seamlessly in order to achieve decisive results. Our doctrine does not distinguish between the components -- active and reserve. While some capabilities may exist in one component and not another, the strength of the Army lies in the ability to blend the strengths and skills resident in each component to tailor the force necessary to ensure victory.

2. Inspectors General (IGs) are an integral element of each component. An IG is normally assigned to all general-officer commands. Additionally, you will find inspectors general assigned at the state level in the Joint Forces Headquarters, the National Guard Bureau (NGB), and the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC). However, because today’s Army does not deploy by discrete units or components but rather as modular packages, IGs of any one component must be prepared to execute IG functions as part of any other component. For example, an active component (AC) division IG stationed in Germany could be deployed into a Multi-National Division responsible for supporting a population that includes no organic brigades but instead AC brigades from Forts Lewis, Hood, Riley, Campbell, and Drum and two Army National Guard (ARNG) brigades headquartered in Arkansas and West Virginia. Additionally, the population supported would include Individual Army Reserve Soldiers; Department of the Army (DA), Department of Defense (DoD), other governmental agency civilians; contractors; and local indigenous civilians and forces.

3. In the early 1970s, General Creighton Abrams said, “If we are ever going to war again, we are going to take the reserves with us.” More recently, Lieutenant General H Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB) from 2003 to 2008, said, "When you call out the Guard, you call out America." The Army, and IGs by extension, is truly executing missions in accordance with the Abrams Doctrine that emerged as a result of General Abrams's vision to ensure that the American public supported the next war.

4. While today’s Army fights as a modular, expeditionary team drawn from all components, members of one component are frequently unfamiliar with systems and regulatory requirements in other components. For example, there are differences in the personnel promotion systems, finance / pay systems, duty statuses, collective training availability, challenges for building and maintaining Family-support groups, and rear detachment support. These challenges are exacerbated when units are geographically separated at home station or an IG from their parent organization, higher headquarters, or component is not available. Furthermore, as Soldiers do not understand why one person gets promoted while deployed but not the other, perceived injustices can grow and detract from unit readiness and warfighting capability. The bottom line is IGs must be prepared to work all issues -- AC, ARNG, and USAR -- arising in their task-organized command, no matter what component the IG may be.

5. The IG Student Guide is designed to provide a baseline of knowledge to prepare IGs to work with units and members of any component. The first part is a brief overview of each of the three uniformed components -- AC, ARNG, and USAR. The second section addresses some of the common issues that confront IGs in the field by providing basic background information of the various systems, guidance on how to proceed, and point-of-contact information for each component's subject matter expert (SME). This section is not meant to be all-inclusive since every case will be uniquely different, but this information will provide a starting point for all IGs seeking guidance to assist all complainants no matter what component the IG or the complainant may be.

Chapter 1

Army Components

1. **Components**. The primary force structure of the U.S. Army incorporates three components designated as follows: Component 1 is the Active Component (AC) or Regular Army (RA), Component 2 is the Army National Guard (ARNG), and Component 3 is the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). The Constitution and the U.S. Code provide the legal basis for the various components (see Appendix A). A Multiple-Component (multi-compo) unit denotes a combination of any two or all three components integrated into one unit as defined on the Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) or Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA). The flag or command of a multi-compo unit can be any of the three components.

2. **Component 1, Active Component (AC).** The Active Component or Regular Army is the federal force consisting of full-time Soldiers who are assigned to operational and institutional organizations engaged in the day-to-day Army missions. Congress annually determines the number of Soldiers the Army may maintain in the Regular Army.

a. The skills and organizations required for operations against today's threats are different from those required in the past. To meet these challenges, the Regular Army is configured to deploy rapidly and execute the first 30 days of an operation. In practice, this requirement means units of the Regular Army are organized, manned, equipped, and maintained to meet the nation's requirement for a full-time, rapidly deployable force capable of executing any mission across the full spectrum of operations.

b. Regular Army units were previously organized into division-centric units comprised of brigades and battalions augmented by supporting units as necessary. Field armies and corps were groups of divisions and supporting organizations. Currently, the Regular Army is in the midst of a transformation to a modular, brigade-centric organization organized to train and fight as part of a Joint force. Brigades are structured to be modular in nature to allow greater ability to tailor the force to meet the needs of any given situation. Brigades are still grouped under a divisional headquarters and consist of subordinate battalions and companies. The notional organization of the 66th Infantry Division in Part 7 of this guide is representative of a current Regular Army divisional structure as of 2009.

c. There are currently four corps and 10 divisions in the Regular Army augmented by Theater Sustainment Commands and separate brigades that provide specific operational capabilities. Unless deployed into a theater of operations, corps and divisional units report to Forces Command (FORSCOM) within the continental U.S. (CONUS), USARPAC in Alaska and Hawaii, USAREUR and 7th Army in Europe, and EUSA and 8th Army in Korea. In addition to conventional forces, the Regular Army provides the major special-operations-capable units (both land and air) in support of U.S. Special Operations Command.

d. The Army Campaign Plan redefined the organizations that support the Army into Army Commands (ACOM), Army Service Component Commands (ASCC), and Direct Reporting Units (DRU). ACOMs perform many Title 10 functions across multiple

disciplines. ASCCs are primarily operational organizations that serve as Army components for combatant commands. Combatant Commanders can designate ASCCs as Joint Forces Land Component Commands (JFLCC) or Joint Task Forces (JTF). DRUs consist of one or more units with institutional or operational functions and provide broad, general support to the Army in a single, unique discipline. Forces Command (FORSCOM), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and Army Material Command (AMC) are the only ACOMs. FORSCOM is both an ACOM and an ASCC.

e. Army IGs are assigned to Regular Army units in ACOMs, ASCCs, DRUs, corps, divisions, and selected separate brigades. In the institutional Army, aside from HQDA, IGs are assigned to the TRADOC centers and schools, AMC organizations (e.g., Communications and Electronics Command (CECOM)), Medical Command (MEDCOM) and its regional centers, and other commands. Generally, IGs at a given installation are assigned to the senior commander on that installation. Only a few selected installations like Fort Belvoir, Fort Meade, and Fort Dix have authorized IGs for the garrison commanders. Additionally, First Army, which has training and mobilization support requirements for Reserve Component organizations within continental United States (CONUS), has an IG assigned.

3. **Component 2, Army National Guard (ARNG).** The Army National Guard of the United States is an operational force that consists of federally recognized units and organizations of the ARNG. The ARNG has a dual mission that includes federal and state roles. In its federal role, sometimes referred to as Title 10, the ARNG provides trained units able to mobilize quickly for war, national emergencies, or other missions. The ARNG receives federal resources to meet its Title 10 requirements. In its state or Title 32 role, it prepares for domestic emergencies and other missions as required by state law. ARNG Soldiers serve as first responders within states during emergencies. Additionally, under Title 32, the ARNG provides forces for full-time support to homeland defense duty as well. Each of the 50 states, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands are authorized ARNG units.

a. "The National Guard Bureau (NGB) is a joint activity and is the channel of communications on all matters pertaining to the National Guard, between (1) the Departments of the Army and the Department of the Air Force, and (2) the several states," according to DoDD 5105.77. The Chief, NGB, is now a four-star general. The Secretaries of the Army and Air Force jointly develop and prescribe a charter for the NGB that covers the following matters: administration; unit structure; strength authorizations; training and discipline; and acquisition, supply, and accountability of property and equipment. While unit organization and structure is a federal matter, the states and territories retain the authority to fix the location of units and headquarters within their states. The Secretaries of the Army and Air Force detail Regular or Active Component commissioned officers and NCOs to duty with the National Guard of each state to facilitate; assist; and, under some provisions, command National Guard organizations.

b. National Guard units are commanded by their state executive, normally the governor, unless mobilized for federal missions. The governor normally executes command responsibilities through The Adjutant General (TAG) and Joint Forces Headquarters. Enlisted members of the ARNG are federally recognized when they enlist in a federally recognized organization and meet the qualification requirements for their position, grade, branch, and type of organization. Officers obtain federal recognition by

graduating from a military academy or officer's training camp under the supervision of an active component commissioned officer and, generally speaking, meeting the requirements for promotion and grade as specified in Title 10.

c. ARNG operational units are organized in the same manner as their active-component counterparts based on unit type and echelon of command. However, chains of command may be geographically separated and cross several state lines. This fact, in conjunction with limited training time and resources, creates challenges in achieving a high degree of collective training the Active Component does not routinely face. There are currently eight divisions along with numerous separate brigade and regimental organizations assigned to the ARNG.

d. IGs are assigned to the NGB, divisions, and selected separate brigades in the ARNG just as in the Active Component. Additionally, Active Component officers are assigned as Command IGs (known as State IGs) in the various states and territories. The State IG normally works directly for TAG and is senior-rated by the Chief, NGB. Active-Army IGs inspect, assist, and investigate matters of federal (Title 10) interest, but Active Component IGs are prevented from inspecting, investigating, or assisting activities that are of State (Title 32) interest.

4. **Component 3, United States Army Reserve (USAR).** The Army Reserve is the Army's primary Federal Reserve force; it includes all members of the reserve force not assigned to the ARNG. It is organized to complement the Regular Army or Active Component by providing specialized units, capabilities, and resources needed to deploy and sustain Army forces at home and overseas. The USAR is the major source of trained individual Soldiers for augmenting and filling vacancies in AC units.

a. The senior military official in the USAR has two missions: Commanding General of the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) and Chief, Army Reserve (CAR). USARC is a DRU to HQDA and commands all USAR units in CONUS not assigned to another command. Some examples of units not assigned to USARC are medical units assigned to their respective functional Active Component commands and Army Reserve units in Europe assigned to 7th ARCOM and reporting to U.S. Army European Command. Army Reserve units in Alaska, Hawaii, and Japan fall under 9th Regional Support Command (RSC) unless assigned to functional commands. USAR units not assigned to a functional command generally fall under one of the Regional Support Commands (RSCs). The RSCs provide regional command and control and base operational support. The Readiness Sustainment Brigades provide deployable headquarters capabilities.

b. IGs are assigned to USARC, the RSCs, selected functional organizations, and specific reserve installations such as Fort McCoy. The USAR is always in a federal status though its members are not always in a duty status. Therefore, USAR IGs can inspect, assist, and investigate all issues of Army interest in accordance with guidance in AR 20-1.

5. **Command and Control.** Due to the rapid reorganization of the Army, a detailed command-and-control structure in this guide will only be a snapshot at a given time. The most current versions at the time of publication of this guide are in Appendix C. These representations do not show the re-alignments of command often experienced during mobilizations and deployments.

Chapter 2

Categories of the Reserve Components

1. **Categories**: Individual participation in the Reserve Components is achieved through a variety of methods. Soldiers have the option to affiliate themselves, depending on their particular military qualifications and contractual obligations, with any of the different reserve categories. Depending on the Soldier's selected category, he or she may fall under a different command-and-control structure, which could change the approach when resolving complaints presented by the individual. The illustration below shows the three major categories of the Nation's total reserve manpower: Standby Reserve, Ready Reserve, and Retired Reserve.



2. **Standby Reserve:** The Standby Reserve consists of trained and Military Occupational Specialty Qualified (MOSQ) personnel who have mobilization potential but maintain their military affiliation without being in the Ready or Retired Reserve. Typically, they have been designated as key civilian employees or have a temporary hardship or disability. Examples of Standby Reserve Soldiers are Members of Congress, judges, and Department of the Army Civilians who hold positions at mobilization stations and who, in their civilian capacities, are considered essential to national security. These individuals are not required to perform training and are not members of RC units. They represent a pool of trained individuals who have completed their statutory obligation and who choose to remain affiliated with the Army.

a. The Standby Reserve is made up principally of individuals who represent a pool of trained individuals who have completed their statutory obligation and who choose to remain affiliated with the Army. They are not required to perform training and are not members of RC units. Standby Reserve categories include:

(1) Active Status List: Soldiers on the Active Status List may participate in Reserve training activities at no expense to the Government, earn retirement points, and be eligible for promotion. This category consists primarily of Soldiers who are temporarily medically disqualified, have a temporary hardship, reside overseas or have a missionary obligation, have been designated as key employees, are HIV positive, or have been approved under the provisions of AR 135-133 or by Secretarial authority.

(2) Inactive Status List: Soldiers on the Inactive Status List may not train for pay or retirement points and are not eligible for promotion. This category consists of designated key employees who do not request assignment to the Active Status List and general officers that no longer have a valid position commensurate with their grade.

b. In time of war or national emergency declared by Congress or when otherwise authorized by law, the Standby Reserve may be involuntarily mobilized for the duration plus six months.

3. **Ready Reserve:** The Ready Reserve consists of units of both the USAR and ARNG and individuals subject to active duty to augment the active forces in time of war or national emergency. The three sub-categories of the Ready Reserve are Individual Ready Reserve, Inactive National Guard, and the Selected Reserve.



a. **Individual Ready Reserve (IRR):** The IRR is the principal source of trained individuals for military manpower shortages in the active and reserve components in the event of a major or protracted operational contingency. IRR members bring both active and reserve units to wartime strength, replace unskilled personnel in critical positions, and provide an initial source of replacements. The IRR is comprised principally of MOSQ or partially qualified individuals who have previously served in the AC or in the selected reserve. IRR Soldiers either have some portion of their Military Service Obligation (MSO) remaining or voluntarily remain in the IRR beyond their obligation. Special non-pay programs provide IRR members a variety of professional assignments and opportunities for earning retirement points and benefits. Members of the IRR are subject to active duty (AD) for training and fulfillment of mobilization requirements. IRR categories include:

(1) Control Group (Annual Training)***:*** Personnel with some type of training requirement remaining on their initial obligation and less than 36 months of active duty.

(2) Control Group (IMA): Non-unit Soldiers who are assigned to authorized augmentation positions documented on Active Army organization Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDAs). These Soldiers are considered available for mobilization or national emergency and are required to perform at least 14 days of annual training (AT) per year.

(3) Control Group (Reinforcement): Personnel who may or may not have completed their initial service obligation.

(4) Control Group (Officer Active Duty Obligator): Officers who have been selected for active duty (AD) but who do not enter AD at the time of appointment. This group includes officers who request educational delay to attend graduate school, law school, seminary, etc.

(5) Control Group (Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)): This group includes contracted cadets in the Senior ROTC Program who have enlisted in the USAR.

(6) Control Group (Delayed Training Program (DTP)): Enlisted personnel who are awaiting initial active duty. These individuals cannot participate in reserve training.

(7) Control Group (Active Guard and Reserve (AGR)): Officer and enlisted personnel assigned to the Active Guard and Reserve Program (AGR).

b. **Inactive National Guard (ING):** The ING consists of members of the ARNG in an inactive status. Although attached to a specific unit for administrative purposes, they are not part of the Selected Reserve and do not participate in unit training activities and, hence, do not train for points and / or pay and are not eligible for promotion. Their personnel and pay records are maintained in their state. To remain in ING status, members must muster once a year with their assigned unit in their states for which they receive inactive duty training pay. They are available for involuntary active duty with the declaration of partial mobilization or a higher level of mobilization. Whereas IRR Soldiers are ordered to active duty as individuals, ING Soldier are ordered to active duty as members of the ARNG units to which they are attached.

c. **Selected Reserve:** The Selected Reserve is composed of units and individuals designated by the Army and approved by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), as essential to wartime missions. They have priority for training, equipment, and personnel over other reserve elements. The Selected Reserve consists of Soldiers who are classified as trained individuals assigned to National Guard units, USAR Troop Program Units (TPUs), Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA), or Soldiers serving in an Active Guard Reserve status. Selected Reserve members are paid for their military service through Inactive Duty Training (IDT) and various forms of Active Duty (AD), e.g., Active Duty for Training (ADT), and Active Duty for Operational Support (ADOS). Unit members are assigned to MTOE or TDA organizations and normally perform, at a minimum, 48 inactive-duty training assemblies and 14 days annual training per year.

4. **Retired Reserve:** The Retired Reserve comprises all RC officers and enlisted Soldiers who receive retirement pay or who are eligible to receive retirement pay upon reaching age 60 ("Gray Area" retirees) or earlier. Active Component retirees are included in the Retired Reserve. All retirees are subject to involuntary recall to active duty. Retirees represent a resource of trained individuals who may augment support and training facilities, relieve Active Component or Ready Reserve members for other duties, or perform operational missions as needed during a period of national emergency.

Chapter 3

Training Status and Compensation

1. To facilitate resolution of complaints, the IG will require a basic understanding of the different statuses within the various components, especially for matters concerning pay, chain of command, etc. AC basically has one status for pay -- Active Duty. However, RC has two categories of training status, Inactive Duty Training (IDT) and Active Duty, which have different rules of compensation for pay and retirement benefits.

2. **AC Training Status:** The AC is always active duty, receiving full pay and entitlements for every day of the year. Each day of federal active duty counts towards retirement eligibility. Pay includes base pay, housing allowance, and other specialty pay depending on the location and assignment of the Soldier. After successfully completing 20 years of federal active duty, the individual is entitled to full retirement benefits starting immediately upon retirement from active duty.

3. **RC Training Status:** The RC has two primary categories of training status -- Inactive Duty and Active Duty. These statuses are explained below. Each of these two categories is comprised of a number of statuses.

a. RC **Inactive Duty Training (IDT) Pay and Retirement Points:** Members of the Selected Reserve typically receive one day's basic pay (plus any entitled special pay) for each Unit Training Assembly (UTA) or Inactive Duty Training (IDT) period attended -- a day's pay for every four hours. IDT pertains to an individual's training status, pay status, and types of unit training. IDT is normally performed one weekend per month consisting of 16 hours (i.e., four days pay). Soldiers performing this duty are authorized to receive IDT pay without duty orders. Soldiers are members of a reserve or guard unit and paid based upon authorized IDT periods. The IDT period must be at least four hours in duration. Pay for this duty is based upon grade and years of service. This pay equates to 1/30th of the active component's monthly base pay. Allowances (BAH, BAS, etc.) are not paid during IDT. Members receive one retirement point for each four hours of duty performed. A maximum of 90 IDT points are allowed per year for retirement.

(1) **Unit Training Assemble (UTA):** An authorized and scheduled IDT of at least four hours. A Soldier may perform no more than two UTAs within a 24-hour period. A UTA is equal to one day's active base pay with no allowances or one retirement point, or both. Each unit member is authorized a minimum of 48 UTAs in a year. USAR Soldiers may not exceed 48 UTAs during any calendar year.

(2) **Multiple-Unit Training Assemblies (MUTA):** The IDT period has more than one UTA. A MUTA-4 is a typical IDT weekend that consists of a full Saturday and Sunday. There can also be MUTA-2s, MUTA-3s, and MUTA-5s.

(3) **Split-Unit Training Assembly (SUTA):** SUTAs are used primarily in the ARNG. Soldiers of the same unit perform IDT at separate times, locations, or both.

(4) **Additional Training Assembly (ATA):** Funds used to support additional unit training requirements. ATAs are closely controlled due to fiscal constraints. One ATA equals four hours of duty, one day of active-duty pay, and one retirement point.

(5) **Readiness Management Assembly (RMA**): Funds used to augment full-time staff. RMAs can be used for administrative or maintenance requirements. RMAs are closely controlled due to fiscal constraints. One RMA equals four hours of duty, one day of active duty pay, and one retirement point. RMAs may not be combined with any other type of duty during the same day.

b. **RC Active Duty Training Pay and Retirement Points:** During periods of active-duty training (such as Annual Training), members of the Selected Reserve receive basic pay plus all allowances like those for subsistence (BAS) and quarters (BAH). Total retirement points for a year are computed by adding all retirement points accrued from AD, IDT, and correspondence courses. One retirement point is accrued for each day of active duty.

(1) **Active Duty (AD):** Primarily used for collective-unit training. AD is also used for special projects, authorized military schools, and unit-support requirements. One active-duty day equals one day's pay with allowances. It also equates to one retirement point. This duty is performed in Title 10 status, so the Soldier is subject to the UCMJ.

(2) **Annual Training (AT):** Annual training is two weeks of active duty where RC units perform collective training as a unit. Some units, normally headquarters elements, are authorized to perform fragmented ATs spread out over the calendar year. Annual training may be used for authorized military schooling.

(3) **Initial Active Duty Training (IADT):** Initial training for RC personnel consists of basic training and advanced individual training or officer basic course (OBC). This training is performed with full allowances and can be performed as split training (BCT and AIT).

(4) **Active Duty for Training (ADT**): ADT is used for RC members enrolled in a military service school or DoD-approved school. It is used for MOS qualification or special-skills training. These funds are available for officers and enlisted personnel. The ARNG Soldier performs this training in a Title 32 status.

(5) RC-**Active Duty for Operations Support (ADOS):** This type of duty is used for temporary special-work projects for the ARNG or USAR. It is not intended to be used to fill full-time support personnel shortages. ADOS was formerly known as Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW).

(6) **Active Duty for Active Guard and Reserve (AGR):** Active Guard and Reserve Soldiers receive pay much like the Active Component Soldiers. ARNG AGR Soldiers can be in either Title 32 or Title 10 status. Both Title 32 and Title 10 AGRs receive pay from federal funding. USAR AGR Soldiers are always Title 10, federal duty status. Pay is for everyday of the year while on AGR status, including housing, and certain other allowances depending on the individual’s entitlements, as well as accruing leave. After 20 years of active service, the Soldier is entitled to full retirement benefits upon retiring from the Army and does not have to wait until age 60.

Chapter 4

Pay

1. **Introduction.** Pay issues are one of the leading causes of frustration among Soldiers and can consume a lot of time for IGs. Common causes for pay issues include Soldier or command errors and dealing with different pay systems. For example, ARNG Soldiers may change pay systems depending upon the type of transaction and status the Soldier is in at the time.

2. **Pay Systems:**

a. **Defense Joint Military Pay System-Active Component (DJMS-AC)**. This system is used to pay Active Army and AGR Soldiers. DJMS-AC supports allotments of pay. Once loaded onto this system, a Soldier automatically is paid every month until separation. Pay dates are the 1st and 15th of the month.

b. **Defense Joint Military Pay System-Reserve Component (DJMS-RC).** This system is used to pay traditional (Title 32) ARNG Soldiers (to include National Guard technicians) and USAR Soldiers (Title 10) for Inactive Duty Training (IDT), AT, and all other periods of active duty, to include mobilization. Unlike DJMS-AC, some type of transaction must be inputted in order for the system to generate pay. This system does not support pay allotments.

c. **Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS).** This system, which was never implemented, was designed to bridge the gap between the components in the finance and personnel functionalities with those in the other services. In a September 2009 Acquisition Decision Memorandum, DIHMRS was cancelled. The new Army system is called the Army Integrated Personnel and Pay System (IPPS). For more information, visit the Web site www.hrc.army.mil/site/armydimhrs/index.html.

d. **Defense Travel System (DTS).** Though not a pay system covering basic pay, DTS is used by all components to cover travel, including flight tickets, hotels, and per diem. The DTS Web site is http://www.defensetravel.osd.mil/dts/site/index.jsp.

3. **Common Pay Issues:** The Soldier can initiate resolution to most pay problems by working the issue through the chain of command. A useful tool is the DA Form 2142, Pay Inquiry, submitted by the Soldier through the command to the local finance office.

The IG can check with the local finance point of contact, who should be the DMPO Chief, Chief Military Pay, Detachment sergeant / commander, CSM, or battalion commander. Most military pay cases that are less than 12 months old should be resolved with the local finance office. USAFINCOM IG is appropriate if military pay cases are more than 12 months old or if related to DFAS travel. Another option for Soldiers is the ARNG Pay Ombudsman, toll free at 1-877-ARNGPAY or ARNG-MILPAY@ARNG-FSC.NGB.ARMY.MIL, or the USAR Pay Inquiry Hotline, toll free at 1-877-462-7782. Some common problem areas follow:

a. Travel Payments. Verify for accuracy and completeness the DD Form 1351-2 (Itinerary, signatures in blocks 20.a., 20.b., 21.a.), all orders and amendments, and receipts showing the "paid" status. Also, problems could arise when crossing the Fiscal Year (FY) -- New Line of Accounting.

b. Debts. To resolve debts, include the following supporting documents as needed: documents that originated the debt (if known), orders / amendments, travel vouchers with backup documentation, DA Form 5960 (BAH) with backup documentation, statement of charges or financial liability investigations of property loss, documents that refute the debt, and / or cash-collection voucher.

c. Support Cases (Garnishments). Supporting documents include the court order and SSN for the Soldier and ex-spouse / child's parent. The requestor for the support may not receive the full amount of court-ordered support / alimony since the limit for garnishment is 50 percent of the Soldier's 'disposable earnings if the Soldier is remarried and supporting a spouse and / or dependent child and 60 percent if the Soldier is single. Add five percent to those limits if the order states that the Soldier is 12 or more weeks behind in support payment. The individual requesting the support should work directly with the commander or DFAS for garnishment of the Soldier's pay.

d. Service Date Corrections. The personnel officer needs to sign the complete and correct DA Form 1506 and include pay date (PEBD) and total active federal military service date (TAFMSD) (BASD), contracts, orders, and all DD Form 214(s). Process this packet through the local Finance office, which submits it through the Case Management System to the Soldier Record Data Center (SRDC). SRDC verifies service dates and forwards it to DFAS through the Case Management System for processing.

e. Retired Recall Pay. The retiree-recalled Soldier pay accounts are placed in a non-entitled pay status with any accounts over six months manually rebuilt.

f. Retired Pay. Retired pay issues can include Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) and Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC). SBP is an insurance plan that will pay the surviving spouse a monthly payment (annuity) to help make up for the loss of the retirement income. Unfortunately, sometimes the current spouse is not the one listed on the SBP documents, so the pay goes to the previous spouse as designated in the insurance. CRSC are additional funds designed to compensate for the reduction of military retired pay due to the receipt of Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) compensation (also known as the VA waiver). With CRSC, the individual can receive either partial or full concurrent receipt of the military retirement pay and the VA disability compensation.

g. Leave. Common leave issues for Reserve Components include leave earned, taken, or sold when demobilized. Common leave issues for the AC include erroneous periods of leave charged, not paid for leave days sold, or lost leave though Special Leave Accrual (SLA). To look into any of these issues, ask for copies of leave form(s), leave control log(s), reenlistment paperwork, a memorandum from the commander specifying if leave was taken and, if SLA, a copy of the SLA-approval memorandum.

h. Civilian Pay. When assisting Civilian Pay cases, please ensure the complainant has gone to his / her customer service representative (CSR) office for assistance first. These cases must be opened on their behalf by their customer service representative

and forwarded to DFAS. All cases are assigned a Remedy number for tracking purposes.

4. **RC Pay Issues During the Mobilization and Demobilization Process:** There are several stages to the mobilization, deployment, and demobilization process. You should know what the phases are, what finance actions will take place, and who is responsible for each phase.

a. **Home-Station Processing:** Each state and USAR MSC conducts a Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP) check for the unit at home station. During the SRP, Soldiers in-process into active duty. One station will have finance personnel from the United States Property and Fiscal Office (USPFO for ARNG) or the USAR MSC, who will review the Soldier's pay account and ensure the Soldier is being properly paid all entitlements based on the supporting documentation. It is critical that Soldiers have copies of all the following documents with them:

(1) SF 1199A Direct-Deposit Form

(2) TD Form IRS W-4 and state tax withholding

(3) DA Form 5960 (BAH, with lease / mortgage)

(4) DA Form 4187 (COLA)

(5) SGLV Form 8286 SGLI / Family SGLI 8286A

(6) DD Form 1561 (Family Separation Allowance)

(7) DD Form 2367 (OHA)

(8) Orders supporting any special or incentive pays

b. **Mobilization Station Processing:** Soldiers will continue to in-process at the mobilization station. Their finance personnel will review the finance records again and check their pay account to make sure that the USPFO or USAR MSC started all entitlements. Soldiers will have an opportunity at this station to make corrections to their pay.

c. **Deployment Site:** This is where Soldiers will be performing their mission. Soldiers may move to more than one deployment site while mobilized. While at the deployment site, if the Soldier has any pay problems, the Soldier should make the first-line supervisor aware of the problem and seek assistance from the unit administrative staff. Most units have a Soldier assigned to act as a liaison between the Soldier with the pay problem and the servicing finance office. The active-duty servicing finance office is responsible to ensure all authorized entitlements are paid in a timely manner, to include theater-specific entitlements. As an IG dealing with a pay problem, get the chain-of-command involved as soon as possible.

d. **Demobilization Station Processing:** When Soldiers are released from active duty (REFRAD) and reassessed into the ARNG or USAR at the demobilization station, be sure all copies of all documents that authorize their entitlements are on hand. Each

Soldier's pay account will be reviewed for accuracy, and any required adjustments will be made. If there are any unresolved pay problems, this is the place to resolve them. Paying Soldiers in a timely and efficient manner requires coordinated actions among several offices. All Soldiers have a basic responsibility to do everything they can to ensure that their pay is correct.

e. **Home Station:** At home station, unit or MSC officials review Soldier pay accounts, assist in preparing final travel vouchers for submission to FINCOM, provide entitlements briefings, and resolve any remaining pay issues.

5. **Finance Command.** The Finance Command is one of the largest finance organizations in the world, spread out over several locations: Indianapolis (USAFINCOM IG Liaison Office, Army and Civilian pay, Cont Travel), Cleveland (Retiree and Navy pay, garnishments), Columbus (Vendor Pay, Travel), Kansas City (Marine Corps pay), Denver (debts, Air Force pay), and Rome (AD Travel). The Indianapolis facility houses the IG Liaison Office currently manned with two Army IG NCOs providing tech-channel support to field IGs. If the local IG has exhausted the support provided by the local finance office, the IG can contact the FINCOM IGs, preferably through e-mail at fincomig@dfas.mil or fincomig@ignet.army.mil for further assistance.

Chapter 5

Incapacitation Pay

1. **Incapacitation Pay (INCAP)**: This is an RC-unique program designed to provide financial relief to members who are physically injured, become ill, or contract a disease during any officially determined duty (IDT, AT or AD) or in a duty-related travel status as defined by AR 135-381, paragraph 1-5 or 1-6, resulting in an inability to perform normal military duties or a demonstrated loss of military income. Prerequisites of entitlement to incapacitation pay are inability to perform normal military duties or satisfactory demonstration of loss of non-military earned income. In the latter case, the Soldier bears the burden to prove the loss. Incapacitation Pay is approved by the USAR Soldier's RSC for the first 180 days. Requests beyond the first 180 days require USARC approval. ARNG Soldier approval authority is the state's Human Resource Officer (HRO) and NGB-ARP with claims submitted each month through the Soldier's administrative channels. A Line-of-Duty Investigation (LODI) has to be completed for all INCAP requests.

2. **Three Laws of INCAP Pay:**

a. Three basic laws or standards must be met in order for Soldiers to be eligible for INCAP pay:

(1) The injury or physical malady must result in loss of income to the Soldier.

(2) The injury or physical malady must preclude the Soldier from performing his or her civilian or military duties.

(3) A Line of Duty Investigation (LODI) must be conducted / approved and results in an "LOD - YES" determination by an Active Component medical doctor.

b. Other requirements and issues surrounding INCAP pay are as follows:

(1) Applicable references: AR 135-381, Incapacitation of Reserve Component Soldiers, AR 40-3, AR 600-8-1 (LOD), NGR 37-104-1, AR 135-200.

(2) Maximum amount payable for any given period is an amount equivalent to military pay and allowances for the period.

(3) Claims must be submitted and processed on a monthly basis following the month requested and are managed through command G-1 channels.

(4) Commanders of Regional Support Commands have the authority to approve up to 180 days of incapacitation pay. For claims over 180 days, the approval authority is USARC.

(5) Formal LODIs may be required for conditions such as heart attacks, stroke, genetic diseases, or previously existing conditions.

(6) Requires re-validation by an AC doctor every three months.

Chapter 6

Other Personnel Actions

1. **Personnel Acquisition**: There are different methods by which Soldiers are accessed into the various Army components at different ranks.

a. Enlistment of Soldiers directly from civilian life is a straightforward process: The individual enlists for an eight-year obligation in the Active Component, USAR, or ARNG and is contractually obligated to serve some portion in an Active, ARNG, or TPU unit (normally four to six years). The individual attends basic combat training and initial entry training (IET). The AC Soldier usually attends one after the other while the RC Soldier may split IET into increments over time up to two years.

b. Transfers between components: Soldiers who transfer into the RC from the AC enter at the last AC rank held and are credited with schooling completed during their AC tenure. The same is not true for enlisted reserve component Soldiers who transfer to the AC; they do not always retain their rank. Soldiers entering the other component to fill positions not within the scope of their MOS must attend the appropriate military schooling (RC or AC) in order to earn the appropriate MOS.

c. Warrant Officers (WO) may transfer between components, be appointed from within, or receive direct appointment as a prior-service warrant officer subject to MOS proponent technical certification. Transfers occur simply and without loss of time in service or skill qualification. Appointments consist of a three-step process requiring selection, successful completion of the Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS), and MOS qualification / proponent technical certification.

d. Officers can be commissioned through a Military Academy, ROTC, Officer Candidate School (OCS), or direct commission.

e. The Civilian-Acquired Skills Program (CASP) is an RC program that allows personnel to enter the Army at elevated pay grades or abbreviated training periods based upon previous training or experience. The program is focused primarily on individuals with skills applicable to the Army Medical Department (AMEDD), Judge Advocate General (JAG), or Chaplain (CHAP) branches.

f. The Simultaneous Membership Program (SMP) is designed to attract cadets into the USAR and ARNG. It involves the individual's participation in both college ROTC and an ARNG unit or USAR TPU as an active member. Pay and allowances are earned from both sources (ROTC and the RC unit). Moreover, the individual has the option of requesting active duty or a guaranteed assignment in the Reserve Component by signing a Guaranteed Reserve Forces Duty (GRFD) contract. RC participants in the SMP are non-deployable members of the Selected Reserve and remain in this status until their education is complete or they stop attending school.

2. **Promotions**: The various components of the Army have different sets of criteria for the promotion of Soldiers. Since the promotion systems are different between the components, misunderstandings and perceptions of unfair treatment quickly arise when

Soldiers working side by side do not get promoted at the same time. Generally speaking, AC Soldiers, once in a promotable status, are on an order-of-merit list with a sequence number and will be promoted in turn, regardless of what position he or she is currently assigned. However, the RC Soldiers need to be slotted in a position of that future grade before he or she can be promoted. References include:

a. AR 600-8-19, Enlisted Promotions and Reductions, which is a consolidated promotion and reduction policy for all elements of the Army.

b. Personnel Policy Guidance. Policy changes published by Department of the Army provide guidance during contingency operations. Personnel Policy Guidance, Chapter 13, establishes procedures, promotion authorities, and waivers for criteria still applicable to non-deployed or mobilized Soldiers. Current guidance is located at http://www.armyg1.army.mil/soldiers.asp.

c. U.S. Army Reserve Command Guidance. Current and superseded policy, clarifications, board announcements, and results may be found at the following Web site: https://www.hrc.army.mil.

Chapter 7

Mobilization, Deployment, and Demobilization Considerations

1. All components are eligible for deployments to various locations world-wide, and the deployment process is roughly the same for all components. Since the AC is already in an active status, the AC is usually ready to deploy in less time with minimal requirements to prepare and usually require only temporary change in station (TCS) orders. On the other hand, the reserve components usually need extra time to mobilize and complete certain training requirements. Depending on the mobilization phase, different command and control for the units could apply, so it is important to know which command / commander has the authority to take corrective actions, cut orders, release Soldiers back to home station, etc. Depending on the severity of the emergency, crisis, or conflict, a different number of personnel can be sent into that area of conflict / operation. The various types of mobilization require authorization and approval at different levels from the President and the Congress. The five types of mobilization and the approval authorities are further explained in Appendix D.

2. **Mobilization Process:** RC unit commanders must continually plan for mobilization and be ready to marshal their unit efficiently and then move them expeditiously to assigned power-projection platforms within CONUS. Accordingly, they must prepare their post-mobilization training plans in order to enhance power-projection-platform training. Moreover, unit mobilization plans / files must be organized to expedite the myriad of personnel and unit administrative requirements throughout the mobilization process. The mobilization process is divided into five phases:

a. **Phase I - Planning**: This phase includes the normal day-to-day endeavors of each unit at its home station during peacetime. During this phase, units plan, train, and prepare to accomplish assigned mobilization missions, to include:

(1) Preparing mobilization plans and files.
(2) Attending mobilization planning conferences.
(3) Providing required planning data to the power-projection platforms.
(4) Conducting mobilization training and developing post mobilization training plans.
(5) Preparing movement plans.
(6) Completing as much administrative processing as possible, to include annual Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP).

b. **Phase II - Alert**: This phase includes all actions taken by a unit following receipt of the official alert. The unit takes specific actions, in accordance with their MOB plans, to prepare for transition from RC to AC status. Actions such as personnel screening and cross-leveling of equipment occur during this phase. This phase ends with the effective date of mobilization of the unit at Home Station. Additional tasks to be executed during this time include the following:

(1) Dental screening
(2) Procuring Common Access Cards (CAC)
(3) Medical records review
(4) DA Form 2-1 review (certified military records)

(5) Judge Advocate General (JAG) brief
(6) Military pay records review

c. **Phase III - Home Station (HS)**: This phase begins on the effective date of the unit mobilization. The unit becomes Title 10 (active duty) upon the E-date and the start of this phase. It comes under the command and control of the Continental United States Army. Actions taken include:

(1) Inventory and loading of unit property
(2) Dispatch of the advance party to the PSP (Power-Support Platform)
(3) Dispatch of organic equipment and vehicles to PSP
(4) Movement of main body
(5) Movement by commercial transportation of personnel and equipment in excess of organic capability
(6) Initiation of active-duty pay and allowances

d. **Phase IV - Power-Projection Platform**: This phase begins with the unit's arrival at the power-projection platform (PPP). The PPP commander assumes overall command of the unit. This phase includes all actions necessary for the unit to meet the deployment criteria stipulated by the theater warfighting Combatant Commander. Actions include:

(1) Processing of personnel and equipment
(2) Accession of the unit into the active structure
(3) Conducting required individual or collective METL training
(4) Completing predeployment SRP / Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM)
(5) Unit validation for deployment

e. **Phase V - Port of Embarkation (POE):** This phase completes the CONUS-based mobilization process. It includes all activities at the Seaport of Embarkation (SPOE) and / or Airport of Embarkation (APOE). These activities include the loading of equipment and the manifesting and loading of personnel.

3. **Deployment:** Some mobilized USAR or ARNG Soldiers deploy overseas while some remain within the U.S. in support of various missions. Though the AC does not mobilize or demobilize, these Soldiers still deploy as well. The deployment issues are often the same across the components and, since all are now Title 10 Federal, same regulations also often apply. Some common areas of concern are listed below.

a. Nonsupport of Family Members: AR 608-99, Family Support, Child Custody, Paternity, applies to all Soldiers on active duty for more than 30 days. The Soldiers have certain responsibilities to their dependents, and commanders have the responsibility to enforce this requirement. IGs are limited to two actions: First, checking for immediate needs -- food and shelter -- and referring the Family members to organizations which can assist as needed. Second, to ensure the commander is aware of the situation and takes action in accordance with AR 608-99. Commanders need to address any questions pertaining to the Soldier’s and Family member’s responsibilities and requirements by working closely with the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) -- not the IG.

b. Pay issues: The overall pay amount will usually change during deployments. Additional pay sometimes includes hazardous duty, Family separation, etc. Not all

service members will be entitled to all types of pay. Pay will depend on the status of the Soldier, the type of orders the Soldiers deployed under, etc. To resolve pay issues, work with the personnel and the finance sections within the units / commands as well as the local finance office. Personnel sections should be able to provide orders and entitlement lists, and Finance can verify implementation of these entitlements.

c. Leave: All components, once on active duty for 30 days, earn leave. While deployed, not everyone will be able to take leave pending mission requirements and commander's policies. Upon redeployment, leave will need to be either taken or, for those who will demobilize, cashed-out.

d. Orders: The most common deployment orders come in the form of Temporary Change of Station (TCS) orders. These orders temporarily assign the Soldier to another duty location without placing him or her in a Temporary Duty status. TCS orders can be amended along the way to meet operational requirements, including extending the amount of time deployed.

4. **Demobilization Process:** Demobilization planning runs concurrently with mobilization planning. It ends with the decision to release RC units and individuals from active duty. Commanders must ensure that their Soldiers receive the following documentation / briefings before completion of the demobilization process and return to home station. Leaders at all levels need to be aware of all medical issues within their respective commands. Many Soldiers are simply signing medical waivers at the PPP so they will not be medically screened. These service members are trying to expedite the medical process so they can get home sooner. However, in the long run, Soldiers end up reporting injuries / illnesses after they return home, which causes problems for the Soldier and ends up costing the Army money better used for unit readiness and warfighting. Demobilization actions include:

a. Receive medical / dental care and appropriate records
b. Update finance / personnel records
c. Leave settlement -- either take or sell
d. Receive required legal and entitlement briefings (re-employment rights)
e. Assess Line of Duty (LOD) determination, if required
f. Complete DD Form 214 (Certificate of release or discharge from active duty), except for Title 10 AGR or AC Soldiers

Chapter 8

Re-Employment Rights

1. **Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA).** Congress provided clear protection for all members of the uniformed services (including non-career National Guard and Reserve members, as well as active-duty personnel) in October 1994 with passage of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), Chapter 43 of Title 38, U. S. Code. The U.S. Department of Labor, through the Veterans Employment and Training Service (VET), provides assistance with respect to employment and reemployment rights and benefits under USERRA. The law:

a. Expands coverage to include specifically the Public Health Service, the Coast Guard, and others designated by the President in time of war or emergency.

b. Places a five-year limit (with some exceptions) on the cumulative length of time a person may serve in the armed forces and remain eligible for reemployment rights with the pre-service employer.

c. Requires an individual to give written or verbal notice to his or her employer prior to departure for military service.

2. **Ombudsman Services:** Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) is a Department of Defense organization. It is a staff group within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD / RA), which is in itself a part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. ESGR was established in 1972 to promote cooperation and understanding between RC members and their civilian employers and to assist in the resolution of conflicts arising from an employee's military commitment. It is the lead DoD organization for this mission under DoD Directive 1250.1, National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (NCESGR), certified current as of 23 April 2007.

a. Trained ESGR volunteers and the Ombudsmen Services national staff are available to respond promptly to inquiries and conflicts presented by employees or employers. More than 95 percent of all such requests for assistance are resolved in this informal process. Many problems result from poor communication between employers and their employees or from a lack of familiarization with the rights and responsibilities of each as defined by law. Today, ESGR operates through a network of thousands of volunteers throughout the nation and Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

b. ESGR Ombudsmen are a resource for employers and members of the National Guard and Reserve and can be reached via e-mail at USERRA@osd.mil or by phone at (800) 336-4590. See ESGR Resources page on the Web site www.esgr.org for additional information.

Chapter 9

Retirement, Transition Initiatives, and Separations

1. **Transitions Out of Service.** Soldiers from all three components transition out of service or between services for various reasons.

2. **Separations.** Separations occur for a variety of reasons: chapter actions, completing service obligations, change in status, or retirement. If leaving active duty, the DD Form 214 reflects favorable and unfavorable separations with a reenlistment eligibility code for future active-duty allowances or restrictions.

3. **Retirement.** Retirement benefits are a major source of compensation for RC participation. RC members must document the service they performed in order to be eligible for retirement, and they must request retirement benefits once they have accumulated sufficient qualifying years.

4. **Retired Reserve:** The Retired Reserve comprises all RC officers and enlisted Soldiers who receive retirement pay or who are eligible to receive retirement pay upon reaching age 60 ("Gray Area" retirees). AC retirees are included in the Retired Reserve. All retirees are subject to involuntary recall to active duty. Retirees represent a resource of trained individuals who may augment support and training facilities, relieve AC or Ready Reserve members for other duties, or perform operational missions as needed during a period of national emergency.

a. Eligibility for retirement differs between the AC and RC.

(1) **AC.** Eligibility for full retirement after 20 years of federal active duty starting the first day of retirement.

(2) **ARNG.** Eligibility for retirement after 20 'good' years (see paragraph 3-3 in this part of the guide) starting at age 60.

(3) **USAR.** Eligibility for retirement after 20 'good' years (see paragraph 3-3 in this part of the guide) starting at age 60.

b. One RMA equals four hours of duty, one day of active-duty pay, and one retirement point. One ATA equals four hours of duty, one day of active-duty pay, and one retirement point. A maximum of 90 IDT (i.e., UTA, ATA, or RMA) points are allowed per year for retirement. A UTA is equal to one day's active base pay with no allowances and one retirement point. Retirees can work for additional retirement points without the pay. Each unit member is authorized a minimum of 48 UTAs in a year. Every day of AD also equates to one retirement point.

c. Fifty (50) retirement points (AD + IDT + correspondence course points) = one (1) qualifying year or 'good year' for retirement. Qualifying years exceeding 50 points equate to greater retirement compensation. RC personnel can retire upon completion of 20 qualifying years but do not receive retirement pay until age 60. Eligible RC members must request retirement pay when they reach age 60.

d. Retirement is based on time in grade and retirement points. A Soldier can start drawing retirement at age 60 if he or she serves 20 'good years', defined as a minimum accrual of 50 retirement points in a one-year period, and requests the retirement pay. The FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (P.L. 110-181) reduced the age at which a member of the Ready Reserve can draw retirement pay by three months for every aggregate 90 days of active duty performed after 28 January 2008, not to be reduced below age 50. Congress is considering legislation to change the "after" date to 11 September 2001.

e. ARNG and USAR retirees, younger than age 60 and known as 'gray area' retirees, are eligible for many of the same benefits available to AC retirees (or to them at age 60). For example, 'gray area' retirees can use the commissary, the PX, other installation facilities, limited legal assistance, Space-A Travel, and the Armed Forces Recreation Clubs (AFRCs). The 'gray area' retirees do not have medical or dental benefits. And, of course, the 'gray area' retiree is not receiving retirement pay. For the latest benefits, visit https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/Reserve/soldierservices/retirement/grayarea.htm.

f. Retiring ARNG and USAR Soldiers can use the Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP) to help with the transition from active duty.

Appendix A

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AASF	Army Aviation Support Facility (ARNG)
AC	Active Component
ACOM	Army Command
AD	Active Duty
ADA	Additional Drill Assembly
ADME	Active Duty Medical Extension
ADOS	Active Duty for Operational Support
ADSW	Active Duty for Special Work
ADT	Active Duty Training
AFS	Active Federal Service
AFTP	Additional Flight Training Periods
AGR	Active Guard Reserve
AIT	Advanced Individual Training
AMEDD	Army Medical Department
AMOS	Additional Military Occupational Specialty
AMSA	Army Maintenance and Support Activity (USAR)
ANCOC	Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course
ANG	Air National Guard
APFT	Army Physical Fitness Test
APOE	Air Port of Embarkation
AR	Army Regulation
ARCOM	Army Reserve Command
ARE	Army Reserve Element
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARNGRC	Army National Guard Readiness Center
ARNGUS	Army National Guard of the United States
ARSTAFF	Army Staff, Department of Army
ASCC	Army Service Component Command
ASL	Authorized Stockage List
AT	Annual Training
AUS	Army of the United States
AUSA	Association of the United States Army
ATA	Additional Training Assembly
AVCRAD	Aviation Classification and Repair Depot
BAS	Basic Allowance Subsistence
BASOPS	Base Operations
BCT	Basic Combat Training
BNCOC	Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course
C2	Command and Control
CA	Combat Arms
CAR	Chief, Army Reserve
CASP	Civilian Acquired Skills Program
CC	Combatant Commander
CG	Commanding General
CGSC	Command and General Staff College

CHAP	Chaplain
CINC	Commander-in-Chief (President)
CJCS	Chief, Joint Chief of Staff
CNGB	Chief, National Guard Bureau
COMPO	Component
CONUS	Continental United States
CONUSA	Continental United States Army
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CS	Combat Support
CSA	Chief of Staff, Army
CSB	CONUS Sustaining Base
CSMS	Command Support Maintenance Shop (ARNG)
CSS	Combat Service Support
CTA	Common Table of Allowances
CTT	Common Task Training
DA	Department of the Army
DAC	Department of the Army Civilian
DAMPL	Department of the Army Master Priority List
DARC	District Area Command
DANG	Director, Air National Guard
DARNG	Director, Army National Guard
DIVEX	Division - Exercise
DIVIT	Division - Institutional Training
DMOSQ	Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualified
DoD	Department of Defense
DOR	Date of Rank
DPP	Dedicated Procurement Program
DRC	Direct Reporting Command
DRCS	Director of Reserve Component Support
DRMO	Defense Re-utilization and Marketing Office
DRC	Direct Reporting Command
DRU	Direct Reporting Unit
DTIG	Deputy The Inspector General
DTP	Delayed Training Program
EAATS	Eastern ARNG Aviation Training Site (ARNG)
EAC	Echelon Above Corps
EAD	Echelon Above Division
EB	Enhanced Brigade
ECS	Equipment Concentration Sites
ESGR	Employer’s Support of the Guard and Reserve
EOH	Equipment on Hand
ERC	Equipment Readiness Code
ERF	Early Reinforcing Forces
FSP	Force Support Package
ET	Equivalent Training
FAD	Force Activity Designator
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FOA	Field Operating Agency
FORMDEPS	FORSCOM Mobilization & Deployment Planning System
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FTM	Full-Time Manning

FTS	Full-Time Support
FTSMD	Full-Time Support Management Directorate
FTTD	Full-Time Training Duty
FTS	Full-Time Support
FTUS	Full-Time Unit Support
FY	Fiscal Year
GSU	Garrison Support Unit
GMR	Graduated Mobilization Response
GOCOM	General Officer Command
GOMO	General Officer Management Office
GS	General Schedule
HIV	Human Immune Deficiency Virus
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
HRC	Human Resources Command
HRMO	Human Resources Management Office
HS	Home Station
IADT	Initial Active Duty Training
IAW	In Accordance With
IDT	Inactive Duty Training
IET	Initial Entry Training
ILE	Intermediate Level Education
IMA	Individual Mobilization Augmentee
IMAAR	Installation Management Agency Army Reserve
INCAP	Incapacitation Pay
ING	Inactive National Guard
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
JAG	Judge Advocate General
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center
JFLCC	Joint Forces Land Component Command
JFHQ	Joint Force Headquarters
JFHQ	Joint Force Headquarters
JTF	Joint Task Force
LOD	Line of Duty
LODI	Line of Duty Investigation
M-Day	Mobilization Day
MAC	Maneuver Area Command
MATES	Mobilization and Training Equipment Sites
MEB	Medical Evaluation Board
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MFTR	Multi-Functional Training Regiment (ARNG)
MILTECH	Military Technician
MMRB	Medical Occupational Specialty Medical Retention Board
MOB	Mobilization
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MOSQ	Military Occupational Specialty Qualification
MPRJ	Military Personnel Records Jacket
MRC	Major Regional Contingency
MS	Mobilization Station
MSC	Major Subordinate Command
MSO	Military Service Obligation

MTOE	Modified Table of Organization & Equipment
MTU	Marksmanship Training Unit (ARNG)
MUTA	Multiple Unit Training Assembly
MWR	Morale, Welfare, and Recreational
MYOS	Maximum Years of Service
NCOES	Noncommissioned Officer Education System
NDA	National Defense Act
NDST	Non-dual Status Technician
NG	National Guard
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NGR	National Guard Regulation
NGUS	National Guard of the United States
NLRB	National Labor Relations Board
NMS	National Military Strategy
NPS	Non-Prior Service
NTC	National Training Center
CCC	Captain's Career Course
OBC	Officer Basic Course
OCAR	Office of the Chief, Army Reserve
OCONUS	Outside Continental United States
OCS	Officer Candidate School
ODT	Overseas Deployment Training
OMAR	Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve
OMARNG	Operations and Maintenance, Army National Guard
OMS	Organizational Maintenance Site
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPMS	Officer Personnel Management System
OPSEC	Operations Security
ORE	Organizational Readiness Evaluation
OSUT	One Station Unit Training
PEB	Physical Evaluation Board
PEBD	Pay Entry Basic Date
PLDC	Primary Leadership Development Course
PLL	Prescribed Load List
PMOS	Primary Military Occupational Specialty
POE	Port of Embarkation
POM	Preparation for Overseas Movement
PPBES	Planning, Programming, Budget & Execution System
PPG	Personnel Policy Guidance
PRIMUS	Primary Care for the Uniformed Services
PRC	Presidential Reserve Call-Up
RA	Regular Army
RASL	Reserve Active Status List
RC	Reserve Component
REFRAD	Release from Active Duty
RMA	Readiness Management Assemblies
ROPMA	Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
RPA	Reserve Personnel Army
RPAS	Retirement Points Accounting System
RRC	Regional Readiness Command

RRG	Regional Readiness Group
RSC	Regional Support Command
RST	Rescheduled Training
RTAP	Reserve Transition Assistance Program
RTB	Regional Training Brigades
RTD	Resident Training Detachment
RTI	Regional Training Institute (ARNG)
RTS-M	Regional Training Site-Maintenance (ARNG)
RTT	Resident Training Teams
RTU	Reinforcement Training Unit
SADT	Special Active Duty for Training
SCMJ	State Code of Military Justice
SDF	State Defense Forces
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SFR	Standard Federal Region
SI	Support Installation
SJAG	Staff Judge Advocate General
SMOS	Secondary Military Occupational Specialty
SMP	Simultaneous Membership Program
SNCOC	Senior Noncommissioned Officer Course
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SPOE	Seaport of Embarkation
SRAA	Senior Regular Army Advisor (USAR)
SRAAG	Senior Regular Army Adviser to the Guard (ARNG)
SRP	Soldier Readiness Processing
SUTA	Split Unit Training Assembly
TAG	The Adjutant General
TAM	Training Assessment Model
TASS	The Army School System
TERARC	Territorial Area Command
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
TIG	The Inspector General or Time In Grade
TIS	Time In Service
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOM-D	Training, Operations, Mobilization and Deployment
TPU	Troop Program Unit
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
TSD	Training Support Division
TTAD	Temporary Tour of Active Duty
UP	Unsatisfactory Participation
USACAPOC	U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Ops Cmd
USAR	U.S. Army Reserve
USARC	U.S. Army Reserve Command
USAREC	U.S. Army Recruiting Command
USAREUR	U.S. Army Europe
USARFS	U.S. Armed Forces School
USARPAC	U.S. Army Pacific
USASOC	U.S. Army Special Operations Command
USC	United States Code
USPFO	U.S. Property and Fiscal Officer (ARNG / ANG)
USR	Unit Status Report

UTA	Unit Training Assembly
UTES	Unit Training Equipment Site (ARNG)
WG	Wage Grade (Civilian)
WT	War Trace
WL	Work Leader (Civilian)
WOCS	Warrant Officer Candidate School

Appendix B

Legal Basis

1. **Components and Authority:** There are three components of the U.S. Army: the Regular Army (RA) or Active Component (AC), the Army National Guard (ARNG), and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). The authority for the ARNG is derived from the Constitution. The general and permanent laws governing the ARNG are contained in Title 10 of the U.S. Code; however, the policy for the employment of the ARNG is found in Titles 10 and 32 of the U.S. Code. The authority for the USAR is found within Title 10 of the U.S. Code.

2. **Article 1, Section 8, U.S. Constitution**: The "Militia Clause" of the Constitution authorizes the existence of the state militia (later known as the National Guard). Simply stated, it gives Congress the right to organize, arm, and discipline the militia while allowing the states certain management prerogatives, including the appointment of officers and the authority to train. Other articles and sections of the Constitution discuss the AC and other aspects of the Armed Forces.

3. **Title 10, U.S. Code (10 USC):** 10 USC contains the general and permanent laws governing the Armed Forces. Various sections of Title 10 establish and govern the RC. The role of the RC, as stated in Section 10102, Title 10, is "to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces in time of war or, national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require."

4. **Title 32, U.S. Code (32 USC):** 32 USC contains the specific laws and policies for the organization, funding, and employment of the ARNG. It states that Army National Guard units shall be ordered to federal active duty and retained as long as necessary whenever Congress determines they are needed. Specifically, the general policy in 32 USC (Section 102) states: "In accordance with the traditional military policy of the United States, it is essential that the strength and organization of the Army National Guard and Air National Guard as an integral part of the first line of defenses of the United States be maintained and assured at all times. Whenever Congress determines that more units and organizations are needed for the national security than are in the regular components of the ground and air forces, the Army National Guard of the United States, and the Air National Guard of the United States, or such part of them as are needed, together with such units of other reserve components as are necessary for a balanced force, shall be ordered to active Federal duty and retained as long as so needed."

Appendix C

Command and Control / Organizational Charts



Figure 1. AC - Command and Control



Figure 2. ARNG - Command and Control -- Title 32



Figure 3. ARNG - Command and Control -- Title 10



Figure 4. USAR - Command and Control

Appendix D

Types of Mobilization

1. **Graduate Mobilization Response.** A key aspect of the mobilization-level concept is Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR) actions. GMR is a flexible, decision-making process. It triggers five levels of response options that can be adjusted to the degree of severity and ambiguity of warning indicators or an event. These options allow the Government to take small or large, often reversible, steps to increase our national security emergency preparedness posture. When planning, commanders and staff officers should understand that a lower level of mobilization does not necessarily precede a higher level of mobilization.

2. **Levels of Mobilization.** There are five levels of mobilization. Generally, the magnitude of the emergency governs the call or level of mobilization. As authorized by law or congressional resolution, and when directed by the President, the Department of Defense mobilizes all or part of the Armed Forces within the parameters of those levels.

a. **Selective Mobilization (10 USC, sections 331 / 332 / 333).** For a domestic emergency, the Congress or the President may order expansion of the active Armed Forces by mobilization of RC units and / or individual reserve Soldiers to deal with a situation where the Armed Forces may be required to protect life, federal property, and functions or to prevent disruption of federal activities. A selective mobilization would not be associated with a requirement for contingency plans involving external threats to the national security. Selective Mobilizations are:

(1) Directed by President or Congress.

(2) For peacetime domestic emergency.

(3) Not associated with external threats.

(4) For selected units.

b. **Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) (10 USC, section 12304).** Under the PRC, the President has the power to activate up to 200,000 Selected Reserve members involuntarily for 270 days without declaring a national emergency. He may use the authority when he determines it necessary to augment the active forces for any operational mission. This authority is not meant to circumvent existing controls on active-duty end strengths through successive call-ups of reserve Soldiers. Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up is:

(1) Directed by Presidential Executive Order.

(2) For up to 200,000 troops for up to 270 days, including up to 30,000 IRR Soldiers.

(3) To meet any operational mission requirements.

(4) Done without a prior declaration of war or national emergency.

c. **Partial Mobilization (10 USC, section 12302).** For a contingency operation or war plan, or upon declaration of a national emergency, the Congress or the President may order augmentation of the active Armed Forces (short of full mobilization) by mobilizing up to one million members of the Ready Reserve (units and individuals) for up to 24 months. Actually, only the one-million-member ceiling limits the President. Congress may establish any limit desired in a congressionally declared partial mobilization and may exceed the 24-month limitation imposed on the President. Partial Mobilization:

(1) Requires Presidential or Congressional proclamation of national emergency.

(2) Requires an Executive Order or Congressional Declaration.

(3) May call up to 1,000,000 troops of the Ready Reserve for up to two years (24 consecutive months of active duty).

(4) May include the involuntary mobilization of IRR.

d. **Full Mobilization (10 USC, section 12301(a)).** Full mobilization requires passage by the Congress of a public law or joint resolution declaring war or a national emergency. It involves the mobilization of all RC units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reserve Soldiers, and the material resources needed for this expanded force structure. Full mobilization:

(1) Requires Public Law or Joint Resolution of Congress.

(2) Requires a declared war or national emergency.

(3) Involves all remaining RC units (IMA and IRR).

e. **Total Mobilization (10 USC, section 12301 (a)).** Total mobilization involves expansion of the active Armed Forces by organizing and / or activating additional units beyond the existing approved force structure to respond to requirements of the emergency and the mobilization of all natural resources needed, to include production facilities to sustain such forces. Congressional authorization is required for these actions. Total mobilization includes:

(1) Public law or a Joint Resolution of Congress.

(2) Expansion of active armed forces.

(3) Expansion of the industrial base.

(4) Generation of new units as required.

Appendix E

Army Forces Generation

1. **Definition.** The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model replaced the Cold War-era's linear model of tiered readiness and sequential deployment with a 21st-Century rotational model based on progressive readiness and cyclical deployments. The ARFORGEN process is responsible for efficiently managing and executing the Army's force generation by addressing the four Rs: rebalancing, resetting, recapitalizing, and redeploying. It is requirements-driven and capabilities-based, with a structured progression of increased unit readiness over time.



Figure 1. MSE as a "Component of ARFORGEN"

2. **The Model.**

a. The ARFORGEN system places units in one of three force pools:

(1) An initial Reset / Train pool for units redeploying from long operations

(2) A Ready pool that includes modular units assessed as “ready” to conduct mission preparation and training

(3) An Available pool that includes modular units assessed as “available” to conduct missions in support of any regional Combatant Commander or serve as rapidly deployable contingency forces.

b. If required, units in the Ready pool can be resourced and committed to meet surge operational needs.

c. All active- and reserve-component units pass through the Available pool under this cyclical approach. Active units are in the one-year window of the Available pool every three years, Army Reserve units are available every five years, and Army National Guard units are available every six years.

Source: An article in the Army News Service by COL Randy Pullen, dated 1 November 2005, reporting on remarks by General Daniel McNeill.



Figure 2. Maturing the Model and Refining the Process

Appendix F

Considerations for the Four IG Functions

1. **Introduction**. For full spectrum operations, the four IG functions of inspections, assistance, investigations, and teaching and training are constant during peace and war or contingency operations where only the conditions change but not the functionalities. The same holds true when considering the various components. The four IG functions remain constant, though the execution of these functions might require some considerations to fit into the various components' timelines and cultures.

2. **Inspections.** Inspections, though time consuming, remain a proactive valuable tool throughout all components. Identifying root causes, recommending ways to fix problems, and ensuring resolution through follow-up are still the best resources to enhance readiness and warfighting capabilities within the command. The 17-step inspections process is time consuming since it requires research, planning, training, execution, analysis, writing reports, etc. The Active Component can work on all these requirements in a continuous flow from start until completion. Though the Reserve Components do as well, the timeline can easily be months instead of weeks. For example, the time required to train the inspections teams for the AC could be about a week, which equals a couple of months in the RC since they only have an average of two days a month to train. If the units to be inspected are geographically dispersed from the headquarters, travel rules need to be monitored. Reserve component Soldiers are limited with travel restrictions -- TDY on an IDT weekend is not usually authorized. The Soldiers need to be brought onto a different duty status, which is at times limited for commands as it is a funding issue. For specific requirements such as initial command inspection timelines and Intelligence Oversight, follow AR 1-201 and The Inspections Guide.

3. **Assistance.** Assistance is the majority workload for the IG. Considerations include using full-time personnel to work time-sensitive assistance cases that cannot wait for the battle assembly or drill weekend. But always try to have some assistance cases available to work for the RC Soldiers to keep them actively involved in the office (helps morale, retention, and recruiting efforts) as well as allow them to do the jobs they have been trained to do. RC Soldiers will usually have been in the unit for a while prior to becoming an IG. They know by face and name who can fix which problems and can be much more effective in quick problem resolution than a new IG coming into the unit. Also, be aware that some regulations don't apply to all components; always check the applicability of the regulation and the complainant's status to ensure proper standards are used for problem resolution.

4. **Investigations.** Investigations require planning and coordination, which is usually easy in the AC world and can be a bit more challenging in the RC. Scheduling an interview can take several months based on the mission of the unit and the availability of the witness, subject, or suspect. Also, consider not using the TPU or M-day Soldiers to conduct the face-to-face or telephonic interviews since these Soldiers will more than likely end up back in the same unit after the IG tour, often working for the person they interviewed and possibly substantiated an allegation against. If possible, the AGR or other full-time support personnel in the IG office should conduct these interviews since

the AGR Soldiers are more likely to move to another unit upon completion of the tour. Use your TPU or M-day Detailed IGs to peer-review your cases and your ROI / ROIIs.

5. **Teaching and Training.** The teaching and training function remains the underlying strength for the other three functions. Considerations include the train-up time required. The reserve components training might take longer looking at calendar days since they are not usually available for consecutive days.

6. **Coverage and Office Location.** Some Reserve Component IGs might be able to collocate with another IG office in the same general geographical area to provide continuous IG coverage in between battle assemblies / drill weekends. Another possibility, if the civilian-life / job requirements of the IG permit, is for the IG to RST and be available on a certain day of the week for four hours and then for just a few hours on the battle assembly / drill weekend. This approach would allow the IG to interact / coordinate with the other agencies usually not available on weekends to fix problems such as finance office, personnel offices, Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) office, Army Community Services (ACS), and Family Advocacy.

Part 7

Fort Von Steuben

Table of Contents

Fort Von Steuben

Installation Facts

Fort Von Steuben is located 70 miles southwest of Richmond, Virginia, and includes two sub-posts, Conway Army Airfield (CAAF) and Camp William North. Fort Von Steuben was one of the original sites where the Continental Army mobilized and trained during the Revolutionary War.

CAAF is located 11 miles northeast of main post and is the home of the 66th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB). Formerly a USAF base, the airfield was transferred to the Army and Fort Von Steuben in 1973.

Camp William North, located 43 miles north of Fort Von Steuben, is home of the 46th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) of the Virginia Army National Guard (VAARNG), and Headquarters, 44th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) (II Corps). Elements of the VAARNG, as well as USAR units from Virginia, West Virginia, and North Carolina, use the camp extensively for training and equipment storage.

The 66th Infantry Division, located on main post, is subordinate to II Corps. The division consists of four active-component brigade combat teams.

FORT VON STEUBEN DATA

Size:	127,988 acres
Main Post	77,139 acres
CAAF	5,651 acres
Camp William North	45,198 acres
Maneuver area:	84,837 acres
Impact area:	26,671 acres
Cantonment area:	2,040 acres
Maintenance space:	310,004 sq ft
Average temperature:	54 degrees Fahrenheit
Average snowfall per year:	15 inches
Active-duty Soldiers:	16,324
Civilian work force:	3,450
Family members:	21,765
Retirees:	2,209
Number of on-post housing units:	3,172
Bachelor officer quarters:	196
Bachelor senior NCO quarters:	58
Barracks spaces available:	8,462
Reserve Component personnel:	
Attending annual training:	26,802
Attending weekend training:	11,653
Mobilization population:	45,554

66th Infantry Division

1st BCT
1st BCT Special Troops
Battalion (STB)
4th Squadron, 6th CAV (RSTA)
1-66 IN (CAB)
1-79 AR (CAB)
1-60 FA
1st BDE Support Battalion

2nd BCT
2nd BDE STB
5th Squadron, 6th CAV (RSTA)
2-66 IN (CAB)
2-79 AR (CAB)
2-60 FA
2nd BDE Support Battalion

3rd BCT
3rd BDE STB
3rd Squadron, 6th CAV (RSTA)
4-66 IN (CAB)
3-79 AR (CAB)
3-60 FA
3rd BDE Support Battalion

4th BCT
4th BDE STB
2nd Squadron, 6th CAV (RSTA)
5-6 IN (CAB)
4-79 AR (CAB)
4-60 FA
4th BDE Support Battalion

66th CAB (Heavy)
266th Aviation Support BN
1-66 Aviation (ATK)
6-6 Cavalry (ATK)
2-66 Aviation (GSAB)
3-66 Aviation (ASLT)

66th Sustainment Brigade
Brigade STB
66th Personnel Services Battalion

66th Division Special Troops Battalion
HHC, STB
5th BN, 77th Cavalry Detachment
Company A, 66th Signal Battalion
66th HSC (Maintenance Support)
66th Division Band

Non-Divisional Units

46th SBCT (VAARNG)
533rd Service and Support Battalion
123rd Engineer Company (Bridge)
Headquarters, 44th Theater Sustainment Command (II Corps)
199th Maintenance Battalion (GS)
144th Transportation Movement Control Battalion
66th Air Support Operations Squadron (USAF)
Detachment 8, 3rd Weather Squadron, AMC (USAF)
A, B, C, and D Flights (Air Liaison)

Other Tenant Units / Activities

Coudray Army Hospital / Director of Health Services
66th Infantry Division Warrior Transition Unit (WTU)
Mary Beth Dental Clinic / Director of Dental Services
Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office
Defense Commissary Agency
Fort Von Steuben District, 2nd Region, USACIDC
Red Cross
Defense Investigative Service
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers District Area Office
Mobilization and Training Equipment Site

Installation Management Command (IMCOM) Activities

Director of Human Resource Development (DHR)—Army Community Services, Civilian Personnel Advisory Center (CPAC), Army Career and Alumni Program, Army Substance Abuse Program, Child and Youth Services, etc.
Director of Plans, Training, Mobilization, and Security (DPTMS)
Director of Information Management (DOIM)
Director of Logistics (DOL)
Director of Emergency Services (DES)
Director of Public Works (DPW)
Director of Family Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (DFMWR)
Director of Resource Management (DRM)
Equal Employment Opportunity Office (EEO)
Installation Chaplain
Staff Judge Advocate
Public Affairs Office
Military Historian
Internal Review and Audit Compliance (IRAC) Office
Conway Army Airfield
Garrison Headquarters, Camp William North

Legend and Unit Composition



BCT (Heavy) - Brigade Combat Team Composition

2 X Combined-Arms Battalions task organized with:
- 2 x Mechanized Infantry Companies (M2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle)
- 2 x Armor Companies (M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank)

1 X Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron (M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle)

1 X Fires Battalion
- 2 x Batteries (M109A6 Paladin Howitzer, Self-Propelled)

1 x Brigade Support Battalion

1 x Brigade Troops Battalion



SBCT- Stryker Brigade Combat Team

1 X Cavalry Troop (M1127 Stryker Reconnaissance Vehicle)
3 X Maneuver Battalions (M1126 Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle)
1 X Fires Battalion (M198 Howitzer, Towed)

Commander's Guidance

This tour at Fort Von Steuben is your first as an IG. The Commanding General has given the following guidance to his Inspector General:

1. General

a. You are part of my personal staff. You work directly for me.

b. I want to employ your talents to benefit this post, the people on it, and the Army -- and to keep me from doing anything dumb.

c. Initially, I want you to take some time to look, see, and hear what is going on in the division. I am eager to hear your assessment of installation and division operations and your recommendations on how we can best use the talents and resources of the IG office.

d. Conduct all of your business in a professional and objective manner. I may forget you during the decision-making process, but do not take that omission personally. Those things happen when you are not part of the coordinating or special staff. Your responsibility is to stay informed of what is happening in the command.

e. Philosophically speaking, I want you to solve problems at the lowest possible level and let the chain of command work. Be a friend to the battalion and brigade commanders and CSMs and help them to succeed.

2. Inspections

a. I want you to review immediately the division's Organizational Inspection Program (OIP) and Green Tab Memorandum #1 (enclosed). Become familiar with both items.

b. I don't want to influence your assessment of the OIP, but I am concerned about the effectiveness of the OIP and our Command Inspections. I want you to evaluate the OIP at all levels and assess the effectiveness of our total inspection effort. Things just don't seem to be going well. See what you can uncover.

c. Remember: You are assigned to a post with Maneuver, Fires, and Effects; Operational Support; and Force Sustainment units that have the primary mission of closing with and destroying the enemy. Our Soldiers, organizations, and equipment must remain ready to conduct that mission on short notice. We have also just transitioned into brigade combat teams and a newly organized division headquarters. A great deal of friction occurred as part of this transition, so keep an eye out for lingering problem areas. We must also ensure that our installation is properly administering installation activities. Keep these facts in mind in everything you do.

d. Likewise, make sure that your section is ready for war. Review your section's Mission Essential Task List (METL) and Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM). I want your thoughts on how best to use the IG when we have to deploy into combat.

3. Assistance

a. I want you to reinforce the fact that Soldiers should use the chain of command to solve problems. Encourage Soldiers to give the chain of command a chance to work the issue first and then return to the IG if the problem is not fixed. Help the chain of command to be heroes whenever possible.

b. Remain especially responsive to the Soldiers' needs. Treat every case with equal importance. The Soldier entering your office thinks that his or her problem is important or that Soldier would not be there to seek help. Do not forget the importance of the Family and civilian members of the command. Ensure that everyone receives fair and equal treatment.

c. I want you to work Equal Opportunity problems that involve field-grade officers or Command Sergeants Major. Keep the installation Equal Opportunity Office informed of the cases you are working.

d. Develop a method to identify possible systemic problems in the command. Work with the chain of command to correct such problems, but tell me when I need to get involved.

4. Investigations and Investigative Inquiries

a. I want to define your investigative inquiry and investigation efforts. With my approval, you will inquire into or investigate any serious allegations concerning senior leaders. Bring your recommendations to me before beginning an investigation. You may conduct a low-key preliminary analysis of prospective cases before seeing me with recommendations. If someone levels an allegation against me, I expect you to comply with AR 20-1's requirements concerning investigations of General Officers.

b. I am especially sensitive to issues that border on criminal behavior involving senior personnel. For example, in cases of alleged adultery (CSMs and Battalion Commanders and above), I will probably have you initiate an investigative inquiry. I expect you to keep your proceedings confidential and to conduct these cases expeditiously. If in doubt about the propriety of your inquiry, consult with the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) and then together see me. In my absence you will consult with the acting commander for guidance. I expect the results of your investigative inquiries to be detailed and stand-alone documents. Get to the point. A summary sheet will be best.

c. I will sign your investigation directives. On your action memorandum soliciting my signature for a directive, I want an estimate of the time required to complete the investigation. I expect you to be right and thorough, but you must make these cases a high priority.

5. Keeping Me Informed

a. I want you to keep me informed of what is happening in the command with respect to Soldier and civilian problems, investigations, assistance inquiries, and inspection results. Let’s plan to meet, at a minimum, on a weekly basis.

b. I do not expect you to brief me on every little problem. Keep me informed of those matters, actual or perceived, that affect -- or have the potential to affect -- the morale, training, discipline, and good order of the command. I especially want to know about issues involving drugs, racism, sexual discrimination, and the abuse of command authority.

c. Keep the Chief of Staff informed in as much as you are able, and coordinate closely with his staff. Finally, you must remember that you are a staff officer, but you report to me as one of my personal staff members.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 66TH INFANTRY DIVISION
FORT VON STEUBEN, VIRGINIA 12345

AFVS 1 January ____

SUBJECT: **Green Tab Memorandum #1:** 66th Infantry Division FY __ Objectives and Assessment Guidance

1. **Objective:** The objective of this memorandum is to provide a framework for improving operational readiness within the context of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) by monitoring performance within the division and Fort Von Steuben. We will improve our readiness by evaluating strengths and weaknesses and reshaping priorities, policies, and plans to overcome identified weaknesses and to sustain demonstrated strengths.

2. **Army Immediate Focus Areas:** We must be aware of -- and consider -- the direction of the Army Chief of Staff (CSA) in everything that we do. The CSA has focused the Army's readiness efforts and relevance to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) by establishing a series of immediate focus areas. The areas that demand our attention are as follows:

a. *The Soldier:* Develop flexible, adaptive, and competent Soldiers with a **Warrior Ethos**.

b. *Leader Development and Education:* Train and educate Army members of the Joint team.

c. *Current to Future Force:* Recognize that Army transformation is part of constant change. The Army's modernization objectives will focus our modernization efforts.

d. *Modularity:* Create, train, and employ modular, capabilities-based units with increased lethality and replace obsolete equipment with newer, more lethal and effective technology.

e. *Joint and Expeditionary Mindset:* Retain our campaign qualities while developing a mindset aimed at conducting Joint operations quickly and with little notice.

f. *Installations:* Enhance Fort Von Steuben's ability to project power rapidly and to support our families.

3. Discussion

a. I expect all commanders and staff members to gather and analyze evaluation data and begin working immediately to correct deficiencies within their authority to fix. I expect those individuals to prepare recommendations for improvement on those areas that fall outside their authority to resolve.

b. We have three elements within our control that will help to ensure mission accomplishment at every level within the division and installation. Those elements are:

1. Training

2. Providing Resources

3. Policy-making and administration

c. We can trace most deficiencies to one of these three elements. To some degree, we can compensate for weaknesses in one element by placing emphasis on the other two. Our goal is to maximize effectiveness in all three areas.

d. When making decisions, I expect leaders to rely on feedback from a number of sources -- from personal observations to reports of Field Training Exercises, Command Post Exercises, inspections, audits, and other activities. These sources can be internal or external to the division. Some of these sources are listed in FM 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations, and in AR 1-201, Army Inspection Policy.

e. Leaders must constantly evaluate and assess their units and Soldiers. For planning purposes, the formal methods for conducting organizational assessments will be Quarterly Training Briefings (QTB), annual updates to this policy letter, Command Training Guidance, and the Organizational Inspection Program (OIP).

4. Assessment Guidance for FY __

a. Vision: The 66th Infantry Division must be the Army's best division -- trained and ready for victory. The 66th Infantry Division is a total force of quality Soldiers and civilians. We must be a values-based organization and an integral part of the Army team that can respond to our Nation's needs during this challenging era of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). We must be able to change to meet the challenges of this war today, tomorrow, and well into the 21st Century.

b. Focus:

1. All activities in the division must contribute to the division's mission and the missions of its subordinate elements. The ability to fight and win on the modern battlefield is the prime focus. Preparing for that eventuality is our peacetime challenge.

2. Combat elements must make combat readiness and Mission-Essential Task List (METL) proficiency their first priority.

3. Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) organizations will focus on sustaining combat forces and preparing them to deploy, which includes performing mobilization functions related to the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard.

4. All organizations must carefully manage resources and respond proactively to the Army's reshaping efforts.

c. Methods: Inspectors and other evaluators will conduct performance-oriented evaluations instead of relying upon indirect indicators of performance such as record keeping. This requirement will demand some imaginative and innovative approaches to evaluations rather than simply 'doing it the way we have always done it.'

d. Topics of Interest**:** I expect commanders to focus on evaluating the readiness of their units in order to accomplish their operational tasks. The division headquarters will evaluate subordinate elements in the following areas:

1. Deployment planning and execution

2. Reshaping the Army initiatives

3. Resource Management

e. Implementation: The Quarterly Training Briefing (QTB) will be the primary forum for subordinate commanders to express their assessments of their command's strengths and weaknesses. These briefings -- combined with my personal observations and the results of inspections, audits, and other evaluations -- will shape my assessment of the division's status. I will readjust priorities, policies, and plans based upon the picture that these sources of information portray.

1. Specific guidance about training, inspections, audits, and external evaluations are in the enclosures (not provided).

2. General guidance on readiness exercises, inspections, and audits in the division is as follows:

(a) Readiness exercises will concentrate on combat readiness at the battalion and company levels. The headquarters two levels above the evaluated unit will conduct the exercises, which will take the form of Field Training Exercises (FTXs), Command Post Exercises (CPXs), and Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWTs). These exercises will normally last no more than 15 days and will culminate with an After-Action Review (AAR) attended by the commanders of the inspecting and inspected units. Rotations to the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, are

some of the best sources of input to commanders' assessments of their units' capabilities and standards.

(b) The division will plan and conduct Initial Command Inspections and Subsequent Command Inspections in accordance with AR 1-201. Staff Inspections and Staff Assistance Visits will concentrate on administrative efficiency and compliance with regulatory standards at the brigade level and below. IG Inspections will focus on widespread systemic issues that affect readiness in the division and on the installation.

(c) Division Internal Review and Audit Compliance (IRAC) auditors will concentrate on the efficiency of fiscal activities starting with the finance and accounting center, the club systems, and private organizations.

5. Integration and Coordination

a. The division G-3 is responsible for coordinating all inspections, audits, and evaluation activities, to include external evaluations by organizations above and outside the division.

b. All subordinate commanders and staff members will notify the G-3 immediately about any audit, inspection, or other evaluation that the G-3 has not coordinated.

c. The G-3 will resolve all scheduling and coordination conflicts.

d. The division Chief of Staff will be informed of any external evaluation team that visits any divisional units without prior coordination.

6. Use of the Inspector General

a. The division IG is available and qualified to train staff and unit inspectors in inspection techniques and inspection planning. For training all inspectors, the IG uses The Inspections Guide, a handbook published by the U.S. Army Inspector General School. This guide is available to all inspectors and not just IGs. Staff principals and unit commanders should arrange for inspections training directly with the division IG.

b. The IG system is designed to track problems down to their root causes and can identify issues that are beyond the division's ability to correct such as conflicting Army regulations. Commanders must inform the IG of issues they cannot resolve so that the IG can pursue these issues to their resolution.

7. Announced and Unannounced Evaluations

a. Advantages and disadvantages exist to announcing and not announcing evaluations. Weigh each approach on its own merits.

b. Unannounced evaluations are a valid way of determining the daily status of units. However, these inspections can disrupt training and other necessary activities, thus making implementation of the tenets of FM 7-0 extremely difficult to follow. Therefore, no unannounced internal or external evaluations will occur in the division without my approval.

c. The G-3 will coordinate announced and unscheduled evaluations by external agencies and capture those evaluations on the appropriate training calendars and schedules.

8. Updates: I will update this Green Tab Memorandum annually to reflect current changes. I will provide interim guidance as necessary. I will publish Green Tab Memorandums from time to time outlining goals and objectives and principles for the division and the post.

Enclosures
(not provided)

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All newly assigned personnel

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

NAME	BRANCH / MOS	POSITION	PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT
LTC Rightway	Aviation	MTOE	Battalion Commander
MAJ Britton	Artillery	TDA*	Battalion XO / S-3
MAJ List	Infantry	MTOE	Battalion XO
CPT Numero	Signal	TDA*	Company Commander
MSG Competent	AG (42H)	MTOE	Brigade PSNCO
MSG Shoulder	Infantry (11B)	MTOE	1SG
MSG Smith	QM (92Y)	MTOE	Battalion S-4 NCOIC
SFC Bergerac	Ordnance (63X)	MTOE	Battalion Motor NCOIC
SFC Davenport	Infantry (11B)	MTOE	Platoon Sergeant
Mr. Newton	Civilian (YA-02 / GS-12)	TDA*	Auditor
SPC Conway	Infantry (11B)	MTOE	Rifleman
Ms LaRue	Administrative	TDA*	Executive Secretary

*Note: All TDA IGs are part of Fort Von Steuben's Mission Support Element (MSE)

Deployment Scenario

In accordance with the rotational plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the 66th Infantry Division deployed to the theater of operations for a twelve-month rotation. FORSCOM identified the task organization for this deployment, which included the following units:

66th Infantry Division
1st BCT, Fort Von Steuben, VA
4th BCT, Fort Von Steuben, VA
46th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), (VAARNG) Camp William North, VA
3rd SBCT, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, WA
66th CAB (Heavy), Fort Von Steuben, VA
66th Sustainment BDE, Fort Von Steuben, VA
300th Maneuver Enhancement BDE, (USAR) Fort McCoy, WI

The Fort Von Steuben Inspector General staff section, which contained both the Division IG section and the Mission Support Element (MSE) IG section, separated for deployment based upon the MTOE and TDA. MAJ Britton became the MSE IG with the mission to support LTC Rightway's deployed IG section as a reach-back capability. In addition, the MSE IG section would support all units, agencies, and Family members remaining on Fort Von Steuben. The following task organizations of both the Division and MSE IG section are as follows:

Deployed	**Fort Von Steuben**
LTC Rightway	MAJ Britton - Mission Support Element IG
MAJ List	CPT Numero
MSG Competent	Mr. Newton
MSG Shoulder	Ms LaRue
MSG Smith	
SFC Bergerac	
SFC Davenport	
SPC Conway	

The Division deployed to the western region of Iraq within an area of operations that includes the provinces of Al Anbar, Karbala, and Babil. The mission of the 66th Infantry Division is to conduct full spectrum operations to isolate and neutralize extremists and foreign terrorists while transitioning the counter-insurgency fight to competent Iraqi Security Forces and ministries in order to establish a secure environment that permits Iraqi self-reliance.

LTC Rightway has split his deployed IG staff between the division's Main Command Post at Camp Panther and the Rear Command Post at Logistics Support Area (LSA) Black Cat. Additionally, because of the dispersion of the division's forces across a large sector of operations, Acting IGs -- appointed by the ACOM / ASCC commander and trained by the division IGs -- became necessary at three of the major base camps (Valley Forge, Leopoldville, and Patriot) to ensure all Soldiers have access to IG support during the deployment. The division has currently been in the theater of operations for two months.